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ABSTRACT
In light of recent changes which redefine the Government
of Egypt's role and that of the private sector, this study con-
centrates on the major issues facing the development of the
Egyptian construction industry in general and contractors in Egypt
in particular. It identifies both the internal and external issues
which arise from the interaction of three distinct levels in the
construction industry; namely, the economy-wide level, the con-
struction firm level and the project level. The interaction of
these levels has been identified from available published statistics
and reports and from the author's personal interviews with both private
and public sector contractors in Egypt. The study further traces
the Government of Egypt's action and Egyptian construction practices
during the past two decades and highlights their effects on
financing for contractors, the actual securing of the contract, as
well as the contractor's organization and project planning and control.
Throughout the study, the reactions of the private contractors are
stressed and compared with that of public contractors.
The analysis leads to the suggestion of some specific action
to be taken by the Government of Egypt, especially in the areas of
coordination of construction relations and de-regulation of private
sector activities. Further suggestions are given for contracting
firms relative to the improvement of their planning and control
activities on project work; and finally, the study suggests joint
efforts towards the recognition and reorganization of contracting
efforts in the Egyptian economy.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Egypt's economy is presently undergoing major changes redefining
the roles of government and the private sector, changes that started
as recently as 1976. The interlinkage that ties construction and hence
contractors with most other sectors of the economy has compounded the
effects, both direct and indirect, of these changes on the contractors
and construction.
In the light of such changes in the construction industry's
environment, the functioning of the firms and that of the industry
must keep pace by undergoing similar changes. However, in order to
identify the required actions to effect such change, the interactions
between the contractors and the government have to be investigated.
The issues facing the development of the firms have to be identified--
their causes traced and their effect understood--before specific
actions can be recommended, tested, and implemented.
1.1 Construction and Egyptian Development
Though the construction industry in Egypt, compared to other
sectors of the economy, makes a relatively small contribution to the
country's GNP and employment, its contribution to fixed capital invest-
ment (FCI) is significant. The value added by construction was only
between 3 and 4 percent of GNP over the last two decades as opposed
to about 40 and 25 percent for agriculture and manufacturing, respec-
tively (1). Employment in construction represented only between 3
and 5 percent of total employment, while agriculture employed 40 to 45
percent and manufacturing 20 to 25 percent (22). However, over the
past two decades construction represented between 40 and 55 percent
of the total FCI. As in any economy, an increase in fixed capital
investment, i.e., increased.capital formation, is a very necessary
condition for economic development. Hence, the role of the construc-
tion industry in Egyptian development cannot be over-emphasized.
Moreover, the imperative need for the reconstruction of more of the
country's housing and infrastructure facilities will make greater
demands on the construction industry in the future. A developing
nation cannot expect immediate return, in terms of increased GNP and
employment, on its construction investment; but in time, as the facili-
ties become operational and the labor force gains experience, this
investment will produce the desired revenues and employment opportuni-
ties for the native population.
Aside from its ties with Egypt's future economic growth, construc-
tion is connected with other important facets of the economy. Construc-
tion depends heavily on other segments of the economy for its required
production inputs. Over the past two decades inputs provided by other
sectors represented between 54 percent in 1954 and 61 percent in 1973
of the production of the industry (22). Although the inputs from the
various sectors did change somewhat over time, in general the require-
ments did not change dramatically. These requirements are usually
concentrated in certain segments of the economy, mostly industry and
manufacturing which represent over 50 percent of these inputs; while
inputs from the services and mining sectors represent some 10 percent
each, and transportation inputs only some 4 percent (22). The develop-
ment of the construction industry can serve to stimulate these
ancillary industries, thus influencing their output and creating
further economic growth.
The timely completion of construction projects also impacts
the investment process and hence development. Generally, the actual
construction of the facility has to be completed before the new
project can be used. This importance is magnified by the long periods
of time required to complete the construction component of investment,
often longer than the procurement and installatoion of equipment; thus
the growth of the economy in a particular year must be geared to the
capacity of the construction industry realized a year or more earlier.
This, in turn, emphasizes the roles the contractors have to play in
the development process.
Contractors are sensitive to changes in the environment since
they are responsible for assembling the various resources into the
different products required by the sectors of the economy. The
recent changes in Egypt have been partly reflected in the increase
in price for both input resources and construction products since
these changes affect the resource markets, the nature of the projects,
and the established technologies. Labor shortages, new towns and
prefabrication techniques are examples of these changes imposing
new challenges for the Egyptian contractors to meet the country's
expanding needs.
1.2 Purpose and Scope of the Research
This study attempts to identify some of the major constraints
facing the development of contracting firms in Egypt, both those caused
by the industry and government, as well as those imposed by the opera-
tions of the firms themselves. It will investigate the effects and
interactions of these constraints on the firms and recommend possible
measures to be adopted by government and contractors to alleviate them.
It is hoped that through this study a bette.r understanding of contrac-
tors and construction in Egypt will be attained, and that further
research can continue to develop a broad framework to tackle -these
constraints, and begin a more in-depth study and analysis of specific
topics.
The study will be restricted to the contract construction in the
formal part of the Egyptian economy,* and will investigate the opera-
tions of general and subcontractors. The study will not cover in
detail the activities of labor contractors, but will cover the opera-
tions of the other contractors in all types of projects, those in
building as well as those in other types of construction. The issues
*Formal contract construction is the construction carried out for
clients by contractors after securing the necessary building permits.
It does not include work carried out by the owners themselves, or
that work being carried out even by contractors without securing
permits.
of fluctuations of demand, and of planning for the construction industry
are included in this report; and their influence on the performance
of contractors is reviewed with respect to financing, contract letting,
and organization of both the private and public sector contractors.
The report also includes the issues relating to the interaction of
the contractors with other participants in the project development
process, as well as those relating to the planning and control of
those projects. In studying these issues the report continuously
emphasizes their effects on the private sector contractors contrasted
with the public sector ones. Only where restricted are inferences made
for both sectors from the performance of public contractors alone.
The study traces the issues to their cause whether internal or
external to the contracting firms. Finally, recommendations.are
forwarded for further study and adoption by the contractors and the
government to remedy these issues.
1.3 Methodology and Structure of the Study
To identify the constraints on firm development in the construc-
tion industry in Egypt, the study relies on published data on the
national economy, the industry, and the public and private sector
contractor. However, when studying the effects and interactions of
the issues on the firms, the study draws heavily on interviews with
public and private contractors from Cairo, as well as the financial
statements of some of the public sector firms affiliated with the
Ministries of Housing and of Development and New Communities. These
interviews cover a wide spectrum of contractors of varying size and
specialization in Egypt -three public building contractors, three
private sector specialty contractors, one private sector general
building contractor, and one general private heavy construction
contractor. The information from these interviews substantiates
statistics available on the firms from a few years ago.
The study analyzes the various issues facing contractors on the
industry, firm, and project levels; and determines their interactions
and their effects on the development of the firms. Chapter 2 reviews
the present and past.situation of the industry and addresses the issues
of demand fluctuations, labor and capital use, as well as price
increases in construction. An attempt is made to construct a realistic
price index for the construction products, which is used to consider
the industry's output in 1960 constant terms; and the trends of the
output are contrasted with the planned outputs from the present
Egyptian five-year plan to show the extent of the challenge facing
the industry in the near future. Chapter 3 covers the development
of contracting firms in Egypt and their characteristics; and analyzes
their performance, organizationally and managerially, by comparing
private and public firms. It also analyzes the financial position
of the public sector firm from a management standpoint, and then shows
the major constraints on the firm's development. Chapter 4 defines
the characteristics of the construction projects in Egypt; it deepens
and broadens the analysis by considering the project development
process. It establishes the relations of the contractors with the
other participants in the process, particularly clients and profession-
als. It analyzes contractors' present project planning and control
techniques, traces their effects on time and cost of the project
execution, and draws the constraints on project development in
Egyptian construction. Chapter 5 summarizes the issues facing the
industry and firms, and forwards conclusions with regard to the
operations of contractors in the construction industry. It briefly
considers the roles that both contractors and government in Egypt
can play in developing the contracting firms, and identifies areas for
further research on the topic.
CHAPTER 2. CONSTRUCTION AND THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY
To be able to understand the' functioning of the Egyptian con-
tractors and to capture the impact of the recent changes in their
environment, it is imperative to consider the construction sector in
general and to study its link to other sections of the Egyptian economy
and how it may be affected by Government action.
This chapter describes how the construction industry in Egypt
reacted in the past to changes and shows how these changes have affected
the construction sector. Chapter 3 will investigate these effects
further with regard to contracting firms; the discussion here is limited
to some of the major issues facing both construction in particular and
the economy in general. First, government policies, demand fluctuation,
and input constraints, among other issues, are discussed briefly in a
supply-demand context; then a preliminary attempt is made to trace the
effects of these factors on product prices. Finally, despite a shortage
of detailed data, some potential implications are drawn for the future
of the industry. Specifically, this chapter discusses: (1) demand
and investment; (2) outputs of the construction industry; (3) employ-
ment/capital variables; (4) product prices; and (5) the five-year
development plan.
2.1 Demand, Investment and Construction
The economy in Egypt is closely controlled by the government.
This control started in 1959 when formalized planning was first
introduced. The plans define economic priorities and set development
objectives for each economic sector, including the private sector. They
are administered through the yearly budget which makes available the
necessary outlays for various projects (14).
In its efforts to implement this policy, the government increased
its control over the economy in 1961 by nationalizing most of the means
of production. As a result, the role of the private sector in the
economy diminished. Its share of fixed capital investment dropped from
over 75 percent in 1951 to some 8 percent in 1971 (20). Even after
enactment of the Open-Door Policy and the government's efforts to re-
vitalize the private sector in 1974, the private sector's share of total
fixed capital investment was still only 8 percent in 1976 (13).
Government intervention had some negative effects on the economy
and the construction industry, as its actions through price fixing and
subsidies distorted the market mechanisms of supply and demand. Such
actions are exemplified in the housing situation in Egypt. Urban popu-
lation growth in Egypt increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent between
1959/1960 and 1976, while real housing output increased by only 2.7 percent
annually between 1975 and 1975. This shows the widening gap between
needs and supply. Looking at the effective demand for housing re-
presented by the ratio of rent to disposable income and comparing it
with the elasticity of demand for housing in urban areas gives an indi-
cation of the market. The ratio of rent to disposable income in real
terms declined from 7.6 percent to 6.1 percent between 1959/1960 and
1975 due to rent controls which kept housing prices down when all other
services were increasing. Such a decrease when compared with the demand
elasticity of 0.66 is considered much more than warranted and is taken
as an indication of suppressed effective demand for housing (10). The
suspected existence of suppressed demand is further suggested by the
increased number of "informal housing" in most urban areas of Egypt.
Some sources claim informal housing in Egypt now comprises as much as
50 percent of total housing production (12).
Furthermore, the government was unable to effect a smooth rate of
growth in the economy because of the instability of its actions and the
inadequacies in the planning process itself. The priorities and strate-
gies kept changing due partly to external circumstances, such as wars,
but also due in part to ambitious goals which even official sources
frequently considered unrealistic (7). Also, most of these plans failed
to take into consideration such important features of the economy as
population characteristics or demand for various consumer or durable
goods. Since implementation of the first five-year plan (1960/61),
at least four others were drawn up. The second five-year plan (1965/66 -
1969/70), which was to complement the first, was never implemented. It
was decided instead to replace it with a more ambitious seven-year plan
which was never even formulated. By 1967, a three-year emergency plan
was instituted; however, the 1967 War intervened; military spending
was increased and the plan was put aside. In 1972, it was announced
by President Sadat that the National Action Program, combining two
five-year plans, would cover the period 1973 through 1982. In 1974, the
first plan was cut short and a new plan for 1976-1980 was announced but
never implemented (23). Finally in 1977, the current five-year plan,
intended to cover the period 1978-1982, was published; but it was not
fully implemented until the end of 1978.
These constant fluctuations have negatively affected the performance
Housing built by individuals without securing necessary building permits.
of many sectors of the economy, including the construction sector.
Demand varied as goals were confronted with conflicting realities of
scarce resource allocation and changes in priority. Planning for the
sector centered around defining building material needs and sporadic
allocations of scarce capital. It is not unusual to consider con-
struction as a sector primarily devoted to serving other-sectors; however,
by not directly addressing the problems of its capacity and efficiency,
it finds it hard to provide such services.
Despite the lack of information on construction demand in the
economy, an idea can be gained of the environment in which that sector
has been operating by studying the development of fixed capital invest-
ment in Egypt. Because construction's contribution to the economy is
to fixed capital formation, studying the construction component in fixed
capital investment (FCI) will reveal the demand fulfilled by the sector,
especially since over the past two decades this component averaged
sore 47 percent of the total while machinery and general equipment
averaged some 35 percent and transport equipment averaged about 10 per-
cent, as shown in Table 2-1. Table 2-1 also shows the development
pattern of FCI in the economy. Between 1959/60 and 1976 FCI grew
considerably in current terms, from some L.E. 1,400 million. Using
the official wholesale price index to deflate these values, we can still
follow that growth and its fluctuations.
In 1960/61, as the first five-year plan was being launched, invest-
ment started to grow at a fast rate of about 20 percent annually until
1963/64 when it reached a peak almost double its 1959/60 level. The
following few years witnessed a decline that reached its lowest level
Table 2-1
Development of Fixed Capital Investment and its Distribution
(Source: Ref. 6)
Total Fixed Capital Distribution
Investment in Egypt (%)
in Current in Constant Building 'Machinery Transport Other
L.E. 59/60 L.E. and Con- and Equip- Equipment Components































































































































in 1967/68. This decline can be attributed to an increase in military
spending due to first the involvement in the "Yemen" War in 1964
when Egyptian military forces backed the Yemenese government against
rebel tribes and then in June of 1967 due to the third war with Israel.
Defense expenditures continued to increase, and FCI reached a low level
of L.E. 230 million in 1967/69. For the remainder of the 1960's and
through the early 1970's, fixed investment almost stagnated, probably
constrained by the continuation of that military spending. In 1974
however, the growth rate picked up again at a very high rate of almost
60 percent with efforts at reconstruction of the war-damaged Suez Canal
area, and FCI realized a jump of over L.E. 600 million in 1975.
It can also be seen how the ovarall effective demand for construction
has been influenced by these changes in FCI. In the early and mid-1960's
with the industrialization plan, land reclamation projects, the Aswan high
dam, etc., demand on the construction sector boomed and the construction
component absorbed about 50 percent of FCI. The decline in FCI that started
in the mid-1960's affected the demand for construction somewhat differently
in the early 1960's than in the late 1960's. The Yemen War, which was
carried on in foreign territory, constrained the economy, including con-
struction, as a whole, and the construction component of the FCI did decline
slightly, to about 47 percent again. The continued decline, due to the
1967 war, on the other hand, did not decrease the effective demand for
construction in the economy because construction activities were initiated
for defense purposes and the construction component of FCI rose once more
to about 50 percent.
The continuation, however, of the decline in FCI in the early
part of the seventies did constrain effective demand for construction;
and in 1974, the construction component's share dropped to only 30
percent. In 1975 and 1976, as the efforts at reconstruction picked up
momentum and previously reclaimed lands were brought into cultivation,
construction's share increased again to about 45 percent of FCI.
TheSe fluctuations were caused by government actions in directing
FCI between the various sectors of the economy. Because the construction
component of sectoral FCI differs greatly among the various sectors, the
change-in channeling of investments from one sector to another changes
the overall construction component in the overall investment. Table 2-2
shows that in the housing sector, for example, construction accounts
for some 90 percent of FCI (ranging from a low of 83 percent to a high
of 97 percent),.while in the industry and electricity sectors it averaged
around 35 percent. In agriculture and irrigation, it ranged from 42
percent to 68 percent (averaging 50 percent), while in the construction
sector itself the construction component averaged only 6 percent with
a low of 1 percent and a high of 12 percent. This difference among
sectors of the economy stems from the different use of FCI in each sector.
While in construction fixed capital is directed primarily towards the
purchase of equipment, in housing it is directed for the most part
towards the building of houses and uti'lities. In agriculture, irrigation
and industry, the use of fixed capital is more evenly distributed be-
tween construction and machinery. Because industry is more mechanized,
machinery claims a larger portion than in the former two.
The difference between the sectors can show the effect of the
government strategy of the past two decades which emphasized the
TABLE 2- 2
Construction Component in Fixed Capital Investment
of Some Economic Sectors (Percent of Total)
(Source: Ref 6)
Sector Agriculture Industry
and and Housing Construction
Year Irrigation Mining
60/61 0.618 0.230 0.880 0.0
61/62 0.683 0.306 0.833 0.0
62/63 0.627 0.317 0.896 0.0
63/64 0.612 0.222 0.949 0.0
64/65 0.536 0.304 0.940 0.0
65/66 0.553 0.257 0.968 0.103
66/67 0.490 0.305 0.936 0.026
67/68 0.510 0.304 0.907 0.0
68/69 0.542 0.250 0.906 0.095
69/70 0.576 0.382 0.978 0.0
70/71 0.456 0.401 0.906 0.011
71/72 0.466 0.305 0.937 0.018
72 0.530 0.464 0.988 0.0'
73 0.419 0.501 0.927 0.040
74 0.618 0.323 0.970 0.066
75 0.578 0.323 0.982 0.080
76 0.632 0.450 0.925 0.123
commodity sectors of the economy as opposed to the services sectors.
Such action contributes to these demand fluctuations. This emphasis,
aside from affecting the development of the service sectors, made
sudden changes in the priorities more proable in order to meet sudden
requirements from the neglected sectors; and because the construction
component in those two groups of sectors is different, such actions
would change the effective demand for construction in the. economy.
The changes in allocation of FCI in individual sectors also affects
construction effective demand because each economic sector requires a
different set of facility types than the other and the changes in
allocation of FCI in each sector increases and decreases the demand
for such facility types. For example, Table 2-2 shows that the
construction sector's share in FCI to the sector increased to 10 and 12
percent on two occasions - in 1965/66 at the end of the first five-year
plan and at the beginning of the High Dam project when most of the
contractors were building facilities for their own use and in 1976 when
eleven prefabricated housing factories were being constructed. In the
agricultural sector, construction's share in 1964/65 with the completion
of the projects ordained by the first five-year plan dropped. It
dropped again in 1970/71 with the completion of the High Dam. It was
on the increase in the mid-1970's when the lands previously reclaimed
during the early 1960's were being brought into cultivation. This
fluctuation requires that the construction industry continues to adapt
itself to such continual changes. This continual adaptation is important
The commodity sectors include: industry and mining; agriculture and
irrigation; transport and communication; and electricity. The service
sectors include: public utilities; housing; construction; finance
and trade and social services (6).
because construction takes somewhat longer to adjust dpe to the
length of the projects it undertakes. For example, in the case
of housing, as will be investigated in Section 2.2 where the production
dropped due to the decrease in FCI allocated to the sector, it did
not increase at the same rate as soon as the FCI increased again, but
took a couple of years to adjust.
Fluctuations not withstanding, it remains to investigate whether
the increase in FCI represents a real increase in the demand for con-
struction in the economy over the past two decades. As shown, the
figures of FCI did increase in 1976 over their 1959/60 level. Government
control however has created some distortions in the price.system in the
economy; and because the wholesale price index used to deflate FCI
figures is based on official prices, it may very well understate the
actual price increases and inflation in the economy. This is particularly
the case in the mid-1970's when the gap between these official and
"black market" prices increased significantly. This might reduce the
credibility of the official figures. On the other hand, some evidence
exists in the economy that tends to substantiate this growth of FCI
during that period. The import figures, especially for investment and
intermediate goods, show that in 1975, they reached a leve.1l double
that of 1970 (30). The consumption of building materials, namely cement,
also continued to increase and reached a level of 4.5 million tons in
1977 as opposed to the 3.0 million tons consumed in 1970 (17). This
evidence is further reinforced by the increase in the employment sector
as well as by the increase in the prices of the products (issues dis-
cussed in later sections), allowing us to conclude that despite the
Black market is the unofficial market where many government controlled
goods are traded at prices beyond the official set prices for these goods.
26
fluctuations in FCI and the distortions caused by government actions,
demand for construction has increased considerably over its 1959/60 level.
It is expected that this growth has imposed some constraints on the
industry, and it is to these constraints that we now turn by investi-
gating the output of the construction sector.
2.2 Construction Outputs
Existing figures on construction output in Egypt show it to be largely
composed of new facilities (Table 2-3); repair and maintenance activities
have not exceeded 10 percent of the total output over the last two decades,
averaging only about 8 percent. This is be expected in developing countries
which, in their efforts toward development, are faced with the necessity of
providing non-existent facilities (27) The Egyptian figures suggest the
low priority attributed to maintenance; repair and maintenance in most
developing countries averaged in the vicinity of 14 percent of total con-
struction output in the 1960's (24). The figures show that the importance
of maintenance declined steadily, falling from 14 percent in 1960/61 to
only 6.5 percent in 1976. Even if one assumes that the price of mainten-
ance works has increased at a lower rate than the price of new construction,
it can still be seen that in Egypt the government has preferred to direct
resources to horizontal expansion rather than to the upkeep of previous
investments.
This policy, in addition to causing depletion in the production and
service sectors, as seen in the case of utilities, causes interruption
in government expansion plans. New government projects are interrupted and
Table 2-3
Output of Construction in Egypt
(Values in L.E. Million)
(Source: Ref. 6)
Total* Output Total* Output Output of - Maintenance and
in current in 1960/61 new construc- repair in 1960/61
L.E. L.E. tion in L.E.
Year 1960/61 L.E.
1960/61 111.5 111.0 94.8 16.1
1961/62 143.5 141.1 124.3 16.8
1962/63 170.8 170.0 154.0 15.9
1963/64 206.1 202.7 187.9 14.7
1964/65 181.2 167.5 152.4 15.1
1965/66 197.9 168.7 154.4 14.3
1966/67 188.1 148.6 134.9 13.8
1967/68 186.3 144.1 107.7 13.2
1968/69 227.7 173.3 121.3 13.6
1969/70 246.5 182.3 130.8 14.5
1970/71 245.5 175.6 116.3 17.9
1971/72 259.8 185.2 114.3 17.5
1972 316.0 223.6 152.5 18.1
1973 277.3 183.4 133.5 16.8
1974 340.0 169.9 180.9 16.0
1975 542.1 291.0 271.8 19.2
1976 716.0 357.3 315.8 24.2
distributed between* Includes output of the armed forces which is not
new construction and maintenance and repair.
emergency projects must be launched, as in 1966 when the Cairo sewage system
had to be revamped, most of the streets being flooded with sewage water.
Such actions pose problems with regard to meeting the demand for construc-
tion in the economy, as they add an unexpected burden to the contractors. who
have to stop work on ongoing projects to meet such emergencies. Furthermore,
defaulting on maintenance inevitabley results in later interruptions in the
production of major building materials., contributing to price increases of
inputs and increasing delivery delays to contractors. For example, cement
production in the mid-1970's, a time when cement consumption was growing
steadily, dropped some 500,000 tons because of lack of maintenance at
production plants.
The output of new construction also suffered from the overall changes
in the economy described in Section 2.1. On the aggregate in current terms
the output grew substantially in the first half of the 1960's almost
doubling. In 1966/67 output started to decline as did fixed capital
investment due to involvement in the Yemen War.. This decline continued until
1968/69 due to the 1967 War. After the War,output did recover somewhat due
mainly to the defense spending started in 1968/69. Between 1969 and 1973
the level of output picked up somewhat, although the figures for new con-
struction in the table do not include military construction. In 1974, output
shot up again, surpassing any previous peak, due to the reconstruction
efforts and the growth in fixed capital investment that followed the 1973
war. This suggests that the construction industry in Egypt entertained a
certain excess capacity in the mid-1960's and the utilization of that
capacity made it possible to meet the rise in demand in the mid-1970's.
Even when taking into consideration the effect of price changes on
the economy, this growth in the mid-1970's can be considered real
growth. The number of urban housing units produced increased
significantly in 1975 over any previous peak as shown in Table 2-4.
Aside from indicating the development of the housing output,
Table 2-4 also gives an indication of the development of output in the
construction industry in Egypt in general. It shows the increased
role of .the public sector in production of housing, which also
occurred in other types of construction. It also evidences the fluctu-
ations that accompanied the growth of construction output, paralelling
the changes in the level of FCI in the economic sectors. Furthermore,
the table shows that production of housing units jumped in one year
from 14,000 to 42,000 (1960/61 - 1962/62), and from 23,000 to 62,000
in 1975. Such jumps constitute compelling evidence for the existence
of excess capacity in the construction industry, unless, of course,
they represent diversion of capacity from production of other facilities.
Examination of the construction output of all the economic sectors
in real terms in Table 2-3 reveals that in the years 1961/62, 1967/68,
and in 1975 when the number of housing units rose dramatically, the
total output of construction also increased or at least remained at the
same level. This fact shows that these increases in residential con-
struction could not have been due to diversion of resources from one
type of.construction to the other but were rather due to increases
in the output of the sector itself. Since these increases happened in
a relatively short period of time, the facts lend strong support to
the theorization that extra capacity existed in the industry.
TABLE 2 - 4
Development of Number of Housing Units




Sector and Public Sector
Year Units Units Units TOTAL
1960/61 1,634 2,296. 11,564 13,860
1961/62 14,678 16,768 25,675 42,443
1962/63 19,628 21,288 22,590 43,878
1963/64 9,263 11,880 10,864 22,744
1964/65 7,890 9,020 8,893 17,913
1965/66 19,267 20,509 13,000 33,509
1966/67 8,493 9,844 15,738 25,582
1967/68 9,832 10,967 29,505 40,472
1968/69 2,878 5,299 22,710 28,009
1969/70 8,222 9,491 28,717 38,208
1970/71 4,038 5,250 22,520 27,770
1971/72 (a )  4,903 5,788 21,540 27,329
1973 7,586 9,691 15,032 24,723
1974 8,088 14,488 8,646 23,134
1975 11,800 37,700 24,000 61,700
(a) 18-month year.
The output in Table 2-3 however is in monetary rather than
physical terms, and the deflator used was the official wholesale price
index. Because it has been observed that prices of the construction
facilities have been increasing rapidly in the last few years and
official deflators tend to understate the extent of price increases in
Egypt, we cannot confidently assure that the growth of the output was not
totally absorbed in these price increases.
In order to investigate such a possibility more closely,.con-
struction price indices have been developed (Section 2.4) based on the
development of prices of inputs to the industry. These indices are used
to deflate the production of the industry so as to evolve a more real-
istic output growth. Since each type of constructed facility consumes
different quantities of the various inputs, it is expected that each
type would have a somewhat different price index. Thus it is important
to consider the output of the industry by type of facility rather than
by economic sector.
The available information on the production of each economic sector in
Egypt in the early seventies is shown in Table 2-5, where the facilities
produced are grouped into 4 main categories -- residential buildings, indus-
trial buildings, other buildings, and non-building construction. Aside
from the industry and public utilities sectors, which had their outputs
concentrated almost entirely in one type (industrial building represented
between 70 and 90 percent of the output of the former, and non-building
between 90 and 93 percent of the latter), all other economic sectors had
their output distributed among these 4 types. For example, in the housing
sector only between 5 and 15 percent of the output was in residential
TABLE 2-5
Construction Output of the Economic Sectors
(Fiscal 1970 and 1971)
Distributed by Type-of Facility
(Source: Ref. 4)
Economic Year Residential Industrial Other Non-
Sector Building Building
% % % %
Agriculture 70/71 8 0 
50 42
71/72 5 40 15 40
Industry 70/71 3 70 4 
23
71/72 3 90 3 4
Housing & (1) 70/71 15 2.5 15 67.5
Building 71/72 5 1.5 5 88.5
Services 70/71 6 10 20 
64
71/72 20 1 35 44
Finance & 70/71 20 6 15 59
Trade 71/72 50 5 30 15
Transportation 70/71 4 20 
25 51
71/72 0 5 50 45
Electricity & 70/71 2 5 3 90
Public Utilities 71/72 4 2 1 93
(1) Because investment in the housing sector was dominated by the
investments of low cost housing in new areas where infrastructure
had to be provided, the distribution of this investment now
between the types of faciliti'es may have differed-
buildings, and between 67 and 88 percent was in the non-building; in the
agriculture and irrigation sector, only between 40 and 42 percent of the
output was in the non-building category, and some 15 to 50 percent was in
other buildings.
The information in Table 2-5 is only available for two years: 1970/71
and 1971/72. Moreover, no statistics exist concerning the type of facilities
produced by the construction industry or by the client organizations for
any other period. But reference 5 based bn the experience of the author and
on his interviews with construction officials in Egypt in the.late 1960's,
assumes a mix of the facilities produced in Egypt within the ranges shown
in Table 2-5. Based on this probability, and for lack of a better approxi-
mation, the average mix of facilities in each economic sector was calculated
and used, without change, to compute the value of the 4 types of facilities
in Egypt. This analysis ignores possible changes that may occur in the
mix of facilities due to changes in the type of projects undertaken by
each sector. For example, new industrial projects in the 1970's may re-
quire less infrastructure construction than in the early or mid-1960's
when such services were less available, which would lead to a mix relatively
concentrated in one type of facility. Nevertheless, use of the more realis-
tic deflation, which represent real price changes in the construction output,
enable us, in any case, to judge the development of that output more
closely.
The calculation of the values of these facilities, deflated by the
appropriate price indices, are shown in Figure 2-1. Figures for each
type were calculated by adding up the share of that type in each economic
sector. By adding the values of the 4 types the development of the total
output of new construction in Egypt can be traced. It grew remarkably over
±A Total output of new construction
-- & Residential buildings
S *-- Industrial buildings
-0 Other buildings
a a Non-building construction
Note: Figures do not include out-
put of the Armed forces. Index
calculated in Table 2-16.
0
0
1960 '62 '64 '66 '68 '70 '72 '74
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FIGURE (2-1) New construction output by type
of facility in 1960/61 fixed LE
(Source: Reference 6)















the first half of the 1960's then declined in 1967/68 to its 1960
level and continued its decline until 1973. Finally in 1975 and 1976 it
shot up beyond its previous peak. This, too, helps to support the
theorization that the industry entertained some excess capacity that
enabled it to meet those sudden increases.
The drop in 1977 however needs to be investigated somewhat more
closely. The nominal output figures of 1977 used for the analysis are
preliminary figures; furthermore, the consumption of the various inputs
by the sector in that year did not decline relative to 1976. Cement
consumption increased as did employment of labor by the sector (17).
Although the demand figures for 1977 are not available, these facts
seem to indicate that the output figure understates the actual output of
the sector. Whether this understatement is due to the nominal output
figure or due to changes in the construction price index, remains to
be investigated; nevertheless, the output of the sector did not decline.
The important issue here is whether the industry has reached its
full capacity or not. -Despite the fact that no detailed data is
available which will enable us to definitely settle this issue, we
can still be relatively sure that in the late 1960's and 1970's the
industry was not working at its mid-1970's level. Regardless of
whether that level is the full capacity of the industry or not, we can
still see that the overall capacity of the sector was not the main
constraint on its development in the past.
The increases in construction prices in the early 1970's is not
only a reflection of increase in demand over supply but, as will be
shown later, bottlenecks in the availability of inputs also contributed
to these increases. Another factor that also confirms these impressions
on capacity is the low utilization of many of the inputs as will be
shown further. Low utilization of the inputs indicates inefficiencies
in the construction industry and further demonstrates the existence
of capacity in the industry.
Inefficiency in the sector can be traced to external as well as
internal causes. Relative changes in demand, demonstrated by the
fluctuation in the output of the construction types, coupled with
changes in the supply factors, represent the former; while the
participants in the industry and their respective use of these resources
represent the latter. While the internal inefficiencies will be
discussed later, the effect of the external causes can be better under-
stood by considering the value added by the construction industry to the
inputs it draws from other sectors of the economy.
Traditionally, construction's contribution to the Gross National
Product is small - some 3 or 4 percent compared with agriculture's
or industry's contribution which ranges between 25 and 30 percent and
18 and 20 percent respectively (5). Construction production, however,
second only to industry, relies heavily on inputs from other sectors.
Value added in construction averaged some 46 percent of the value of
production, compared to industry, which averaged some 25 percent; while
in agriculture it represents some 67 percent (16). Also, the value added
is composed of wages, depreciation and rents (16) which can help in
studying the effect of changes in inputs to the sector.
The construction industry is relatively more labor intensive than is
industrial production in Egypt. This can be seen from comparison of the
value added figure in the construction industry to those in other
sectors of the economy. In 1969 and 1970 the wages component of the
value added in the total economy was about 46 percent; in the con-
struction sector, wages represent some 58 percent of the value added;
while in the agriculture and industry sectors, wages' share was 29
and 33 percent respectively (16). The reason that the share of wages
in agricutlure is so low is because the average wage per worker ih
that sector was nearly one-fourth that in the industry and construction
sectors. The high share of wages in construction relative to industry
when considering that the average wage differential between them is
very small, proves the labor intensity of the construction sector.
The effect of tne changes in the relative input prices and their pro-
portions in the mix can be seen from the development of the value added
relative to the total output of the sector. Figure 2-2 shows that in
general, as expectnd, the value added changed in a pattern similar to that
of the production of the industry previously described. The decreases of
the value added in real terms over time however do not demonstrate the
same increases in the late seventies like those displayed by the figures of
the constuction production. Up to the mid-1960's the value added share was
between 46 and 47 percent of the total output. In the late 1960's, however,
this ratio increased somewhat to more than 65 percent, while in the mid 1970's
that share dropped to some 35 percent of toal output.
The change in the late 1960's may not reflect a major change in the
pattern of the output of the industry; these production figures under-
state actual production as they do not include the production of the sector
for the armed forces. The figure of the value added in the early and
0 O Total new construction production
deflated by construction cost index.
- Value added by construction
by labor cost index.
(Values in 1960 constant LE million.) P
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FIGURE (2-2) Development of Value Added
(Source: Reference 6)












mid-1970's, on the other hand, may overstate the effect of wage increases
because the price index used is not based on the actual year-by-year mix
of the 4 types of construction previously referred to, but rather on an
approximation of that mix. Despite such misrepresentation of the value of
value added, however, the share of the value added in the output of the
sector in the 1970's did decline relative to the 1960's.
Changes in the value-added share can be partially explained by change
in the mix of the industry products since the input mix between the types
of products is different. Considering the relative shares of labor, material,
and capital in the cost of production of the 4 types of construction, it is
evident that in building construction in the early 1970's the material costs
were larger than the labor costs, compared'to. non-building construction.
Tabel 2-6 shows that in residential buildings material costs are about
70 percent of the value of the building, while in non-building construction
they are only about 55 percent. This coupled with the fact that non-building
construction's share of total output declined slightly in the 1970's (see
Figure 2-1), can account for part of the decline in the share of value added.
The decline of the share of non-building construction in total output
was however, relatively small, dropping from an average of some 50 percent
during the 1960's to some 46 percent in the mid 1970's. Such a drop cannot
thus fully explain the 50 percent drop in the share of value added to the
total output in that decade. This shows the effects of the declining pro-
ductivity of construction labor, and maybe even changes in the technology,
i.e., the mix of the inputs of the industry.
The table shows a certain mix that prevailed in the early 1970's;
however, that mix is basically dependant on the relative prices of these
two inputs. This issue will be investigated more closely in the following
TABLE 2-6
Distribution of Costs by Public
versus Private Contractors for Various Facilities
(Sources: 3,4)
Residential Industrial Other Non-
Building Building
Percent Public 72 65 -68 57
Material
Costs Private 68 63 65 53
Percent Public 23 27 24 24
Labor
Costs Private 23 27 25 35
Percent Public 5 8 9 13
Depreciation
and rents Private 9 10 10 12
Public 100 100 100 100
TOTAL
Private 100 100 100 100
sections. However, the existing data point out that the industry has not
undergone any major change in the technology of production even after the
recent changes in the relative prices and.quantities of the inputs. This
finding supports the theorization that the drop in the value added share
would thus represent mainly declines in the productivity of the inputs to
the sector. This decline indicates the efficiency problem of the sector
and warrants a closer look at the situation of the various inputs of the
sector.
2.3 Employment, Capital, and Construction
Construction at present provides employment to about 3 percent of the
labor force in Egypt. While the total number involved in the construction
industry may be low compared to other sectors, the absolute level in the
sector employment has shown an increase, Between 1960 and 1966 it increased
by about 30 percent. Between 1966 and 1976 that increase was in the range
of 14 percent, although it represented only 3 percent of the increase in
the total labor force.
There are diffculties associated with data on construction employment
in Egypt, partly because of the nature of the industry, where employment is
temporary and geographically diversely distributed. Tabel 2-7 from a recent
study on employment in construction in Egypt (22) details development of
employment in the sector. The pattern of employment closely follows devel-
opment of fixed capital investments in the economy. Between 1960 and 1965
employment in the sector grew considerably with the increases in production.
Between 1966 and 1972 employment experienced almost no increase. In 1968
* The labor force includes all those between the ages of 12 and 65 employed
or unemployed; they represent about 25 percent of the population (22).
TABLE 2-7
Development of Construction Employment
(Source: Ref.22)
Total Construction














employment actually dropped slightly as a result of the 1967 War. After
the 1973 increase in investment however, employment increased once again.
Since construction in Egypt is relatively labor intensive,
labor migration to other Arab countries has put'the sector under
considerable pressure which is reflected in the wages of various con-
struction workers. In the 10 years between 1960 and 1970, wages in all
categories increased 15 to 50 percent for all occupations, even for the
assistant categories. Since 1970 this increase has augmented even more;
and wages have risen between 200 and 500 percent for all occupations
as shown in Table 2-8. The increase in demand for construction during
the 1960's can account for such wage increases up to 1970; however,
large increases since then cannot be explained only by the increase of
employment in the sector. According to the most recent population census,
the number of Egyptians living abroad increased from an estimated 100,000
in 1965 to almost 1.4 million in 1976; and this scarcity of laborers
might have affected wages.
Traditionally, Egyptians migrating to other Arab countries consisted
chiefly of clerks and teachers, with painters, masons and carpenters following
a close second. Since 1971 this pattern has somewhat altered. In a
recent study on the migration of construction workers it was found that in
the mid 1970's more that 65 percent of the Egyptian migrants to Libya were
construction workers. It was also found that the Egyptian construction
labor migration tripled in size between 1973 and 1976 (22). Using a
variety of estimates for the number of construction workers emigrating
and thier skills, from Egyptian as well as recipient country figures, the
TABLE 2-8
































1960 (a) 1962 (a) 1965 (a) 1 9 7 0 (b) 1973 (b)
0.80 0.80 0.90 1.50 2.50
% Change %Change
1975(b) 1977 60 - 70 70 - 77
3.50 5.70 87.5 280
0.60 0.60 0.70 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.70 67.0 470
0.40 0.40 0.50 0.60 1.50 2.00 3.00 50.0 400
0.20 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.60 1.00 1.50 50.0 480
0.70 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.25 2.00 3.25 29.0. 260
0.40 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.80 1.50 2.25 50.0 275
0.50 0.50 0.55 0.70 1.00 2.00 3.00 40.0 329
0.50 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.90 1.50 2.50 20.0 317
0.40 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.90 2.00 3.00 50.0 400






























































































10 to account for social security
study concluded that possibly between 200,000 and 250,000 construction
workers emigrated in 1976 alone. A possible breakdown of those into
three categories of workers, namely, mason and carpenters, painters
and electricians, was 50 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent respectively.
This represents some 46 to 58 percent of the total construction work
force in Egypt in 1976.
This migration of construction workers has affected wages and hence
labor costs of production in the construction sector. While this resulted
uniformly in a big increase in labor wages in construction, the increase
in labor costs was somewhat different because of the difference in the
numbers and skills required by each type of construction.
Table 2-9 shows the numbers and skills necessary for the construction
of L.E. 1,000,000 worth of facilities in the categories of residential,
industrial, other buildings, and non-building construction. These
figures exclude excavation work which in non-building construction is
assumed to be performed partially by equipment such as bulldozers and
shovel loaders. Such an assumption has validity based on the experience
of public sector contractors on large projects. Using these numbers
as weights for the labor cost changes derived from Table 2-10 on wages,
we arrive at possible labor cost indices for the four categories of
construction.
Labor costs have increased substantially over their 1960 level.
By 1970 they had increased by some 55 percent; but between 1972 and 1977
they more than tripled for all types of construction. In building
construction the labor cost increases affected residential more than
industrial or other building construction since this type is slightly
TABLE 2-.9
Type-. of Workers Fequired
to Build 1,000,000 L.E. of Differing Facility Types
(Source: Ref.11)
Type of worker Residential
and level of skill Weight Numbe:
Industrial Other Building Non-building



















































































































TOTAL 1.000 680 






















1.000 680 1.000 485 1.000 652
TABLE 2-10
Labor Cost Indices for Major Types of Construction
(Calculated from Tables 2-8 and 2-9)
Residential Industrial Other Building. Non-Building
Year !abor CQst. Index Labor Cost Index Labor Cost Index Labor Cost Index A* Index B*in .E. in L.E. In L.E. in L.E.
1960 30.57 1.000 18.05 1.000 26.75 1.000 667.45 1.000 1.000
1961 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1962 30.57 1.000 18.05 1.000 26.75 1.000 668.45 1.000 1.000
1963 1.071 1.073 1.075 1.083 1.081
1964 1.142 1.145 1.149 1.167 1.162
1965 37.08 1.213 21.99 1.218 32.73 1.224 834.30 1.250 1.242
1966 1.275 1.270 1.277 1.300 1.307
1967 1.338 1.323 1.330 1.350 1.372
19.8 1.400 1.375 1.384 1.400 1.437
15 9 1.463 1.428 1.437 1.450 1.502
1970 46.61 1.525 26.71 1.480 39.86 1.490 1001.25 1.500 1.567
1t71 1.830 1.707 1.792 1.999 1.914
172 2.136 1.935 2.093 2.499 2.261
1 73 74.62 2.441 39.02 2.162 64.06 2.395 2001.96 2.999 2.607
;974 3.455 3.120 3.379 3.999 3.087
1975 136.58 4.468 73.59 4.077 116.72 4.363 3335.75 4.998 3.567
1976 5.697 5.197 5.585 6.245 5.612
1977 211.69 6.925 113.38 6.281 182.11 6.807 5006.05 7.500 7.667
* Index A based on a construction technology thatuses labor for earthwork; Index B
based on a construction technology that uses earthmoving equipment instead of
labor or earthwork.
Note: Figures for the years 1960, 1962, 1965,1970, 1973, 1975 and 1977 are from
Table 2-8. For the other ,ears the increase in the index was assumed to be
linear.
more labor-intensive than the other two. The labor cost increases
have affected non-building construction the most.' Although labor
costs in non-building are still lower than in residential construction,
they have increased at a much higher rate. While between 1960 and 1970
labor costs for both grew at about the same rate (about 5 percent on
the average per year), non-building grew at a rate of 57 percent per
year between 1970 and 1977, and residential grew at a rate of only
some 50 percent. (See Table 2-10).
Such a trend might speed up capital-labor substitution at least in
non-building construction. Although we have not considered the develop-
ment of total costs yet, a general indication of labor substitution may
still be gained in considering the changes in the occupational distri-
bution of labor in the construction sector. The recent study on emloy-
ment in construction in Egypt (22) showed that between 1960 and 1966,
administrative/professional/clerical and sales activities rose from their
previous 6 percent level to about 15 percent. This shift occurred at the
expense of actual production workers, whose 90 percent share dropped
to some 80 percent in 1966 (Table 2-11). In 1974 this distribution was
still the case and no real change had occurred in that mix. These changes
however were not unique to construction. In manufacturing the share
of such supervisory/administrative activities was about 7 percent in 1960
and increased to 14 percent in 1966, compared to production workers'
share dropping from 90 to 82 percent. The same is true in agriculture
where in 1966 the farmers' share in employment dropped slight and the
share of supervisory/administrative occupations increased from 0.3
percent in 1960 to 1.7 percent in 1966.
TABLE 2-11
Composition of Labor Force in Some Sectors
(Source: Ref. 22)
Professioqal Administrative Clerical Salesmen Craftsmen Services Other & Not Total
Year & Technical & Workers Workers Classified
1960 1.70 4.20 0.10 0.40 90.80 1.00 0.40 100
Construction 1966 3.53 5.72 5.68 0.58 79.74 2.88 100
1974 4.40 6.30 6.40 0.30 78.20 4.00 0.40 100
1960 1.24 1.22 3.93 0.73 90.53 1.78 0.55 100
Manufacturing 1966 2.21 2.40 8.08 1.58 82.03 1.78 1.78 100
1974 3.57 0.64 6.00 0.85 84.07 4.83 0.83 100
1960 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.39 0.46 98.84 100
Agriculture 1966 0.56 0.16 0.88 0.14 1.77 0.60 95.90 100
1974 0.38 0.07 0.72 0.03 0.87 0.61 97.33 100
These shifts in occupational distribution may reflect some change in
technology due to development and an increase in education (22). Most
probably however, they represent a response to nationalization and the
creation of the public sector in the industry. Three factors support this
conclusion. The first is the fact that public sector firms tend to employ
more technical, administrative, and clerical staff then do private sector
firms. And since, as will be'discussed fully in Chapter 3, public sector.
firms are responsible for the majority of the output of the construction
industry, it is expected that such a change in occupational distribution
would be magnified. Secondly, the changes in the occupational structure of
agriculture was the smallest compared to both construction and industry.
While this is a reflection of the intensity of agriculture, it is impor-
tant to note that the agriculture sector was one of the few sectors where
public sector intervention was the smallest. Finally, as will be shown,
any recent change that may have happened was not accompanied by an increase
in the productivity of labor, which would be expected had substitution,
i.e. technological change, taken place.
Perhaps the best way to investigate the issue is to look at the
development of capital in the sector. Traditionally, fixed capital invest-
ment in construction in Egypt was relatively small in comparison to invest-
ment in other sectors of the economy as well as to total fixed capital
investment in the economy. The construction sector's share, unlike all
other sectors of the economy, is largely composed of machinery and trans-
port equipment. (Building has averaged some 2 percent of fixed capital
investment in the construction sector over the past two decades (see
TABLE 2-12
Investments (in current L.E. million) in the Construction Sector
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Section 2.1)). The absolute value of fixed capital investments in construc-
tion was very small; they ranged from 0 to 2.1 percent of the total fixed
investment in the economy (Table 2-12). This was also due to the -fact that
construction relied for part of its fixed capital requirements on other
sectors; this amounted to about one third of the total fixed capital
investment directed to the sector. In specific, construction has relied
heavily on the client sectors for the purchase of equipment. Most equip-
ment has been purchased specifically for certain projects, such as the
High Dam.
In 1974 fixed capital investment in construction increased almost
two-fold over its previous level, and in 1975 and 1976 this increase was
maintained. While this increase might have been caused in part by the
severe shortage in labor previously discussed, there.is some evidence that
this capital intensification did not really represent substitution of
capital for labor in the production of the various types of constructed
facilities. Despite such intensification labor productivity in the
mid-1970's did not rise. Between 1971 and 1975 employment in construction
grew by almost 26 percent (Table 2-7), while value added in 1970 prices
only grew by 8 percent (15). This slack in productivity might also be due
to the fact that since migration was draining skills from the sector, more
people from other sectors of the economy were attracted to construction.
These laborers, never having been previously employed in construction had
to acquire the requisite skills. Furthermore, labor productivity might have
been somewhat constrained by the inconsistent availability of building
materials, as will be discussed in the following section. But the fact that
this increase in fixed capital investment in 1974 and 1975 went mostly
toward the purchase of eleven prefabricated unit factories, costing some
L.E. 60 million, refutes the capital/labor substitution theorization, since
even now, after 4 years, these factories are not yet fully operational and
have not yet started to play any role in residential construction.
Captial output ratios give more of an indication of the use of capital
in the sector. In the 1960's the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR)
for construction in Egypt was equal to 0.3. Such a figure is consistent
with the labor intensiveness of the industry. For the period between 1970
and 1975, the ICOR jumped to a value of 8.8 (15). This value is very high
by almost any standard. This very high value reflects the underutilization
of capital in the construction industry. Some studies maintain that the
actual figure is in reality much lower, due to the underevaluation of
foreign currency in the economy since most of the capital is imported (20)
This is consistant with the fact that in the last few years the FCI to the
construction sector has increased significantlyby the purchase of the
prefabrication factories.
The low use of capital in the construction sector in.Egypt is to
be expected. The distribution of intermediate inputs to the sector also
provides such evidence. The intermediate inputs from manufacturing are
around 50 percent of the intermediate inputs to the sector, while that of
transport is 2 percent. This distribution of factor inputs when com-
pared with countries such as India, Italy and Japan for example, show
construction in Egypt to have a distribution similar to that of India (5).
ICOR is the ratio of the capital spent in time period (t) over the out-
put of the following period (t + 1). In developed economies the ICOR
is in the range of 1.0 (15,20).
Japan's industry shows a higher reliance on manufactured goods. This
fact makes the use of sophisticated technologies and equipment in
construction difficult in Egypt. The prefabricated houses factories
are faced with such problems as the non-availability of building
components and the whole industry is faced with certain shortages in
locally manufactured raw materials and components. As will be dis-
cussed in the-following section, such shortages have also affected the
performance of the industry. These shortages contribute to the low
productivity of both labor and capital.
2.4 Construction Prices and Other Inputs
Using fixed investment as a proxy for-demand in Section 2.1, we
concluded that demand for construction has increased in terms of 1959/60
constant Egyptian pounds. Construction prices have also undergone
changes since then. These can be discerned somewhat from the housing
construction price index in Figure 2-3, although that figure indicates
changes in public sector contractors costs and thus does not fully
capture the changes in input prices. The figure shows that in the
period between 1962 and 1970 construction prices increased at an annual
rate of between 6 and 7 percent. In the 1970-76 period, the index
suggests that prices have increased at an average of some 60 percent.
These increases cannot be attributed only to the demand pull effects
of growth in the economy (22); many changes have also occurred in the
supply of various inputs to the industry.
As discussed in Section 2.3, the labor supply has suffered from a
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FIGURE (2-3) Construction cost per square meter
for typical public sector housing
project in LE per square meter
(Source: Reference 10)
struction equipment also in Egypt is mostly imported and subject to the
availability of foreign exchange. While in the early 1970's, acqui-
sition on the international market might have enjoyed a short lead
time due to the world-wide recession particularly in investment activity
(21), the scarcity of foreign exchange in Egypt now constrains equip-
ment purchase. The contribution of equipment to the construction cost
however may be small compared to materials and labor inputs. As shown
earlier, in 1971/72 capital costs accounted for only some 10 to 18 per-
cent of total costs in building and non-building contracts.
Up to very recently, the government in Egypt controlled both the
supply and price of the main building materials such as cement, steel,
wood, and glass. This control extended from producing to trading and
delivering of materials. These controls were partly introduced to
control the costs of construction, especially on government projects
and led to the involvement of government in the rationing of such
materials. Clients would be allocated a quota of these materials
according to an estimate of their requirements, calculated by the govern-
ment at the time that a building permit for a particular-construction
project was issued. While such a system might have been highly effective
in controlling the distribution of these materials, prices were not set
according to economic scarcities, but rather according to bureaucratic
decrees. Inevitably such a system has led to the development of a black
market, where some quantitites of these materials are traded at much
higher prices than those ordained by the government.
Black market prices however are not directly tied tothe economic
scarcity of materials either, but are determined mostly by speculatory
motives. Table 2-13 shows the wholesale price index for building materials,
as well as the official and black market prices for cement and steel in the
1970's. Both prices have gone up considerably since 1970. Examination of
cement production and of the import/export situation might given some
insight to the reasons for such price increases.' In 1973 Egypt was a net
exporter of cement exporting some 1.0 million tons, while local production
was close to 4.0 million ton/year peak. Black market prices at the time
ranged between 1.5 and 2.0 times the official prices. In 1974, production
slowed down to 3.5 million tons/year while consumption continued to grow.
Imports grew substantially from near 0.1 million tons to about 1.0 million
tons, and exports declined to almost nil. This situation continued, and
even in 1976 Egypt was importing almost one-third of her cement consumption.
Official prices had increased by about 65 percent, but black market prices
ranged between 2 and 3 times the official ones. Steel prices also increased,
as did steel imports, which were negligible in 1970 and grew to about
350,000 tons in 1976; steel production did not decline and remained be-
tween 220,000 and 260,000 tons/year (2). The differences between black
market and official prices at that time, reflect not only speculation but
also reflect real shortages in building materials as well as the inadequacies
of the official allocation-distribution system.
Government controls make it difficult to capture the extent of price
increases in building materials, as it is difficult to separate increases
This subject is explored in Ref. 2.
TABLE 2-13
Official and Market Prices
For Cement and Steel (L.E. per ton)




Year Index* Official Market Official Market
1972 1.082 11 18-25 100 160-180
1973 1.164 11 18-25 100 170-200
1974 1.343 12 24-40 120 170-200
1975 1.587 14 40-50 115 180-210
1976 1.868 14 45-60 150 180-190
1977 N.A. 18 32-55 150 100-220
1978 N.A. 18 75-90 170 230-270
* Base year for index: 1970 = 1.000
attributable to scarcities from those attributable to speculation. Fortun-
ately, in 1978 and 1979 the government started to ease its control over
the building materials supply, first by allowing private firms to import
building materials, then by de-regulating prices of both imported and
locally-produced cement and glass. Such actions will, in the future, tie
the market price of building materials to their availability, and prices
will be representative of scarcities.
Price indices for construction are difficult to develop, due partly
to the heterogenity of industry products. This can be overcome to some
extent by construction of a price index based on input prices rather than
on product prices albeit the mix of the inputs might change from one
product to the other over time. Another drawback is that data on the com-
position of inputs by type of construction is incomplete and rather old.
Finally, prices in Egypt differ between private sector and public sector
contractors.
While both types of contractors use somewhat similar techniques in
the construction of various types of facilities, differences exist between
them. Wages in the private sector are usually higher than those in the
public sector, and the risks for the private sector, heightened by government
intervention in building materials distribution, investment allocations,
etc., are higher; it may be expected therefore that private construction
would carry a higher price than public construction. Table 2-14 how-
ever, shows that in building a five-story walk-up apartment, private
sector costs are lower. Public sector figures are based on 1975 costs and
private sector ones on 1976 costs; the difference is less than 5 percent
TABLE 2-14
Public and Private Construction Costs
of a Typical Apartment Building
(Source: Ref. 10)
Item Public Sector Private Sector
















Overhead (percent) 21.8 20.0*
Grand Total 22,289.9 23,054.7
Floor area m2  675.0 675.0
Cost per square meter 33.0 34.1
* Includes profits.
in total cost. The fact can be attributed to many factors, all of which
revolve around basic differences between the public and private sectors:
management differences, lower overhead costs, closer supervision, direct
order in contract letting in the public sector are all potential hypotheses
accounting for this fact. Such differences will be investigated more
closely in Chapters 3 and 4.
Available price indices for construction in Egypt are either based on
the prices of building material inputs and so do not reflect the real
increases in construction prices, or apply only to residential building
construction which represents only a small portion of the output of the
industry (as shown in Section 2.2). An attempt is made here to construct
price indices for the 4 categories of construction types. These were
used in Section 2.2 to deflate the output of new construction.
The labor price indices for these types of construction were
detailed in Section 2.3 (see Table 2-12). Taking into consideration the
previous discussion for building materials, we shall use the price index
developed by the Ministry of Housing despite the fact that it may reflect
some speculation. This index reflects the price changes in the 1970's
better than the official wholesale building materials price index, which
only reflects the changes in the prices set by the government. Captial
costs, as previously discussed, are very difficult to pinpoint in Egypt
due to distortions in foreign exchange and the subsidies of interest
rates in government projects. But since capital constitutes only a small
part of the total cost in construction (even in non-building it represents
only 18 percent of the total cost), a case could be made for using the
wholesale price index to reflect changes in capital costs. These two
indices are shown in Table 2-15.
Tabel 2-6 earlier showed the relative materials costs as well
as the approximate wages and capital used in producing the four types
of facilities under consideration. Using the figures in this breakdown
as weights for the indices of the various inputs, we arrive at the price
indices for construction products shown in Table 2-16.
In the 1960's residential and other building prices in general were
growing slightly faster than industrial and non-building construction
prices, where prices of all inputs were growing at approximately the same
rate. In 1977, when labor costs increased much faster than material costs,
the prices in non-building construction grew faster than those of building
construction, although building construction is highly labor intensive, and
materials costs are much higher relative to labor and captial. If this
trend continues, non-building may begin to substitute capital for labor in
its production mix.
These increases in the costs of construction may have inhibited invest-
ment in construction in the past few years. No data, however, exists on the
potential demand which may have been discouraged by these increases, since
most of the large investments were government investments. If, in the
near future, Egypt's objectives are to encourage private and foreign
investment, construction costs may be one constraint on these types of
investments which are highly sensitive to profitability.
TABLE 2-15
Price Indices for Material & Capital
Year Capital Cost Building Material


























































Estimated based on extending previous trend.
(A)
TABLE 2-16
Construction Price Indices for Differing Facility Types
(Based on Tables 2-6, 2-12, 2-16)




























































































Note: The price indices were calculated from the individual
input indices using the consumption of these inputs
by the facilities shown in Table 2-6 as weights as
follows:
(1)0.70 x material cost index + 0.23 x labor cost
(2) 0.65 x material cost index + 0.27 x labor cost
(3) 0.65 x material cost index + 0.27 x labor cost
(4)0.55 x material cost index + 0.30 x labor cost
index + 0.07 x capital cost index
index + 0.09 x capital cost index
index + 0.10 x capital cost index
index + 0.15 x capital cost index
2.5 Construction Industry and the Five-Year Plan
To be able to draw definite conclusions about the future of the con-
struction industry is a difficult task. Some insight can be gained on the
major issues facing the industry by considering some implications of the
new five-year development plan for the period 1978-1982. The full imple-
mentation of this plan, like many of its previous antecedants, is clouded
with doubts, espeically that until the end of 1978 it had not fully started.
Nevertheless, the information contained in the plan allows us to form some
idea about a-possible, if not probable, scenario for the development of the
construction sector over the next few years; and this provides us with a
context to highlight the issues facing such development.
The objectives of the plan are briefly: to achieve high economic
growth rates for the economy (to average 9-10 percent per year) while
increasing the provision of services, especially utilities, and reduci'g
the balance of payment deficit. These objectives are to be accomplished
through the strengthening of existing public sector firms, the encourage-
ment of private and foreign investment, and the improvement of government
efficiency. The plan sets a level of fixed capital investment for the
economy equal to about 25 to 30 percent of the Gross National Product annu-
ally, as opposed to the 15 percent of recent years.
The breakdown of the fixed capital investment proposed in the plan
shown in Table 2-17 does not constitute any major departure from the sec-
toral allocations of the early seventies. Apart from the relative empha-
sis on publoic utilities, which receives some 6 percent of the total fixed
capital investments compared to the 3 percent in previous plans, housing
and services still recieve only a low.8 and 9 percent respectively.
Industry continues to get between 25 and 30 percent of the total, while
agriculture and irrigation only some 8 to 10 percent.
The correlation coefficients (24) for each sector, shown in the last
column of Table 2-17, have been calculated based on the construction com-
ponent of the various sectors in the sectoral fixed capital investment in
the last two decades and show that construction represents some 45 percent
of FCI in Egypt. Multiplying these coefficients by the sectoral invest-
ments, we get the planned effective demand for construction from each
sector; which is equivalent to the planned output of the construction
sector.
The realization of the levels of investment in the economy becomes
thus contingent on realizing the planned output for the construction sec-
tor. Based on the preceeding analysis of the industry, we can tentatively
investigate this possibility. -
The values of the planned demand for the sector deflated by the con-
struction price indicies, developed earlier, are shown in Table 2-18 in
terms of the 1960's prices, and seem to indicate an increase in demand of
some 12 percent a year. This rate, which seems to be an extension of the
rates of growth of the mid-seventies may seem to be too high for Egypt. In
the past two decades the overall rate up until the early seventies was only
about 7 percent per year. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the expec-
TABLE 2-17
Five. Year Plan Sectoral Distribution of
Fixed Capital Investment
in 1977 L.E. million
(Source: Ref. 7)
Year
Economic 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Construction's
Sectors Share (%)
Housing(a) 140.1 168.5 198.8 243.2 291.7 93.63
Construction 32.0 42.5 44.6 46.3 48.4 10.84
Trade & Commerce 30.7 40.9 48.1 45.6 50.5 43.12
Services 158.7 179.5 201.6 216.6 221.8 63.08
Agriculture &(b) 159.8 175.7 188.5 202.9 215.5 57.89
Irrigation
Transport, Communica c) 502.4 572.8 646.7 544.8 597.2 30.97
tion, & Suez Canal
(d)
Industry & Mining 504.7 554.5 696.8 872.7 1055.4 35.98
Electricity 122.6 172.2 223.8 211.7 193.7 28.11
Public Utilities 94.6 124.4 133.5 135.5 136.0 63.14
Unclassified 14.5 16.0 20.7 54.3 41.5 NA
Private Investment
Grand Total 1760.1 2047.0 2403.1 2573.6 2850.7
Total Public Sector 1584.1 1865.0 2153.1 2283.6 2350.7 NA
Total Private Sector 176.0 182.0 250.0 350.0 500.0 NA
Includes 31.3 percent of private
Includes 44.0 percent of private
Includes 7.3 percent of private










Planned and Likely Output of New Construction
in 1960 prices*
(Sources ref.-7)
Residential Industrial Other building New building
Total Output Output Output Output Out ut
iscal Planned () Likely Planned Likely Planned Likely Planned Likely
Year
1978 225.98 265.8 18.56 19.2 55.69 71.51 24.26 42.51 127.47 132.48
1979 263.96 299.7 21.61 22.0 61.69 80.91 27.84 47.45 152.82 149.15
1980 307.31 333.5 24.78 24.8 75.66 90.32 31.40 52.40 175.47 165.81
1981 326.07 367.4 23.96 27.6 91.97 99.72 30.87 57.30 179.27 182.47
1982 373.75 401.2 30.94 '30.4 103.23 109.12 38.35 62.28 195.23 199.14
Notes:
(1) The planned demand origianl figures were in 1976 prices.
(2) The likely figures were extrapolated based on the actual output of the years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 used in
Section 2.2 above.
(*) Both values of planned and likely output were deflated by the price indicies of Table 2-16.
a)0ki
tation of continuing increase in demand, but we might consider the figures
as an upper boundary for such an increase over the next few years. This
means thatwe can expect the increase in demand for construction to continue
in the near future.
Despite such increases, Table 2-18 also shows that the output of the
construction sector can adequately meet such demands if the growth rate
of the output is maintained at the rate of the 1970's and if construction
prices keep increasing at the same rates. Despite the fact that the level
of investment directed to the construction sector in the late seventies has
been much higher than ever before, we have shown that no real change in the
production technology of the construction output has really occurred yet.
This supports the fact that the output growth in the mid-seventies can be
expected to continue. It also indicates that this rate might even increase
when such change occurs. Furthermore, the figures extrapolated do not
take into account the expected effects of the current policy changes in
Egypt. Encouraging the privete sector, and deregulating parts of the
indsutry can allow for even higher growth for the construction output.
Implementation of previous plans however, seem to indicate that
the construction output might be constrained by fluctuations in the demand
both over time and between construction types. The flucutations over time
on the aggregate would occur if the implementation of the plan is either
partially or totally interrupted. Such interruptions in the past have
affected the construction output of the various types. Such a constraint
might be reflected in the figures of the various construction types in the
table. While demand for building seem slightly below the likely output, the
figures are reversed in non-building. This would show that to the extent
that these figures represent demand, part of the capacity devoted to the
production of building would be diverted to non-building construction, or new
new contractors have to enter the industry.
At any rate, such fluctuations would involve extra costs to the firms,
either by having to support idle capacity or by having to change production
processes. These would lead to support a continuing increase in the con-
struction prices in the economy. The fact that the demand for construction
in the economy is growing, as suggested earlier, increases the demand-pull
effect on the prices; first,through the increases in demand for the
construction types as shown, secondly through the increase in the demand
for the input resources to construction. Consideration of the main inputs
to the sector has shown that shortages in the labor and building materials
market due to migration, capacity and regulations do exist. These short-
ages have also pushed the costs of these inputs up and hence the price
of construction.
The figures in Table 2-18 show that the differences between the planned
and likely outputs over the five years to be in the range of 10 percent.
This small difference shows the importance of assuring adequate supply to
realize the development goals of Egypt. While the output figures have been
sensitive to prices, we have no reason to believe that the prices would
increase at a higher rate than the 30 percent per year demonstrated over
the past 7 years. The other factor that might affect the output however,
would be a decline in the efficiency of the sector.
The analysis of the output in 1960 prices had indicated that some
inefficiencies existed in the supply of construction facilities. These
were detected from increases in wages relative to those of production of
labor in the sector, from bottlenecks in the distribution of building
materials and their use by contractors, as well as low productivity of
capital investment in the sector itself. The existance of such inefficien-
cies in turn adversly affects prices and quantity of output of the sector.
The reasons for such inefficiencies can be traced to factors both
external as well as internal to the contracting firms. Actions such as
direct order award of contracts, regulations on building materials, are
some exampl-es of the latter. Studying the operation of the firms in the
sector, their interaction with the other participants in the construction
process will allow us to identify the issues most relavant to the raising
of the efficiency of the contractors in Egypt today.
CHAPTER 3. CONTRACTORS AND THE INDUSTRY
Contractors in Egypt account for almost the entire output of
formal construction. For example, in 1975, contractors were respon-
sible for about 97 percent of the total output of the construction
sector. Only three percent was carried out on force account* by the
government, as shown in Table 3-1, which shows some of the character-
istics of the contracting firms in Egypt. The contractors are
divided between two sectors, public and private. The public sector
firms, which are affiliated to various Minihtries of the government,
are responsible for about 75 percent of the total output of the
sector. The private firms, which are more nLtnerous, are responsible
for only some 25 percent of the output. The present chapter traces
the development of both these two types of firms, considers their
performance in the context of the Egyptian environment, and attempts
to identify the issues confronting their further development, espe-
cially the private sector ones. It begins by studying the creation
and development of the public sector firms and describes the major
characteristics of both public and private contractors. It then
addresses two major issues confronting construction firms in Egypt
and finally identifies the constraints that might inhibit contractor
development.
* Force account work is construction carried out by the clients them-
selves without resorting to contractors (25).
TABLE 3-1
Number and Production
of the Various Contractors in Egypt
Public Sector by Companies(a) 1975 Production(b)
Ministry of Affiliation (number) (L.E. million)
Housing and Reconstruction 30 (c) 255
Transport and Communication 4 47
Agriculture and Land Reclamation 6 20
Irrigation 4' 25
Industry and Mining 4 30
Total Public Sector 48 392






(c) The number includes "the Pre-fabricated Houses Company"
which up to 1975 was under the Ministry of Industry,
and which to date has not produced housing. The output
of the remaining 29 firms was 255 million.
(d) Includes some L.E. 15 million in force account work for
the railway and telephone authorities.
(e) Includes L.E. 50 million carried out as subcontracts for
the public sector companies.
(f) Estimates number from "private contractors office", M.O.H.
Not all these companies are responsible for that output
only about 3,000 contractors are active yearly on govern-
ment and public contracts.
3.1 Development of Firms
As suggested by Table 3-1, contractors in Egypt today are composed
of two distinct groups: one comprising a very large number of
variously sized, generally small, private contractors; and the other
a very limited number of medium and large public contractors. The
existence at any one time of various sizes of firms in the construction
industry is not unusual. For example, in the U.S. in 1967 less than
one percent of the total number of construction firms accounted for 38
percent of the construction industry receipts and reported total
receipts of $2,500,000 or more, while 44 percent of the total number
reported receipts of less than $100,000 (26). But the existence of
large construction firms in Egypt is the result of government action
attempting to legislate development of the economy.
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, in 1959/60 the government
started to consider its first five-year socio-economic development
plan. The official figures for 1959 show that in construction some
1,800 firms were active in construction and building (2). These firms
were all in the private sector and were responsible for most of the
output of the sector, which amounted to LE 115 million. Since this
plan was considered to be the base-for the development and industriali-
zation of Egypt, it had a construction component for the five years of
LE 717 million (14). This figure suggests a yearly construction budget
averaging some LE 140 million, which does not seem to have been much
beyond the capacity of the industry at the time. Since the majority
of projects in this five-year plan comprised large government-financed
projects, it was contended that the existing contracting firms, with
their lack of management and financial capabilities, could not under-
take implementation of the plan without some kind of government
support (14). It is not clear from the official documents to what
extent this assumption was based on actual assessment of the
capacity of firms in the industry or how it was affected by the socio-
political views of the government regarding the distribution of
income in Egypt. Of the 1,800 firms involved in construction, the
government considered that only between 150 and 180 were capable of
undertaking the government projects. This would suggest that the
available capacity was very limited (14). but actual figures on the
capacity of these firms are not available. Furthermore, most private
contractors were regarded at the time as "people exploiting the situ-
ation to realize the maximum personal profit with but a few considering
the development of Egypt" (14).
With the ambition of realizing the goals of the development
plan, the government acted in 1961. Instead of considering enlarging
the base of firms working on its projects by providing incentives, the
government decided to perform the construction itself. In July of
1961 the socialist laws were passed, and some 13* large contracting
firms, along with some other private firms in other sectors of the
economy, were brought under government control. One firm was fully
* Some sources state the number as being 17 (27).
nationalized, while government participated in 50 percent of the
capital of the other 12 firms (14). At the same time a Presidential
decree was issued: the amount of work let by government agencies and
public sector organizations to private sector firms in which govern-
ment had less than 50 percent interest was limited to LE 30,000 per
year. Shortly thereafter this ceiling was raised to LE 100,000 (35)*.
Although this ceiling on private contractors was implemented to
ensure that the profits realized on government-financed projects went
back to the government (an idea representing the interests of the
majority of the population and in line with government concern about
income distribution), this action severely limited the capacity
available for implementing the plan. Government-controlled firms at
the time had a capacity of only some LE 15 million per year. The 150 to 180
private firms qualified to work for the government had not increased
in number, and with the LE 100,000 per firm ceiling, had a potential
output of only another LE 15 to 18 million per year. This output of
LE 30-32 million was clearly below the LE 140 million proposed by the
plan. So in September of 1961 the government allowed private sector
firms to apply for membership in the public sector by asking the
government to participate in 50 percent of their capital. By 1963
some 70 private firms had been accepted to join the public sector,
thus increasing the capacity available to execute the plan. But the
* The ceiling remained at that level until 1974 when it was again
raised to LE 500,000 per year--or LE 1,000,000 over 2 years. It was
not until March of 1978 that this ceiling was removed altogether.
government was still faced with problems in running these firms with
mixed ownership. Contractors were not bidding on new work as fast as
the government wanted them to. This led to further action by the
government: in 196-2 a law was passed giving the Minister of Housing
power to give direct orders to public sector firms to carry out
work included in the government plans on a cost-plus basis (48)
This step, as will be investigated in later sections, had a serious
effect on those public contractors, as it reduced the incentive for
competition.* It is not quite clear why contractors did abstain
from bidding. The documents of the time attribute this abstension in
large part to the fact that in many cases managers in the newly
formed public sector contracting firms were the previous owners of
the firms before government participation. It was argued that this
provided them with a motive to stand in the way of the government that
limited their previous influence It was felt that
these managers, who had a personal interest in the firms, used the
privilege of being backed by the government to secure loans from
banks at more favorable terms than would otherwise be possible. It
was also contended that some-of them did so to their own benefit**
In March of 1964 the government took a further step by fully
nationalizing around 120 contracting companies, the 70 or so firms that
had joined the public sector voluntarily as well as some of the larger
private firms that had not joined. In order to be able to draw upon
some of the assets which had been acquired by previous owners during
* Although in 1978 the government issued a directive to the client
agencies to return to competitive bidding in awarding contracts,
the direct order law has not been revoked.
** The government did capture at the time more than one large embezzle-
ment case involving a few of these managers
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the period when they had shared ownership with the government,
nationalization was enacted retroactively as of July 1961, based on
the fact that any profit that had accrued to private owners between
1961 and 1964 was attributable to the 50 percent government partici-
pation in capital. This retroactivity, however, created some prob-
lems in awarding compensation for nationalization, and led to lengthy
litigation.
Most of the firms at the time of nationalization were relatively
small in size (see Table 3-2 for some examples of companies nationa-
lized in 1964), ranging from firms having assets with a market value
of a few thousand pounds to a very few firms with assets worth more
than one million pounds. The government therefore grouped some of
the smaller firms together and formed new companies, placed under the
supervision of general organizations to coordinate their work.
The management and organization of the sector, however, did not
stabilize quickly. Rather, the number of firms changed from time to
time when decisions were taken for reorganizing the sector. For
example, the number of companies affiliated to the Ministry of Housing
in 1964 was 35; they were then broken into 41, and finally reorganized
as 36; and now, after liquidation (i.e. cancellation) of some of them,
they number 29.
Adding to the potential problems resulting from this instability
were other changes in the affiliation of these firms. The reorgani-










Example of Pubic Sector Companies
Fully Nationalized in 1964
(Source: Ref. 27)
Financial Evaluation
as of July 20, 1961
Assets Liabilities
Financial Evaluation
as of June 30, 1964




























Contracting Co. (6,547) 75,830 27,470 20,00 1,354,000 13,249,000
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supervising the companies (reduction or proliferation)--until 1974,,
when they were cancelled altogether. Now, public sector companies
are supervised directly by the various Ministries, without the
intermediary of a "general organization." And to further complicate
matters, the changes in affiliation extended also to change as to
the Ministry in charge of supervising the companies in question. For
example, during the reconstruction period in 1974, the 4 companies
specializing in road construction, then affiliated to the Ministry of
Transport were reassigned to the Ministry of Housing and
Reconstruction; this lasted until 1977, when they were returned to
their original Ministry.
Despite such changes, the output of the public sector companies
grew considerably over the years. For example, while the production
of the 120 companies nationalized and affiliated to the Ministry of
Housing in 1964 was estimated to be about L.E. 75 million, in 1977
the 29 companies affiliated to the Ministry accounted for an output of
some L.E. 522 million In current terms. Also, in the mid-sixties some
of these firms started to work outside of Egypt. While in 1966 only
4 firms were working in other Arab countries, by 1977 12 of these
firms had projects abroad. Actually some 20 percent of the output of
these firms was realized from foreign work (27).
Private sector contractors, on the other hand, have assumed a
secondary role in contract construction since 1961. While in 1959
their estimated output was around L.E. 100 million, official figures
estimated their output in 1975 to be about L.E. 150 million, out of
which some L.E. 50 million represented subcontracts to the public
sector (see Table 3-1). If we allow for price changes, this would
indicate that their output has actually decreased. Such figures,
however, might understate the output of these firms. It is antici-
pated that the official figures might not accurately represent the
amount of work carried out by private firms for the private sector of
the economy. The figures of the private sector contractor's office in the
Ministry of Housing, which is responsible for registering the work
private contractors perform for the government and the public sector,
show that for these two clients alone in 1975 private contractors
produced an output of some L.E. 150 million. Also, as with public
contractors, many private firms are currently working outside Egypt.
Some firms, in fact, operate mainly outside of Egypt, maintaining only
minor activities inside the country (3). Even if we allow for such
omissions in the output data on the private sector, we must conclude
that private sector contractors have not grown substantially in size
over the past two decades compared to public sector firms.
The number of private sector contractors in Egyptian construction
is a difficult figure to obtain. Table 3-3 shows some estimates of
that figure taken from 3 different official sources in the Egyptian
government. The range is from 12,000 to 20,000 contractors. Many
factors interact to create this discrepancy. The commercial registry,
which is the main body of registration for all concerns doing business
in Egypt, does not keep records by type of activity, but only by
TABLE 3-3
Number of Contractors in Egypt According to Various Registration Offices
Private Contiactors Registered with the Contractors Holding a Commercial Contractors Paying Taxes
Office of Private Sector Contractors,(MOH) Registry Numbera in the Cairo Tax Office
for Constructionb
General &
Year General Specialty Subtotal Labor Total General Building Total Partial Civil TotalGeneral Building
1966 3884 2831 6715 2996 9711
1971 6013 4226 10239 4621 14860
1972 6449 4427 10876 4951 15827
1973 6913 4630 11543' 5216 16759 3951 109 4060
1974 7470 4900 12370 5566 17936 4344 118 4462
1975 8070 5130 13200 5866 19066 6529 834 2068 '9431 4753 126 4879
1976 8708 5352 14060 6148 20208 i7102 2327 2327 10693 '103 140 5243
1977 9381 5566 14974 6715 21662 7445 1457 2411 11313 5417 152 5569
(June)
1978 10035 5843 15878 6863 22741
(August)
Note: The fact that the number of contractors registered in
the Commercial Registry is less than that with the
Office of Private Sector Contractors is somewhat sur-
prising in that a first requirement is a Commercial
Registry number; also only contractors who want to
work on public and government contracts register with
the Office, although all are supposed to have a Reg-
istry number. The CAPMAS contractor studies (3,4 )
in the early seventies show about a third of the pri-
vate contractors to be in Cairo which places.the Tax
Office figures on number of contractors in Egypt some-
where between those of the other two sources.
a Categories 1720, 1718, and 1722, respectively.
b Categories 410 and 420, respectively.
Source: Offices indicated in table.
geographic location. Even when the effort to make such a classification
was started in 1975, it was discontinued shortly thereafter (45). The
tax department would also be another potential source for the number
of contractors; however, only the Cairo and Alexandria tax offices are
organized by type of activity. The private sector contractors' tax
office of the Ministry of Housing,.another potential source of such
information, was set up mainly to control enforcement of the ceiling
on the private firms. The office therefore is required only to
register those firms performing work for either the 'government or
public sector clients. And although these two clients are the major
backers of all construction in Egypt, the existence of the ceiling has
encouraged many contractors to register under more than one name.
What is more, due to the lack of a formal, enforced definition of
"contractor" in Egypt, many firms do operate in the market without
any registration.
The inadequacy of the data not withstanding, all the sources
do agree that the number of private firms has increased considerably
over the years. Some indication of the development of private firms
can be gained from Table 3-3 in any case, especially with regard to
recent changes in government policy in the mid-seventies when the
government started to encourage the private sector. This policy
should effect an increase in the role of private sector clients as
well as private sector contractors in the economy. From the figures
of the private sector's contractors office of the Ministry of
Housing we can see that during the sixties and early seventies, when
the government was exercising control and when regulations hindered
the development of the private sector, the number of contractors
registered to work on government and public sector projects increased
at a high annual rate (about 10 percent per annum between 1966 and
1974). When in 1974 the government adopted the Open-Door Policy,
encouraged the private sector, and raised the ceiling on government
contracts, the rate of increase in private contractors registered to
work for the government slowed down somewhat (about 7 percent per
annum between 1974 and mid-1978). Since the number of contractors
paying taxes continued to increase at a higher rate (about 10 percent
per annum), we can conclude that a larger number of private contractors
are now working for private sector clients.
If government policies continue to move in this direction, it
might be expected that more private contractors would work for
private clients, But for this to take place, many constraints have
to be overcome. It is such issues that will be discussed in later
sections in this chapter.
3.2 Characteristics of Contracting Firms
Contractors in Egypt, aside from being either public or
private sector enterprises, can be classified under three main
categories: general, specialty, and labor contractors. General
contractors work in building, road, or non-building construction.
Specialty contractors specialize in only one phase of the construction
activity and include, for example, masonary, plumbing, concrete works,
and electrical works. Labor contractors provide only the necessary
labor for any of the above activities. Private contractors are
active in all three categories, while public sector firms only work
in the first two, leaving labor contracting entirely to the private
sector.
Official figures on the contractors are available only for the
early seventies. Such information is given in Table 3-4; despite
the incompleteness of the data, some insight can still be gained with
regard to the size of the contractors in the various categories. The
information given in the table is only confined to general and
specialty contractors, where general contractors are grouped in
three subgroups according to the type of work they perform: general
building, general roads, and general non-building. Besides the fact
that private contractors are much more numerous in each category
than public sector ones, the value of work on the average per public.
contractor is between 100 and 180 times greater than for private firms.
Also, the average number of projects per public sector firm is greater
than that of the private ones; private firms average between 2 and 3
projects each, while public firms average some 20 to 35 projects,
which emphasizes the big difference in size between firms in the two
sectors. Furthermore, the private sector firms tend to be involved in
specialty work; about half of the private firms are concentrated in
the specialty category. Public sector contractors, on the other hand,
are concentrated in the general contractors category, while only about
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*The number of public sector general non-building contractors was increased'by the creation of a new company and the elevation of a













The type of work also affects the size and the distribution of
the various firms. While this point will be discussed further in
Chapter 4, Table 3-4 shows that general contractors tend to concentrate
their efforts in the building field, where projects are somewhat more
numerous and require less capital commitment from the firms. This is
equally true for private and public firms; 65 percent of the private
general contractors and 60 percent of the public ones are in this
field. In the non-building field, where projects seem to be larger
and are less numerous, only 25 percent of the private firms and 35
percent of the public ones work in this area. Because the average
value of contracts per firm in the roads as well as non-building
contracting is larger than in the case of general building, it is
expected that on the average general non-building contractors would be
somewhat larger and maybe even more capitalized than in the general
building ones. The fact that in 1971/72 average value of public
sector building contracts per firm exceeded that of the non-building
contracts does not contradict this fact. First, the total value of
contracts in non-building that year did decrease relative to building
contracts; and secondly, the number of general non-building contrac-
tors increased from 10 to 12 times that year, while the general
building contractors remained 23 firms. Even in the specialty
contracting field this is also the case. The table only shows that
public firms in that field average larger projects than those in the
private sector, but the fact that most of the private sector works in
that category is in small partial work while that of the public
sector ones is in larger projects explains more clearly the differ-
ence in size. In 1971/72, 30 percent of the private sector specialty
firms were active in masonry work, while 30 percent of the public
firms were involved in foundation work.
As previously discussed, these official figures, however, may
not be entirely accurate, especially with regard to the number of
firms in each category, because of the problems in Egypt associated
with the registration of firms. For example, while the figures in
Table 3-4 suggest that more than half the private firms are in the
specialty category, the figure of the private sector contractors'
office of the Ministry of Housing show that such contractors represent
only between 20 and 25 percent of those registered (28). It is not
clear whether such figures indicate 'real changes in the composition
of private sector contractors, or whether the number of those
registered as general contractors is merely overstated. Registration
as a general contractor with the Ministry, aside from filling in
appropriate forms, requires only that the firm have a minimum capital
of L.E. 3,000.(28). This makes it possible for many specialty
contractors to register as general contractors.
Despite questionableness with regard to the numbers of private
firms, the figures from the private sector contractors' office
support the findings as to the size of private firms. Table 3-5
shows that in the last 3 years the average value, of contracts (per
contractor per year) in the general category tended to be about twice
TABLE 3-5
Contracts Signed by Private Contractors
For Public and .Government Work
(Value in L.E. Million)
(Source: Ref.2E
Contractor 1975 1976 1977 1/2 1978(June)
Type Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number
General
Contractor 100.0 - 1281.0 88.0 1250.0 97.0 1027.0 82.0 1220.0
Speciality 21.5 646.0 23.0 782.0 26.0 723.0 23.0 512.0
Labor 27.0 876.0 33.5 856.0 37.0 1015.0 25.0 842.0
otal 148.5 2803.0 144.5 2888.0 160.0 2765.0 130.0 2574.0
that of either specialty or labor contractors. Although the value
of contracts (per contractor per year) for specialty contractors
does seem a little larger than those for labor contractors, it is
difficult to consider this fact alone to reflect difference between
the sizes of these firms: first, because fact could not be confirmed
by information from other sources with respect to labor contractors;
secondly, because an attempt to verify such findings from the data cards
on record failed to do so. In a random sample of 25 names from each
category, 4 names in the labor category had contracts for L.E. 300,000
or more, and only 2 names in the specialty category were in that range.
While such a test may not be significant, it is an example of the discre-
pencies encountered in researching the data concerning private sector
contractors.
Despite such shortcomings in the statistical data on private
sector contractors, some insight might still be gained on the distri-
bution of firms in the industry by considering the information on
public sector firms. Public contractors vary widely in size from
small firms with a turnover of some L.E. 500,000 per year to rather
large corporations with a turnover of more than L.E. 100,000,000 per
year. The firms also vary in size in each category, but the range
of variation is less pronounced. The figures available on the
capital of these public firms do suggest that despite these variations,
non-building contractors tend to be more capitalized than building
ones. In 1975, capital for specialty contractors ranged from L.E.
150,000 to L.E. 1,500,000 with 3 firms around L.E. 1,000,000. In
the general building group the range was between L.E. 250,000 and
L.E. 2,500,000, with the majority of the firms (about 10) around
L.E. 1,000,000. The non-building general contractors had a range
between L.E. 300,000 and L.E. 2,000,000 with most of them clustering
around L.E. 1,500,000, while the 4 general road contractors had
capital in the range of 500,000 to 2,000",000 with 3 of them around
500,000 (29).
Further indication of the specialization and size of various
contractors can benmade fron considering the type of projects they
undertake. Those projects, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, can be
grouped into five categories: three in building construction, namely
residential building, industrial building, and general building; and
two in non-building, namely roads, and other non-building projects.
Private firms tend to specialize more in the type of projects they undertake.
While public general building contractors, for example, do 25 percent
of their work on non-building projects and general non-building
contractors perform some 15 percent of their work on building projects,
no private general building contractors are involved in non-building
projects or vice-versa Csee Table 3-6).
About 65 percent of the output of private contractors is in
building construction, while for public contractors the output is
almost equally divided between building and non-building, which is
consistent with the difference in size between the two types of
contractors. Considering non-building construction, we find that
the 24 percent of private contractors active in this field (from
Value of Work Executed by Types
TABLE 3-6
of General Contractors and Type of Facilities in the Public and Private Sectors
(Source: Refs. 3,4)
Residential Industrial General Building Roads Construction Other Non-Building Total













6,567 4,563 23,093 4,534

































1,921 - 1,644 1,975 11,127 7,659 15,131 2,634
1,618 - 4,966 1,947 10,142 8,693 17,514 10,640
15,684 10,400 20,954 1,975 25,472 7,659 91,770 29,131
19,685 10,248 28,101 1,947 24,074 8,693 123,859 29,749
Figures for public sector include work subcontracted to other firms.
Figures for private sector include part of the work carried out by speciality contractors.




















Table 3-4) are responsible for some 35 percent of the output of
private sector contractors. Since in the case of public contractors
also 30 percent of the firms are responsible for about 50 percent of
the output, we can conclude that these firms are slightly larger than
the building contractors. Furthermore, public sector firms, which
are larger than private ones, seem to concentrate their work in
industrial buildings, while private firms concentrate in general
building. Also, while output in residential building for private
contractors is almost equal to that of industrial building, in the
case of public contractors, residential building represents only some
10 percent of total output.
This distribution reflects the differences in size of contracting
firms, as well as the differences in type of clients in the economy.
Where public firms are larger in size, they are not expected to
pursue small projects. This is probably why only a small portion
of their output is in residential construction, which is mostly
smaller projects, as will be shown in Chapter 4. As will be investi-
gated in Section 3.5, public sector contractors rely almost entirely
on government and public sector projects. These projects are mostly
in the non-building, industrial, and general building categories,
which explains the dominance of these types in their output. Private
contractors, while also relying on these same clients for the majority
of their work, because of the dominance of these clients in the
market, perform the majority of the work for private sector clients.
This is why residential building, the field which private clients in
Egypt used to dominate, represent an important portion of the output
of these contractors.
Such distribution of contractors in Egypt is not, however,
independent of the development of demand for the various types of
construction, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. Although the
data on the output of all categories and types of contractors is
limited, if we trace the development of the output of the 29 public
sector contractors affiliated-to the Ministry of Housing, some of the
effects of the development environment can be discerned. These
firms can be grouped into 3 groups, as shown in Table 3-7, according
to the kind of work they mostly perform, with the largest 3 firms
that do not specialize in one type of construction or the other
comprising a fourth group. At nationalization in 1964, the differ-
ence between the output of the three groups was not large. The
average output of building contractors was about L.E. 1.8 million,
compared to some L.E. 2.5 million for non-building contractors.
Aggregate output of the firms grew in a pattern similar to that
of the construction demand, declining after the 1965/66 peak to a
low level in 1967/68, then picking up again and steadily increasing
up to 1973, when the rate increased much faster.
The disaggregate figures for building and non-building firms
exhibit similar overall changes, but their respective growth also
TABLE 3-7
Development of Output of the 29 Companies
Affiliated with Both Ministry of Housing & Ministry of Development
and New Communities
(Value in Current L.E. Millions)
(Sources: Refs. 37.38)
Fiscal Total of all 3 Biggest 15 Building 8 Non-Building 3 Speciality
Year Contractors Contractors Contractors Contractors Contractors
1964/65 75.7 25.1 28.5 20.8 1.3
1965/66 87.8 35.0 24.2 21.4 1.2
1966/67 83.3 32.8 28.0 19.7 2.7
1967/68 79.7 35.2 25.1 17.6 1.8
1968/69 75.0 30.6 25.7 16.1 2.0
1969/70 100.8 42.4 33.2 22.0 3.4
1970/71 121.3 48.6 39.9 29.7 3.1
1971/72*' 191.3 84.3 61.7 41.5 4.4
1973 194.4 99.6 59.4 32.5 2.9
1974 234.0 121.8 74.0 34.9 3.3
1975 338.1 168.0 112.4 51.4 6.3
1976 493.8 245.7 167.2 73.7 7.1
1977 522.8 280.1 153.7 79.3 9.7
1978(June) 271.6 141.5 85.5 38.8 5.9
*Since 1972 fiscal year was chpnged from July 1-June 30 year to match calendar
year. Figures here are for a period of 18 months.
gives further indication of the effect of demand fluctuation. In
1971, the difference between average output of building and non-
building contractors narrowed: for building contractors it grew to
L.E. 4 million, for non-building it was only L.E. 5 million.
Building's growth continued until 1977, when the average building
contractor's output actually outgrew non-building. This happened
at the time when investment directed towards non-building in the
economy declined somewhat relative to that directed to building
construction (see Chapter 2). This alteration was accentuated in
the case'of the 29 companies by the fact that the 3 largest firms'
share of the total output also increased. In 1977 this share
became 50 percent of the aggregate output, compared to a share of a
little over 25 percent in 1964/65. This is a partial reflection
of direct order contract award, where these firms were awarded a very
large number of the larger contracts. The specialty contractors'
share of the total output remained constant, around 2 percent
throughout. This may be a clue as to why many smaller contractors
concentrate in the field of specialty work. This field, although not
sheltered from the fluctuations of total demand, seems to be somewhat
independent of the disaggregate demand for building or non-building
construction, which reduces firms' exposure to extra risks.
As a result of the differences in contractor size, contract
award, and development plans, most private sector contractors
specialize geographically in certain areas of Egypt. This specializa-
tion reflects the importance attributed in Egypt to urban development.
Contractors operating in Cairo and Alexandria comprise about 45 percent
of the total, while the Delta area claims only some 33 percent of them,
and Upper Egypt only 20 percent (3). These percentages vary, as one
might expect, from one contractor type-to the other: in general
road construction, about 60 percent of the contractors specialize in
Cairo; in non-building, about 40 percent specialize in the Delta
area--which accords with the distribution of types of work in Egypt,
as will be investigated in the following chapter. In contrast,
public contractors generally do not specialize geographically. In
the late 1960's, of the 34 firms then supervised by the Ministry of
Housing, only 5, providing 1 percent of the total output, concentrated
their efforts in one urban area (14).
As expected, most of the private sector firms, being small, are
much less mechanized and also less capitalized than the large-public
sector firms in Egyptian construction. In the early seventies
official figures quoted the equipment owned by 45 public contractors
as being about 12 times that owned by the 3,000-some private
contractors operating in Egypt(3).. Recently, after enactment of
the open door policy in 1974 and changes in the availability of
price of construction labor, it might be expected that such a situa-
tion would be changing. Important evidence of change in the charac-
teristics of contracting firms in Egypt is the recent tendency of
firms, both private and public, to-diversify in construction as well
as in other related areas. Such diversification started with larger
firms, many of which are involved -in real estate or importation of
building materials and construction equipment (33). Other firms are
actively seeking joint ventures with foreign multinational
contractors to carry out work in Egypt under stipulations of the law
for foreign investment and free zones (50). Such a trend, if it
continues in the future, will have significant impacts on contracting
firms, especially private firms, permitting them to grow and to
benefit from the transfer of modern expertise and technology.
3.3 Organization and Administration of Firms
The differences in size and in type of work performed by the
various contractors in Egypt influence the organization and administra-
tion of the various firms. Contracting firms can be proprietorships,
partnerships, or shareholding companies. Because most of the firms
in the private sector are numerous and small, sole proprietorships
and partnerships are the two forms of contractor organization most
common in Egypt. This is still the case even now after efforts to
revitalize the private sector. In 1976 and 1977 only three of the
new companies which registered with the commercial registry as
contractors were shareholding companies, out of a total of over 1,000-
One major difference between types of firms is the treatment of
liabilities. In the case of proprietorships and partnerships, the
owners bear personal responsibility for the liabilities of their
firms. In the case of limited partnerships and corporations,
investor liabilities are limited to the amount invested in the
company. Egyptian law, however, requires that in the case of limited
partnership, at least one of the partners responsible for running
the partnership be personally responsible for the firm's liabilities
(31). The small number of private corporations in Egyptian
contracting, despite the advantages of incorporation, is an indication
of a certain reluctance to form large private firms. Besides the
fact that corporations are obliged to sell their shares on the public
stock exchange, thus reducing the possibilities for a family or
concern to exercise full control over the firm, government interven-
tion may also have contributed to such reluctance. Although the
initial capital requirement for corporations in Egypt is relatively
low (minimum of L.E. 5,000), the law stipulates that a corporation
must receive special permission from the president of the republic
to be legally approved. This permission includes approval of the
board of directors appointed to run the company. (31). Furthermore,
the law stipulates a maximum allowable renumeration payable to board
members of these private corporations and does not allow individuals
to serve on the boards of more than two firms.*
* Law 43 for 1976 for foreign investment and free zones exempted firms
initiated under its stipulations from such requirements.
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Public sector firms, regardless of their size and specialization,
are all organized as corporations, with their board of directors
appointed by the government and, as mentioned previously, supervised
by various government ministries. With regard to private sector
firms, albeit statistics are lacking, one would expect their organi-
zation to vary depending on their size and type of work. From
interviews, it seems that most proprietorships are found in the
specialty or labor contractor categories, where the required
investment is minimal and the nature of the work very specialized.
Sometimes, however, small general contractors also are proprietor-
ships, most of them taking the form of simple limited partnership
firms. This form is also commonly taken by larger specialty contrac-
tors as they enlarge their activities.
The differences that exist between private and public contrac-
tors, stemming from the type as well as the size of work each performs,
extend also to the way that work is performed. Figures 3-1 through
3-6 detail organizational schema collected from interviews with
contractors in Cairo, showing company positions and the activities
performed by each position for 3 specialty contractors and 2 general
contractors from the private sector, as well as one general contractor
from the public sector. Consideration of these firms as examples and
study of the way they perform their activities, including executive
function, accounting and payroll, procurement and warehousing,
estimating, engineering and construction (32), insight can be gained
as to some of the differences that exist between public and private
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FIGURE 3-2
Organizational Schema for A Private Sector Electrical Works Contractor
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FIGURE 3-3
Organizational Schema for a Private Sector General Building Contractor
(Source: Ref. 33)
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Executive functions, which include financing decisions, long-
range planning, contract negotiations, salary and bonus setting,
among other tasks, are in both cases the responsibility of the execu-
tive in charge, or the board of directors. In private firms, when
responsibility is not delegated as in Figure 3-1, or even when
distributed among the partners either geographically as in Figures
3-2 and 3-3 or functionally as in Figure 3-4, executive functions are
still carried out by the executive in charge. In public sector firms
the case is no different as far as responsibility is concerned, but
other senior executives have predefined roles set by public sector
firm laws and regulations (Figures 3-5 and 3-6). Such regulations
define, among other things, the organization of the company, respon-
sibilities of different management personnel, and rules for compensa-
tion and salary levels of employees. These regulations usually lie
beyond the control of the firm's board of directors, which has to
operate within them. For example, major expenditures by the firm
might require, in addition to approval from the board, approval from
the various relevant ministries in the government. Such rules and
regulations constitute a major part of the difference between the
public and private sectors, since in the private sector such matters
are regulated for the most part by the individuals involved.
Besides with regard to financing decisions, which will be inves-
tigated more fully in the following section, the differences between
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public and private firms is pronouned in the carrying out of any
diversification in other areas of specialization or other geographic
locations, which is a tendency demonstrated by many contractors in
Egypt today. In both sectors the decision to diversify is an
executive one, and thus closely controlled by the executive in
charge. In the public sector, however, this decision has to be
discussed with the appropriate government agencies; for example,
contracting in other Arab countries by public contractors is coordi-
nated by the Egyptian government, which directs firms to the various
locations. Also, while in the private sector this diversification
starts developing very slo;ly, in the public sector, as soon as a new
activity starts to develop ii the firm, the tendency is to create an
affiliate to specialize in t:at activity, as shown in Figure 3-5.
Accounting and payroll activities, which include record keeping,
tax payment, billing, col , ction, and personnel record keeping, among
others, in private small firms are usually handled by an independent
accountant, although most firms also have clerks to keep some form of
books ready for tax purposes at least. These clerks are more often
than not hired on a temporary basis to help the proprietors and
executives (Figure 3-1); the latter, however, take care personally
of paying dues and collecting money. Larger firms in the private
sector might have an in-house administration accounting function
(Figures 3-2 through 3-5); but most of the work is still handled by
the senior executive, especially the billing and even payment of
invoices. In public sector firms, except in special circumstances,
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i.e. special projects, these functions are performed by the two
executives in charge of administration and financing respectively.
The senior executive is involved only in* final budgeting, administra-
tive regulation setting, and financial status checking. Auditing is
required from public companies, and the law makes the setting up of
an auditing department in each firm compulsory to monitor the
accounting system, which is then checked over annually by the Central
Agency for Auditing. In the private sector the auditing is done by
those outside accountants who judge the accuracy of the company books.
Procurement in large firms may be divided into two distinct
activities, as in Figure 3-6: procurement and warehousing, each
having its own executive in charge at the firm level. Smaller firms
do not make that distinction between purchase and storage; some
private firms may not even envisage procurement as an independent
activity, and add it to the responsibility of the partner in charge
of field operations. This individual schedules the needs of the
various projects and acquires those materials, as in Figure 3-3.
Warehousing in small firms is very limited, as they do not carry much
inventory. Subcontracting to other firms in the case of private sector
firms is a decision taken by the partner in charge of field operations,
together with the senior executive. In public sector firms this
decision is usually delegated to the technical director in charge of
projects. Financial and contractual agreements with the subcontractors
are usually arranged by the executive officers in both cases. When
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contracts are signed, the relation is monitored by the office partner
in private firms and by the financial department in public companies.
Depending on the characteristics of executives who run the firm
and the types of work that they do, estimating may develop as an
important activity. Private contractors in Egypt range from illiter-
ates to individuals with PhD's. For specialty contractors, particu-
larly those who specialize in a narrow field like masonry work or
carpentry, estimating is usually done without the help of either
in-house or outside specialists. But general contractors, especially
when they are not engineers themselves, usually employ in-house
specialists, or at least have long-term arrangements with a consulting
office for assistance with quantities, take off and estimation.
On ordinary projects the take-off is usually calculated by the
contractor's own staff of engineers or technicians. Although public
firms possess the technical capability to perform the estimating
activity in terms of personnel, these latter may lack the necessary
experience in bidding due to the former practice of awarding contracts
to firms through direct order; only those firms which have performed
outside of Egypt are likely to possess such capability. The decision
itself to bid is usually taken by the senior executive of the firm in
the case of the private sector firms where one-of the partners is in
charge of field operations, as in Figure 3-2. In public sector firms
this decision is also taken by the senior executive, only in limited
number of cases that authority is delegated to technical directors,
as will be discussed shortly. In the case of firms working abroad
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(Figures 3-3 and 3-5), decisions to bid are taken usually by the
senior executive of the firm, even if decisions to bid for work
inside Egypt might be delegated to lower ranks in the organization.
Engineering work, which includes making shop drawings and
checking plans, in the case of private firms is usually carried out
by outside consultants. Even with public contractors, some medium-
sized firms do not have such a department (34). In .those companies
that have such departments, even if the department has grown to
become an independent firm, as in the case of Figure 3-5, it takes
only a staff role in the activities of estimating and construction
for the firm's projects. It does not supervise the construction or
the activities of other departments of the company. It takes an
active role only in the rare cases where the contractor undertakes a
design/construct package. Some firms entrust these departments with
the duty of planning and follow-up on the work in progress, but the
large public.sector firms usually have separate departments for such
activities, as in Figure 3-6. These, however, like the engineering
departments, usually take only a staff role, which, as will be
discussed later is hampered by the lack of formality in planning and
control of projects.
The construction activity itself includes supervision of one's own
labor force, coordination between subcontractors, and control of
project progress, among other things (32). Because it is central to
the performance of the firm, it will be discussed more fully in
Chapter IV. What is worthy of note here is the way this activity is
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supervised. In private firms this is usually done through one or more
partners (Figures 3-1 through 3-5). This is especially important in
private firms, most of which do not necessarily hire resident
engineers and tend to rely on a few trained foremen or even on just
highly skilled permanent workers in the firm to supervise the work
on site (34). It is also a common practice with small contractors to
sell small jobs to these foremen on subcontracts, so as to minimize
the necessary supervision. Many contractors, however, fear that this
practice might jeopardize the quality of the work and ultimately
affect their own reputation. In the public sector, on the other hand,
where engineers used to be more abundant and the size of jobs larger,
it is common practice to have resident engineers at each site or at
the most, every two sites. These resident engineers/project managers
are usually supervised by an executive manager who reports to senior
executives, usually either a vice-president or the chairman (see
Figure 3-6).
Many contractors organize their construction activities geogra-
phically as in Figures 3-2, 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5. A few firms make this
functional classification by-type of facility, as in Figure 3-5.
However, as was detailed in the above discussions, most contractor
activities are essentially centrally controlled, in the case of private
as well as public sector companies. As a company's activities grow
in size and become more diversified, this central control becomes more
difficult to exercise. Private contractors' response to this diffi-
culty is often to maintain supervision of the divisions by the
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partners, especially since in many instances partners are family
members, which renders informal communication easier. Public
contractors also tend to create divisions, but because of control
requirements, these divisions are not usually independent. Only one
public contractor was able to implement a system that made it
possible for the firm to run its divisions as separate, independent
branches, with each branch carrying most of the responsibilities of
a separate firm.
The above description illustrates the importance of the planning
and control activities for contracting firms, which is why these
issues are to be further investigated. Before doing so, however, a
few issues that have been advanced as problems in Egypt will be
discussed, namely, the financingand securing of work for the firm.
3.4 Financing of Firms
Both public and private contractors in Egypt consider financing
to be an important issue constraining their performance. Private
firms complain mainly about the inaccessability as well as the
inadequacy of the financing available to them (33). Public firms
complain also of the inadequacy of financing, and further of the
burden added to their costs by financing costs, especially in making
capital investment financing(34).
Figures on the credit extended to contractors in Egypt in Table
3-8 show that traditionally these credits, extended by the government
controlled banks, have been relatively low compared to those extended
to the industry sector. Construction's share annually has ranged
114
from 5 to 9 percent of the total credit extended to non-government
agencies; industry's share ranged between 27 and 40 percent in the
period from 1966 to 1975. In monetary terms, construction credit
ranged from a low of L.E. 25 million to a high of L.E. 47 million,
while the low for industry was L.E. 125 million and its high was
L.E. 350 million.
The private sector in the mid-sixties was only allowed to consume
some 10 to 15 percent of the total credit extended, as shown in Table
3-8. This situation changed in the mid-seventies, and the sector's
share of credit rose to 25 percent in 1975. But this happened at a
time when because of the shortage of labor previously discussed in
Chapter 2, one might expect that the private sector was competing
somewhat with public firms for long-term loans.
Table 3-8 shows that the value of total credit extended to
individuals and firms has increased over the years. This increase,
however, is shown in current Egyptian pounds; furthermore, this
increase in total value was not always accompanied by increases in
the credit extended to the industry and construction sectors. Their
share of the total changed from time to time. It fell following
decline in Fixed Capital Investments (described in Chapter 2); at
times of low fixed capital investment in the production sectors, the
trade sectors took priority with respect to credit. In 1969/70 and
1973, for example, trade took priority over industry in order to
satisfy the country's demnad for food, a situation probably resulting
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from shortage of foreign exchange in the economy (20). Industry and
construction's share increased again in 1974 and 1975, when foreign
exchange became more available through foreign loans and assistance.
These affect the financing available to contractors, since most of
the finance required for equipment purchase is in foreign exchange.
In order to assess the extent of the financing problems facing
contractors, we need to look at their requirements. However, figures
on the breakdown of financing required by contractors in Egypt with
regard to equipment purchase versus working capital are not readily
available. But taking a look at the composition of the assets held
by some public sector contractors might give some insight as to the
extent of those requirements. Figures on the value of the different
assets held are accounting figures taken from a variety of company
balance sheets. These figures show the book value of fixed assets.
Depreciation figures for the fixed assets, unfortunately, are not
disaggregated to show the depreciation of the various items composing
these fixed assets. For our purposes this can be remedied by
considering only the addition to those fixed assets between consecutive
years. Furthermore, the available aggregate information does not
show what proportion of these assets was financed through banks as
opposed to what proportion was bought for cash or financed through
suppliers' facilities.
Nevertheless, the value of assets held by the 29 public sector
contracting firms supervised by the Ministry of Housing is shown for
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the years 1974 and 1975 in Table 3-9. The value of machines and
tools represents some 90 percent of the increase in total fixed assets
of the 29 companies. The increase was about L.E. 25.5 million,
which would represent a little more than half of the construction
credit extended in 1975 for all public and private contractors in
Egypt. However, there is no indication of the loan-financed amount
of those 25.5 million pounds.. The table also confirms what was
mentioned earlier about the 3 largest firms using nearly 50 percent
of their income while the remaining 26 firms share the other 50
percent. For smaller private sector firms it is expected that
requirements would be far smaller. The table further shows that
inventories of building materials represent some 15 to 16 percent of
the total assets for these firms, while the net fixed assets
represent only some 8 to 10 percent. This is more pronounced in the
smaller firms, with inventories representing some 16 percent of total
assets while net fixed assets represent only 8 percent. It is
expected that this would be more often the case with private contrac-
tors, who require less fixed assets to perform their activities, as
previously discussed.*
Although this implies that the role of equipment in Egyptian
construction is of minor significance, thus attributing short-term
financing with more importance and maybe impact on firms, long-term
loans remain important and the existing system for extending them to
* See Chapter 2 and Section 3.2 above.
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TABLE 3-9
Assets Held by Contractors in the Public Sector Controlled by
the Minstry of Housing
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contractors creates distortions that work against private sector
firms. First, the government directly finances public sector
equipment purchases through the annual budget; and at a time when the
foreign exchange regulations were strict, public sector firms
received preferential treatment. Foreign exchange quotas were set
by the government for various sectors, giving priority to government
and public sector projects. Since public contractors usually worked
on such projects, they received priority over private sector firms.
It is only recently that the parallel market system, whereby exporters
of goods from Egypt may use their funds to import goods to the country,
has allowed more flexibility in these regulations. Also, since
enactment of the open door policy, many equipment suppliers have
started to operate in Egypt, through either representative offices
or agencies; these have started to extend suppliers' credit to
contracting firms, arranging for credit to be extended directly to the
buyer from the manufacturer of the equipment. These suppliers have
made it easier for contractors to afford equipment also by accepting
payment in local currency and then arranging for the exchange
themselves.
This, however, is somewhat distorted by the regulations governing
commercial banks in Egypt. These often require from private firms
collateral with a value that may surpass the amount of the loan. (33)
Because of such regulations, equipment financing may still favor
public sector firms, which are backed by the government, and larger
private sector firms which have real estate assets that can be used to
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satisfy collateral requirements.
Turning to short-term financing, 3 main sources of such
financing exist: supplier credit,- client payment, and bank loans.
Since nationalization of primary building materials production and
their trade facilities, it has been common practice for public sector
suppliers to require payment in advance for chief materials such as
cement and steel (14). The monopoly these suppliers enjoyed over
those materials forced contractors to comply. Suppliers were thus
not contributing to contractors' working capital requirements, thus
reducing the financing available from this.source. Client payments
at the same time are late, and downpayment procedure is not regular.
As an example, in 1977 the 29 companies of the Ministry of Housing
had some L.E. 190 million in back payments from the government.
This put liquidity pressure on contractors and on their subcontrac-
tors, forcing them to rely on bank loans and credits. In 1974, loans
to the above-mentioned 29 companies alone were L.E. 20 million; in
1975, L.E. 35 million. (41) Examination of the figures on inventories
in Table 3-9 leads to the conclusion that about 50 percent of
contractor requirements on the average are financed through bank
loans.
In extending working capital loans, government-controlled
commercial banks also exercise discrimination between public and
private sector contractors. The rate of interest is usually not
different for the two types, but some differences may exist in treat-
ment of the firms as a result of regulations assigning different rates
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for individuals and corporations. The interest rate on short-term
loans is set 2 percent higher than the rate paid as interest on
deposits (40). The latter in 1977 was 5.5 percent for individuals
and 6.5 percent for corporations (40). As in the case of long-term
loans, public sector firms, because of government backing, secure
loans more easily from banks. Private firms may have to give up a
large part of their profit on a specific project to secure financing
for it from the banks. The bank in this case "buys" the project from
the contractor and thus assumes the financial burden, while the
contractor assumes technical and managerial responsibilities for
carrying out the work. Furthermore, many of the very small
contracting firms in the private sector may have difficulty meeting
bank requirements, e.g. orderly ';ooks, statement of assets, registra-
tion numbers, etc. Such requirrcnents may hamper the use, especially
by very small contractors, of jrmal financing mechanisms. These
very small contractors probably acquire their financing through an
informal system which operates on a more personal basis. This is most
evident in the construction of "informal housing" around the urban
areas in Egypt (29).
The example of the 29 companies, however, gives some indication
of the severity of the problem with regard to overall availability
of financing for all contractors. These 29 companies, as demonstrated
in previous sections, are responsible for a little over 1/3 of the
production of the construction industry in Egypt.* The outstanding
* See Section 3.2.
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short-term loans to these firms in 1974 and 1975 represents some 70
percent of total credit extended to the industry, shown in Table 3-8.
This means that the remaining 29 public contractors and the 13,000
private firms are competing for only 30 percent of the available
'credit, for both long- and short-term uses.
In order to evaluate the effect of the financial market on the
performance of construction firms, we considered the financial
documents of a diversified sample of contractors. Many difficulties
however stand in the way of such an attempt, especially with regard to
private sector firms.
Small private firms, which are mostly proprietorships and
partnerships, are not required by law to publish their financial
statements. Actually, they are required only to keep regular accounts
for tax purposes, if their capital exceeds L.E. 2,000. The minimum
requirements set by law are a general ledger posting current income
and expenses, plus an inventory ledger showing merchandise in stock.
Corporations, on the other hand, are required by law to publish their
end-of-year financial statement, which is prepared according to common
Egyptian accounting practice. This is similar to most Western
accounting systems, from dual entry of transactions to reflection of
historic costs and application of the revenue realization concept (41).
However, such documents are not readily available for examination and
may not be representative of the private sector, since as we discussed
earlier, only a very few private contractors are incorporated. On
the other hand, in the late sixties, when government had extended
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its control over most production facilities and public sector firms
were operating in almost all sectors of the economy, an accounting
system was devised by the government for implementation by those firms.
This system, the Unified Accounting System, was created to standardize
the accounting procedures used in public sector firms, to facilitate
their supervision by the government, and to link company activities
to the Egyptian National Accounts; it is used in all public sector
firms except banks and insurance companies (42).
Information on this system is readily available, as well as
the financial documents of the 29 companies supervised by the Ministry
of Housing. It is therefore possible to study the financial position
of the latter and by so doing gain an insight into the financial
constraints on their activities. This will lead to some understanding
of the industry, since, as previously demonstrated, these firms are
varied in size and specialization and are responsible for a major
part of the output of the industry. In order to understand the import
of the accounting figures included in the financial statements of these
firms, a description of the Unified Accounting System and some of its
limitations with regard to contracting firms is given as an appendix,
showing the effects, for instance, of rulings on depreciation and
inventory valuation on the figures reported by these firms.
The return on investment,* which is an indicator of a firm's
performance, is affected by many factors, such as sales, expenses, and
* The ratio of the after-tax net income generated by the firm to the
amounts invested in it. (41)
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invested capital, as shown in Figure 3-7. Although in the figure
invested capital is shown as equal to working capital and non-current
assets owned, invested capital can also be viewed as the owners'
equity, which represents the amounts the owners have invested in the
firm (41). The value of the owners' equity, in our case government
equity, for the 29 companies in fiscal years 1974 and 1975, and the
net income figures for these companies are in the consolidated balance
sheets and income statement in Appendix 2. This net
income is generated from contracting and other incidental incomes, as
can be seen from the table; however, since general and indirect
expenses are not allocated separately for contracting and other
activities, we will have to use the net income figure, assuming
thereby that contracting activity is the major source of income for
all the firms. With that qualification in mind, it is possible to
calculate the rate of return on equity for the 29 companies, which
averaged some 23.75 percent in those 2 years.
The usefulness of the rate would be greater if data were available
on its development with respect to time or for different industries
in Egypt. Nevertheless, some information may still be gained from
that figure when comparing it with figures for other countries.
References show that in the United States in 1970, corporate contract
construction had a rate of return on shareholders' investment of some
16 percent, that rate fluctuating over the years from a high of 22 to
a low of 7 percent. Also, the ratio for contracting firms was almost
always a little higher than for other corporate industries, and its
125
FIGURE 3-7






























fluctuations more pronounced. It might be expected that in Egyptian
construction this would also be the case, because, as discussed in
Chapter 2, construction requires less capital than industry and its
output fluctuates more than industry. Likewise, if we consider the
groups that form the 29 companies under study, defined in Section
3.2, it can be seen that the return on equity fluctuates widely
depending on the group, from zero to almost 29.5 percent one year,
and from 1.0 to 23 percent the next. Such wide differences, although
partly explainable by the differences in firm size and specialization,
warrant a closer look at the performance of these firms.
The relationship in Figure 3-7 indicates two components inter-
acting to produce the rate of return on invested capital: the
profit margin, which is the ratio of net income to the value of
sales, on the one hand; and capital turnover, which is the ratio of
sales to invested capital, on the other, The net profit margin (or
return on sales) can be calculated directly from the income state-
ments; for the 29 companies it was in the range of 4 percent. The
sales figure that is used in calculating this ratio is the value of
the work on which profits were calculated. As discussed in the
Appendix, this figure is usually different from the value of work
executed during the year. Parts of this volume are forwarded to the
following year, and parts of it are continued from previous years.
The figure does not take into consideration, either, the incidental
and extra income generated during the year, which to some extent
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increases a firm's income, so this sales volume usually understates
actual sales of the firm. Using the volume of work executed during
the year, however, may be misleading in the absence of disaggregate
data on the income statement with regard to which work did versus
which work did not generate profits. With these qualifications in
mind, we see from Table 3-10 that the ratio for the various groups
of firms also fluctuates frum zero to about 6 percent. If we
consider, however, the gross margin from contracting for all groups
of firms, we find that with the exception of small specialty firms
the ratio tends to be consistently about 12 percent of sales. Small
differences can clearly be attributed to the type of work executed,
with specialty firms which did not incur many direct expenses related
to the work realizing the largest gross margin.
It is clear that after adding general expenses, even after
augmenting sales by the value of incidental and other income, these
specialty contractors realized the lowest return on sales, realizing
as low as 3.5 and even zero percent. This happened at times when the
sales volume of all firms increased, even non-building contractors',
whose profit margin fell considerably despite the increase in sales.
These facts emphasize the effect of expense control on the profitability
of firms, especially smaller ones; they also show the overhead burden
carried by the public firms which may cause income loss. Private
firms, which are smaller still in size but less subject to regulation,
might be somewhat better off with regard to overhead expenses, although
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being smaller, it is expected that their profit margin would be a
little lower than that of public firms. This may justify the fact
that the tax office-usually taxes contractors who do not keep
regular records using the rule of thumb that 5 percent of sales
represents taxable income, which at a 40 percent tax rate makes the
net profits of private firms about 3 percent of sales.
The profit margin-measure fails to take into consideration the
investment needed to generate this income. This is an important
issue since even with low profit margins firms can still. achieve
high rates of return, by increasing their investment turnover.
Table 3-10 shows the ranges of turnover for various groups of firms,
according to differing definitions of "investment," which is variously
defined as equity, invested capital, or even total assets owned by
the firm. This figure gives an indication of the capital (investment)
intensity of a firm, which explains why in the three sets of turnover
ratios, non-building companies show a somewhat lower ratio than other -
firms; it is expected that non-building construction firms require
higher investments than building construction firms. Considering
the ratio using invested capital, the reasons for difference
between rates of return on investment referred to earlier can be
partially explained. The small specialty contractors in 1974 had a
turnover ratio of 10, when the average was 5.6, although these
companies did not realize any profits, due probably to increased
expenses. In 1975 their turnover dropped to almost half, but they
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realized a rate of return somewhat similar to other firms'. Large
firms did not experience remarkable changes during those two years.
This might suggest that one could expect this rate of return to be
sustainable by firms. The non-building firms, on the other hand,
realized a drop in rates of return in 1975 to almost one third
their 1974 level. This might suggest either that the sales increases
which occurred that year were inadequate compared to the increase
in capital, or that the 1974 rate was not sustainable due to the
nature of non-building construction, which generally involves large
projects, Without more qualitative information, however, the ratios
themselves do not favor either of these possibilities.
One further piece of information is revealed by the turnover
ratios. It has to do with the difference between the various invest-
ment ratios used. The ratios for invested capital turnover and
equity turnover per year were in the range of 5, while those for
total asset turnover per year were less than 1 (see Table 3-10). The
reason for this large difference is the relatively small portion of
both equity and invested capital in total assets. For both large
and small contractors, equify represented only less than 30 percent
of total assets. With most assets and liabilities in the form of
short-term investments, working capital plays a major role in control-
ling contractor performance, as if affects both the turnover as well
as the liquidity of the firms.
Receivables and payables are two issues that affect the availa-
bility of working capital for firms. From the receivables turnover
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ratio, which indicates the speed of receivables collection, it can
be seen that on the average the collection period for the 29
companies was a little over 200 days (see Table 3-10). While it was
within the same range for the large contractors, the averages for
non-building and small specialty firms were much longer: 230 for
the former and 320 for the latter. It is expected that this situation
also affects the accounts payable of a firm; these have, as expected,
a somewhat shorter collection period than receivables, averaging 140
days. These ratios also show that when the receivables situation
improved somewhat in 1975, so did the payables. The ratios further
indicate that smaller firms tend to suffer slightly more than
larger ones from these long collection periods. Although the lack
of statistics prevents the development of a measure of optimal
collection time for contractor receivables, some insight can be
gained by considering the billing process of contractors. Usually
contractors bill clients every month, with a billing period equal to
30 days; likewise, it is not expected that the payment period extend
much byond a similar 30 days (14). This would make the 200-day
figure seem 3 times larger than it should be, which has an adverse
effect on loans received from banks, as with the increase in time
comes an increase in cost.
Other indicators of liquidity, such as the current ratio, which
is equal to current assets divided by current liabilities, tend to
reinforce these impressions with regard to the inability of firms to
meet their obligations in a timely fashion. The current ratio for
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the 29 companies is barely 1.0, and for smaller firms, as would be
expected, the ratio is less than for larger ones. This clearly
protrays the effect of late receivables on the working capital
conditions of a firm, which, as indicated here, must finance part of
its current liability from long-term sources. If we investigate
more closely by using the acid-test ratio which excludes inventories
from current assets, the ratio is clearly below 1 for all types of
firms. One qualification is worthy of note here; current liabilities
include allowances for bad debt, tax payment, and the like. These
allowances are usually set arbitrarily based on past experience.
This may result in an overestimation of current liabilities. Also
the inventories of contracting firms are usually perishable and move
relatively fast. Taking these two factors into consideration may
improve the outlook somewhat, but on the overall firms are faced
with a substantial liquidity problem with regard to meeting their
short-term commitments. One would expect private sector firms to
face similar problems of liquidity, if anything, more severe, since
their accessibility to financing is more restricted.
Long-term assets and liabilities do not represent a large pro-
portion of the total assets of public contractors; only 12 percent
of total assets are long-term. The financing of those assets is
usually through long-term instruments, either equity or long-term
loans (14). The ratio of long-term debt to capitalization for the
29 companies changed from 1.46 to less than one between 1974 and 1975.
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The less-than-one ratio indicates that firms tend to finance some of
their fixed assets acquisition through the use of short-term
sources, be they client advances or short-term loans. Although the
ratio includes the value of assets net the depreciation, which, as
explained in the Appendix, may not represent either the real book or
the market value of these assets, coverage of long-term debt is very
small in general, especially for small contractors. Despite the
lack of historic data from which one might extract a trend, and
especially despite the fact that values did generally drop that year,
possible explanation may be found for that low ratio. The ratio
could be the result of mismanagement on the part of the company, since
some of the firms had a relatively high coverage value, while others
did not. Also, this low ratio may reflect difficulties faced by
these firms with respect to obtaining long-term facilities for
financing their acquisitions. This can be substantiated by considering
the ratio of equity to fixed assets for the non-building contractors,
which had larger debt-to-capitalization ratios than building
contractors, had almost similar ratios in this case, which shows
that these firms did finance their atquisition through equity as
opposed to debt mechanisms. It is not, however, definite whether this
financing through equity is because of government regulations or due
to lack of available bank financing. But it can be assumed that the
government, in light of its control over the assets of firms as well
as the financing mechanisms in the economy, would rather invest in
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the equity of firms and earn a higher return on its i.nvestment than
do so through the banking systen, as the expected return on equity
in these firms is higher than the interest earned by any government
loan. If this is true, then it is natural to find that credit
available to firms through banks is limited. This limitation on
credit affects private sector firms most since they do not enjoy
the privilege of government-backed investment.
This analysis, constrained by the availability of data both on
firms working in other industries in Egypt and with regard to a
more extended historical record of these 29 public contractors,
possesses limited capability for detecting any quantitative trend or
for establishing firm industry averages for the performance and
financial condition of contractors in Egypt. But it reinforces what
was forwarded earlier, that financing problems do exist, especially
for small- and medium-size private sector firms.
3.5 Securing Contracts in the Industry
Traditionally in Egypt contracts were awarded on a lump sum or
unit cost basis after a comp-etition between contractors. After
nationalization of the various production facilities in 1961 the
government became the largest client in Egypt. Directly through its
own work it was responsible for over 50 percent of the construction
of non-building facilities, as well as commercial and institutional
buildings, and for some 40 percent of residential buildings.
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Indirectly through its public sector firms it was responsible for
over 75 percent of industrial construction and about another 40
percent of non-building construction. This made the private.sector
responsible for only a little over 10 percent of the residential
construction and about 7 percent of other buildings
(3,4).
To qualify for work in the formal sector in Egypt, all contractors,
public or private, partnership or corporation, are required to
register with the Conmmercial Registry (44). The application requires
some basic data about the firm, date of establishment, type of firm,
address of main office. The Chamber of Commerce for the geographic
area concerned is the body responsible for checking these applications,
and based on the latter's certificate, the Commercial Registry issues
a registration number to the firm. The Chamber of Commerce require-
ments for registration are minimal. The firm is considered qualified
if it is owned by a qualified engineer, or if it owns the equipment/
tools necessary for the trade, or if it has worked for public sector
firms in the past (45). To work for the private sector it may not
be entirely necessary to have this commercial registration; however,
the government has made delivery of the materials it controls, such
as glass, wood, etc., to any firm contingent on this registration.
Small firms manage to perform work for private clients without
official registration, especially on small jobs, relying either on
the client or on the black market for securing building materials (10).
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To perform work for the government and for public sector firms,
private contractors were further required to register
with the Office of Private Contractors in the Ministry of Housing.
This office's main role was to monitor their work and to make sure
that these firms did not exceed the yearly ceiling.* Each contractor,
after registering with the Commercial Registry, had to make separate
application to this office, where immediately a file would be
opened. Every time any government or publi sector client plans to
sign a contract with a private firm, he is required to ask the
Private Contractor's Office for approval. If the office issues
permission, then the public client can act. The Office monitors the
amount of work performed by keeping track of the work awarded and
adjusting the record after work has been completed. The Office also
has on file a performance evaluation sheet that is turned in with
the notice of completion of each contract. But since the main task
of this office in the past has been to monitor the ceiling on private
contractors, it is not certain that such evaluation was being closely
followed; in the office's twelve years of existence, only some ten
contractors have defaulted (28).
The last place for registration of contractors is with the
client agencies themselves. Most government agencies advertise
yearly for interested contractors to register with them so that they
may be able to participate in competitions launched by those agencies.
* Since the ceiling was lifted entirely in 1978, it is not clear
whether this registration is still required or not.
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The series of registration requirements notwithstanding, prequalifi-
cation procedures appear to be of arbitrary stringency in Egypt.
First, public contractors, being owned and guaranteed by the govern-
ment, do not have to go through the same procedures as private
contractors to qualify. Second, no formal classification exists
which delineates what constitutes being qualified to perform the
work in question for the respective client agencies.
With lump sum or unit price contracts, the bill of quantities
is usually handed to the contractor with the tender documents. (33)
The prices of building materials and labor are thus set at the
beginning of the contract. Although government contracts usually
allow for increases in official prices of building materials, the
delay in obtaining and the scarcity of such materials, investigated
more closely in Chapter 4, add to the contractor's problems.
Furthermore, the law allows a client government agency to alter the
contract by 25 percent, up or down, without having to readjust the
unit prices or compensate the contractor for change. (48) Such
actions increase the factor of uncertainty for contractors and may
have an inflationary effect on their prices. Fixed price contracts
make the role of the contractor dependent to a large extent on the
professionals preparing the drawings, especially since civil law
holds them both responsible for any failure in the structure. The
fact that these professionals are somewhat organized in a represen-
tative body, namely the Syndicate of Egyptian Engineers, helps them
to define their role, responsibility and liability. Contractor
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responsibilities, on the other hand, are largely defined by the
clients and professionals. These issues, plus the inadequacies
that exist in codes and specifications, reinforce the contractors'
feelings of insecurity. (33)
On government and public sector contracts performance bonds and
guarantees are required. Such requirements may set an example for
private sector clients; these latter, however, in many cases do not
require such sureties and rely more on reputation in dealing with
contracting firms. Bids presented to a government agency have to be
accompanied by a temporary deposit of about 1 percent of the total
contract value and no less than 2 percent of the value of all
subcontraction bids. This guarantee may be-in cash, but more often
than not it is in the form of a bank guarantee drawn on an approved
bank. In most of the interviews conducted, private contractors
claimed that public sector contractors are usually even exempted
from such deposits, at least for government work. (33)
Immediately after contract award, the contractor must raise the
temporary guarantee to cover 5 percent of the value of the construc-
tion awarded and 10 percent of any other deliveries, as a performance
guarantee. This is further supplemented by a 5 percent withholding
from each payment effected to the contractor during execution. This
performance bond is released in two stages. The first 5 percent
is returned upon project completion and the second, one year after
final delivery. Contractors are held jointly responsible with
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professionals by civil law for the safety of the structure for 10
years after final delivery (46). Most contractors carry liability
insurance with local insurance companies to cover that liability,
although recentl-y the law also requires the private owners of any
building worth more than L.E. 10,000 to provide liability insurance
covering them and any third party for the same 10-year period. (47)
Contractors must also make provision for labor and equipment insur-
ance, which usually runs around 3 percent of costs. (33) Such
insurances add to the financial burden of private contractors, who
have to cover a large portion of their guarantees with banks. For
new firms more than 35 percent of the value of these guarantees has
to be backed by L.E. currency in the bank. This may fall to 20
percent as the company becomes more established; however, the exact
figure usually depends on the value of the assets used as collateral
by the firm. (34) This financial burden is not alleviated by the
schedule of payments to the contractor. While regulations do
instruct that contractors should be paid installments according to
the progress of the work, they do not specify that advances should
be made. Public contractors, however, usually receive 20 to 25
percent in advance payments, so do private sector general contractors,
while the advance payment for private firms working as subcontractors
is left to the discretion of the main contractor and his resident
engineer.
Government efforts to protect public sector firms, maintain their
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profits in the government treasury, and implement the government's
ambitious goals did not help to improve the contract letting proce-
dure. The direct order system introduced in 1962, while it may have
speeded up contract award for public sector firms, had some negative
effects on firms. Contracts were entered into before unit costs
could be determined by the contractor. Prices were set as the work
progressed by prive committees made up of the contractor, the
client, and a representative of the Ministry of Housing as an arbi-
trator. This delayed the payment process and dues settlement for
contractors. Furthermore, it allowed projects to be initiated
without adequate technical or financial preparation, thus worsening
the relationship between contractors, clients, and professionals.
It is even believed that this practice, being a cost-plus approach,
contributed to increases in price of construction in Egypt, causing
the government to issue directives in 1978 to all Agencies mandating
reversion to competitive bidding. (40)
Aside from the ceiling on government and public sector work,
contractors in the private sector consider the Egyptian tax laws to
constitute another disincentive for them. (33) While both public
and private contractors are subject to the main basic tax, "the
commercial and industrial profits tax" levied on a firm's profits at
the flat rate of 39.7 percent, some differences in the treatment of
public and private contractors exist. Private firms, whether corpor-
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ations, limited partnerships, proprietorships, or full partnerships,
are taxed more than once, basically, under the graduated "general
income" tax. The first tax levied on these companies is the tax on
income from movable capital, which is set at a rate of 40.55 percent
of all dividends, directors' fees paid out in corporations or limited
partnerships, and on any deposits and guarantees due to individuals
in partnerships or proprietorships. This tax, although consuming
part of the profits, is deducted from the profits which are subject
to the "industrial and commercial profits" tax. But all individuals,
whether shareholders in a corporation or partners, are then taxed
again under the "general income" tax. Although other taxes and some
minor expenses are deducted in calculating the accounts taxed (10-
20 percent of income), this graduated tax up until 1978 started at 8
percent for a taxable income of L.E. 1,000 to 1,500 and reached 95
percent for incomes over L.E. 10,000. This probably inhibited many
private firms, especially since in cases where the tax office did not
have a firm's books, it arbitrarily treated 5 percent* of total
income as taxable profit.
Under conditions discriminating against private firms with
regard to the volume of work, accessability to financing, and resource
availability, private sector contractors assumed a secondary role.
Some firms strove to continue their efforts, while others preferred
to leave the industry altogether. Those who continued to work
* This 5 percent figure was quoted by the Cairo Contractors Tax
Office; other participants voiced figures as high as 20 percent.
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attempted to secure work in the industry by various means.
One common approach during the sixties was based on the idea
of cooperation between private firms. Contractors, like any other
private businesses, can, under Egyptian law, form cooperative societies,
with the basic intent of rendering service to their members. These
cooperatives are usually geographically determined units located
in the various- governorates of Egypt. By negotiating with the local
government and securing a participation of some 50 percent there
from in its capital, the cooperative receives public sector status.
This allows the cooperative to bid on government or public sector
projects without being subject to a ceiling and maybe also to be
free of bond and preliminary deposit restrictions. Private members
use the cooperative name and work individually on projects, paying
a certain percentage to the cooperative, ranging from 3 to 6 percent
of their profits, for that privilege. (33)
Another approach to securing work was for a contractor to
register with various agencies under different, even fictitious, names.
Because close control was lacking, he would be able to get larger
contracts by securing smaller parts under a different name. It has
been suggested that even public contractors in letting out subcontracts
knew of this practice and did not report it. (33)
By mid-1978, however, discriminatory practices were reduced to
a minimum, if not abolished. The ceiling on private contractors was
eliminated; the general income tax was drastically reduced. It now
143
graduates from 8 percent for incomes between L.E. 1,200 and L.E.
2,000 to 80 percent for incomes over L.E. 100,000 (36). This was
subsequent to the open door policy's encouraging foreign contracting
firms to joint venture with local firms. With regard to the letting
of work, the only action that was taken was an attempt to return
to competitive bidding on all government and public projects. The
results of such actions remain to be seen, although the Ministry of
Housing reports that by mid-1978 the figures for contracts with
public contractors brought forward to the following year had already
fallen.(38) This is an indication that not as much work is being
started/contracted by these firms as before. In the absence of
figures on the output of the industry for that year, however, we
cannot judge whether work has been shifted to the private sector or
whether the whole industry has suffered following these changes.
3.6 Constraints on Contractors" Development
The government actions taken, as demonstrated, have had far-
reaching effects both on the construction industry in general, and on
contractors in particular. Nationalization of private contractors
and the ceiling imposed on their activity in the last fifteen years
have tended to limit the size of private contractors and to encourage
them to specialize. With the increase expected in demand for
construction and the threat of price increases on contractor output,
development of the existing contractor capacity in the private as
well as public sector becomes important. Such development might be
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hampered by various issues that arise from the separate but
complementary roles of government and contractor.
Government actions in the past have been characterized by
instability and reliance on direct intervention through control of
resources and subsidies. These are reflections of the inadequacy
of the government planning process. This process presently concen-
trates on the supply of building materials, labor, and fixed capital
investment policies without recognizing other factors involved in
the industry. This emphasis constrains the development of output
in many ways. For example, not considering all. possible resources
for financing housing construction may inhibit the realization of
the derived output and limit it to three financial resources that
were mobilized. By failing to recognize that one side effect of rent
control is to direct resources from housing investment to other
forms of investment, any plan for housing production can hardly be
met. Furthermore, in trying to subsidize the supply of the resources
that are planned for, the government gets directly involved in the
allocation and distribution of many resources, thus creating
distortions in the markets and- helping secondary markets and informal
mechanisms. This compounds the effects of the changes of priorities
in governmen plans and aversely affects the demand for construction.
Ignoring other than public sector contractors and material
suppliers has encouraged the direct intervention of government in
cases of resource shortage. Sometimes this intervention comes in
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the form of changes in regulations, as in the case of the importing
of building materials and equipment to Egypt. In dealing with
variances in the foreign exchange situation, the government alters
the rules governing the sector almost sporadically, either permitting
or banning trade in certain items. These changes affect the
suppliers of both imported and local materials and reflect on the
availability of such materials and thus on their prices. The
government is now trying to deregulate building materials; unless
such pendulum swings stabilize, suppliers will remain reluctant to
provide advances to contractors in order to protect themselves.
Government concentration on the requirements of the public
sector affects private contractors more directly also, as is the
case with financing. In addition to the fact that credit available
to contractors is limited, banking regulations, which require
relatively high collateral from firms, have made it difficult for
small- and medium-size private firms to secure long-term financing
for equipment purchase. Although no other options in terms of
equipment leasing or rental are readily available to them either,
public firms, with government backing, enjoy easier dealings with
the banks. As far as working capital is concerned, the payments of
government as a client do get delayed, and the policy of making
downpayments to the main contractor only tends to favor public
sector firms. Banks do extend working capital loans, but again
public firms have an advantage, as their cover for such loans may
be much less than that required from private firms.
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Differential treatment of public and private contractors
further exists in the implementation of regulations governing
contracting, and may inhibit private firms from enlarging their
activities. Good examples are the tax laws and the guarantee regu-
lations. While the initial tax is no different for public and
private contractors, private firms are faced with the individual
graduated general income tax. They are also faced with the danger
of the arbitrarily set profit rates if-the tax office does not honor
their records. With regard to the guarantees, although contractor
liabilities are essentially the same whether public or private,
government agencies when exempting public firms from bid bonds and
initial deposits, are helping these firms financially, while private
firms have to bear this financial burden. Such actions pose extra
burdens on the private firms and increase their risks relative to
the public ones and thus encourage their smallness and specialization.
The abundance of discriminatory rules and regulations is
coupled with a paucity of other forms of regulation organizing the
industry. Contractor qualification, in the absence of an established
classification of firms, is .left to the discretion of clients and
design consultants. Also, no explicit differentiation exists
between the respective liabilities of contractor and designer with
regard to the projects they undertake. Their respective responsibili-
ties are defined on a project to project basis. Such ambiguities
affect private contractors most of all, since no formal organization
exists that represents their interests; public sector contractors are
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supervised by government ministries, and professionals are organized
somewhat in a syndicate.
These various government actions have encouraged private firms
to remain small and specialized in the past two decades. Since the
changes of 1974 and the alteration of some of these regulations,
the situation might be expected to change. More is required, however,
than just the return to competitive bidding and the lifting of the
ceiling; consistent action from the government to reassure private
firms of the enduring nature of government encouragement is
necessary. Private firms themselves have to start developing their
capabilities in anticipation of such action. Active participation
with multinationals should be encouraged, to gain managerial and
technical capabilities, while local joint ventures should be encouraged
to help in disseminating such skills among the smaller firms. This
will enhance improvements in the management as well as the financial
capabilities of private sector firms. These firms presently suffer
from underutilization and mismanagement of their available resources,
which will be investigated more fully in Chapter 4.
The quality of management personnel who are assigned executive
authority in firms is now based too much on personal relations in
private firms and too much in response to bureaucratic rules in public
firms; procedural guidelines for personnel development and qualifica-
tion as firms grow must be established. Improvement of the informa-
tion flow and communication among a firm's different departments and
activities depends to a great extent on the support of and delegation
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made by top management. This may also entail changes in the rules and
regulations concerning management renumeration as well as those
imposed on the Board of Directors of the firm. The latter are signi-
ficant in that private investors are understandably reluctant to
invest in corporations which may not allow them much control over
the management of their investments.
In addition to improvement of the quality of management and its
ability to delegate responsibility, management strategies and policies
for the use of resources, from equipment to labor and finances, are
needed. This applies especially to private firms, which will face
problems associated with larger projects to which they are unaccus-
tomed. These changes will drastically affect their present set-up,
since they still rely on minimal use of equipment and mostly on
skilled,labor for the supervision and quality control of work. Also,
they use a highly informal system of control, centered around
personal contact, to monitor the progress of the work. As projects
become more complex and requirements more demanding, they will have
to use a more formal system, which may require' change in the
abilities and skills of personnel, as these latter will be required
to interact efficiently with it.
Finally, central to any future development of contracting firms
and the construction industry is the existence and availability of
information. As apparent, information, whether on the industry-wide
or the firm level, is not readily available. Both the government and
the contractors need information such as the number of firms entering
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the market, the number of firms and their reasons for leaving the
market, forecasts of demand for various facilities, construction
cost indices, the number and value of contracts awarded, etc. The
lack of or the non-dissemination of such information hinders planning
for t.he sector and for the firms and also limits the possibility of
assessing the effects of many of the actions undertaken by the
government. The government can help by starting to analyze and
publish the information already gathered in the various registration
agencies concerning contractors and by encouraging the establishment
of a contractor organization that would help to collect and dissemi-
nate information on firms in the future.
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CHAPTER 4. PROJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Issues that arise from the implementation of projects in Egypt,
together with issues constraining the contractors in the industry
and firm levels, add to the constraints facing the development of
such firms. To study the various stages of the project's delivery
process would allow us to identify such issues. Consideration of the
project's inception and design phases allows us to establish re-
lationships between contractors and other participants in the
industry. The investigation of such relations identifies those
issues external to the control of the contractors. Study of the pro-
ject's planning, as well as the execution stages, allows us to
complete the list of such external issues while indicating the main
inherent issues internal to the contractors in Egypt.
4.1 Project Size Distribution
Projects in the industry by both public and private contractors
cover a wide range of types, as well as sizes of constructed facili-
ties. Such projects nevertheless can be grouped in some general
categories.
The categorizing that has been used here grouped the projects
under two main headings: (1) building construction and (2) non-
building construction. Building construction can be further divided
into: (1) residential buildings, which includes all buildings
intended for residence; (2) industrial buildings, which includes
all buildings intended for industrial use; and (3) other buildings,
which includes all other buildings such as those for commercial,
health, educational, etc. purposes. Non-building construction would
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include: (1) road construction, encompassing all work on roadways
and (2) other non-building construction, which would comprise all
other constructed facilities such as power stations, canal work,
utilities works, etc.
Despite the lack of published statistics on the project sizes
in Egypt, some indications can be gained from considering the old
data. Figures on the projects in the 1967 plan show that almost
50 percent of the 1,700 projects planned for that year were of a
size less than L.E. 20,000, while only 0.7 percent were of a size more
than L.E. 250,000 and some 45 percent were in the middle range be-
tween L.E. 20,000 and 250,000, with the mean size of all projects
around L.E. 100,000 (5). There is no indication that such distri-
bution has dramatically changed in recent years. Even from a quick
investigation of the 1978-1982 five-year plan, the listed projects
ranged from the construction of small buildings of some L.E. 5,000
to factory buildings costing some L.E. 2,000,000 (7). Such a range
is consistent with the range in the figures of the early seventies
shown in Table 4-1, where average size per project varies from
L.E. 2,000 to almost L.E. 200,000.
The table further shows that the projects in non-building
construction are generally larger than those in building con-
struction: average non-building projects are almost twice the
size of average building projects, with road construction somewhat
larger than other non-building. Industrial projects are the
largest in thebuilding construction category, while residential
and other buildings follow alternatively, although somewhat
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TABLE 4-1
Average Size of Contracts Executed According
to Type of Project, for Fiscal 1970 and 1971
(Value in L.E. 1000)
(Source: Ref. 3,4)
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distantly, in size. This is more or less expected due to the
nature of the projects, as non-building involves larger quantities
of materials and larger scale of activity than building con-
struction. What is of particular interest in this case, however,
is the large difference in average size between public and private
sector contractors. This difference is on the average a factor
of 10 to 15 times for all project types, which clearly shows the
fact that public sector contractors work on the large projects,
while the private firms concentrate on small projects.
The fact that projects undertaken by private firms are
smaller than those undertaken by the public sector, is not in
of itself conclusive. It fails to show whether this fact is a
cause or an effect to the smaller size of the private sector
contractors. Considering the types of clients for which the
private firms work and the size of the projects per cleint would
give indications on the subject.
Table 4-2 shows such information; it further shows the value
of work executed on subcontracts as well as that carried out
as main contractors. This is an important figure since on the
average direct contracts are larger in size than subcontracts.
The table shows that the largest client is the public sector
firms as they represent some 45 percent of the work of the
contractors. These are closely followed by the Government which
is responsible for 40 percent of the output. On public sector
projects, 60 percent of the contractors' output was on a sub-
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TABLE 4-2
Average Size of Contracts Executed by Private Sector Contractors in Fiscal
Values in L.E. 1000
(Source: Ref. 3,4)
Years 1970/71, 1971/72
SClient Government Sector Public Sector Private Sector
R Fiscal Type of No. of Value of Average No.of Value of Average No. of Value of Average
O Year Contract Projects Projects Value Projects Projects Value Projects Projects Value
M 1970/71 Sub - - - 294 918 3.1 191 , 356 1.9
4-J All 139 1520 11.0 345 1154 3.3 2.33 1889 0.9
1971/72 Sub - - - 173 867 5.0 144 486 3.4
All 119 1824 15.3 219 1090 5.0 1355 2023 1.5
1970/71 Sub - " - - 494 1901 3.4 74 136 1.8
All 39 173 4.4 906 3965 4.4 127 396 3.1
4 1971/72 Sub - - - 390 1606 4.1 46 148 3.2
All 32 122 3.8 706 3474 4.9 85 328 3.9
- 1970/71 Sub - - - 965 2850 3.0 409 646 1.6
D All 1088 4469 4.1 1409 4666 3.3 749 1265 • 1.7
" 1971/72 Sub - - - 749 2724 3.6 263 730 2.8
All 921 4752 5.2 1050 4234 4.0 511 1289 2.5
T970/71 Sub - - - 72 788 11.0 19 154 8.1
All 88 927 10.5 • 92 893 9.7 20 155.. 7.8
1971/72 Sub - - - 67 661 9.9 15 167 11.1
r All 62 964 15.6 85 816 9.6 15 167 11.1
. 1970/71 Sub - - - 7- r 5.8 97 365 3.7
All 543 4791 8.8 357 2459 6.9 113 409 3.6
O r
L= 1971/72 Sub - - 281 2289 8.2 68 305 4.5
All 429 5793 331 2571 7.8 81 324 4.1
1970/71 Sub - - - 2092 7817 3.7 790 1657 2.1
All :J97 11880 6.3 3107 13137 4.2 3142 4114 1.3
o 1971/72 Sub - - - 1660 8147 4.9 536 1836 3.4
All 1563 13455 86 2391 12185 5.1 2047 4128 2.0
contract basis, as well as 40 percent of their output on private
sector projects. This means that about 30 percent of their
total output is carried out on a subcontract basis, that is
smaller projects. Even the projects executed for the government's
as main contracts are small in size, which is due to the enactment
of the ceiling on work carried by these private contractors. All
such facts tend to indicate that the small size of the projects
carried out by the private sector is more of a reflection of-such
actions rather than a reflection of the very limited capacity
of these firms.
4.2 Project Inception and Contract Award
The fact that the government is the largest client in the
Egyptian industry, whether directly or indirectly through public
sector firms, has imposed an added burden on that mechanism. In
addition to its role as sovereign regulator, it also assumed the
role of a client, that is party to the contract. This added role
has considerable impact on project initiation, since it decides
the location and financing, as well as the required studies for
these projects which considerably affect the performance of the
contractors in the planning and execution phases of project
development.
The location of the project derives its importance from
the fact that it influences the decisions on the materials and
also the labor necessary for its execution. For example, projects
that are in the Delta area used to rely heavily on masonry because
of the easy availability of clay bricks. When the same kinds of
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projects are contemplated in the Suez Canal area east of
the delta, bricks become a problem as they have to be transported
from the Delta.
Traditionally, the governorate of Cairo has been the
location with the highest concentration of projects; 25 to 30
percent of all projects were in Cairo, while the other 23
governorates of Egypt shared the remaining 70 to 75 percent, as
indicated in Table 4-3. As far as building construction is con-
cerned, the concentration of projects is in Cairo, as well. The
size of residential building projects is also larger in Cairo
than in most of the other governorates, while other building
projects seem to be larger, relatively-speaking, in the Delta and
Upper Egypt because of the combination of warehouses as well as
administrative and educational buildings that were being built
outside of Cairo in the late 1960's. As for non-building con-
struction, the average size of projects in the Delta and Upper
Egypt regions is larger than in Cairo, which is to be expected
due to the land-reclamation and industrial-infrastructure projects
that are being undertaken there.
This distribution of project concentration and size influences
the geographic distribution of private sector contractors. More
private contractors can be expected to register and work in the
Cairo area, especially in the building field, than in the Delta
and Upper Egypt, where the number of contractors is smaller and
the larger firms tend to specialize in non-building construction.
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occurred in the geographic distribution of projects over the
last two decades. Two important changes occurred on that front.
The first change occurred during the decade of the sixties with
the construction of the High Dam in Aswan, which increased the
importance of construction output in that governorate; actually,
construction employment peaked there in the late sixties, at
almost double that of Cairo (22). The second change occurred .in the
second half of the 1970's, when reconstruction efforts started
in the Suez Canal governorates and a new drive was initiated to
create settlements in the desert areas. The first reconstruction
efforts to rebuild the war-damaged cities had been completed by
1977; this entailed some concentration of effort in these governo-
rates over three year's time (51). The new settlements policy is
still in the planning phase and only the future can tell the result
of its implementation; this policy will no doubt have effects
on the contractors since it is expected to absorb some 50 percent
of the nationwide increase in construction employment in the first
five years of its implementation (52).
Such abrupt changes in the absence of an overall physical
planning regulation represent part of the demand fluctuation
faced by the firms (57). Furthermore, they accentuate the constraint
on the lands ready for development. This absence makes urban
growth irratic and allows for speculation and gives rise to
litigation and delay in the start of the projects.
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The main regulations that govern construction are a set
of laws that concern the actual buildings (type, height, spaces),
recently amended by Law 106 of 1976 (58). These regulations do not
concern themselves with the zones of development for various
types of construction, which somewhat complicates the construction
approval process for projects. This is especially true for
private sector clients, who first have to secure the approval
of the appropriate government agency on the project concept itself
and then get a building permit with the assistance of the
contractor. Although this is expected to create more problems for
private contractors, the public sector projects are also affected as
site delivery (construction start) is often delayed because of
problems with the local authorities concerning the project site (14).
Securing long-term financing for private sector clients is
very difficult since the appropriation of such funds requires the
interaction of many government agencies. For example, if a private
client would like to start-a factory in one of the governorates of
Egypt, first he would have to obtain approval from the Ministry
of Industry, which will determine whether the project is permissible
as far as the laws and regulations designed to protect public sector
industry are concerned. Then, the Ministry, together with the
governorate, would have to determine whether that governorate has
funds allocated in its budget which would allow the client to expend
money and invest in that project.
In making such decisions, the governorate usually requires
an estimate from the client, who therefore has to hire a professional
architect/engineer to undertake a preliminary design. Even after
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preliminary approval is given and banks have agreed to extend
financing for the project, the building permit and the allocations
of regulated building materials remain to be secured by the
contractor. The contractor is not only faced by potential delays
in securing such requirements, but also by the threat of so much
time passing before he can start the work, that completion of the
work before appropriation of the funds for the specified fiscal
year expires is jeopardized. Should this happen, funds may not
be available for the client to pay the contractor in full and the
financial burden of the contractor is augmented.
Such problems in financing 'projects afflict not only the
private sector; public sector contractors also have problems
with government and public clients. A recent study conducted
by the Ministry of Housing showed that 29 contracting firms super-
vised by the Ministry have some L.E. 96 million in back payments
outstanding with the government alone (22).
Such problems are in part a reflection of circumstances out-
side the control of the clients, such as the inadequacy of financial
resources in the economy. On the other hand, they also reflect
defficiencies in planning and feasibility studies for projects
themselves. External reasons have been demonstrated in the
fluctuations in government policies, and also in lack of
aggressiveness on the part of existing financial institutions (40),
while planning problems are reflected in inadequate estimations of
project duration and costs
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The contractor's performance on projects in Egypt is also
affected by the design of the project; and like in the United States,
the contractor is faced with issues arising from the separation of
design and construction activities. This delays the start of the
planning for execution of the project by the contractor until details
are finalized. It emphasizes the temporary relationship between the
client, the professional designer, and the contractor, and complicates
the relationship between design and construction. Because the law
holds them both responsible for the projects, contractors usually
complain that the delay in the detailed design plans is a major source
of delay on the projects* (51). Professionals claim to be underpaid
despite the existence of guidelines for the performance of consultations
in Egypt. If this is the case, then one would expect that the detailed
design stage would suffer from any cutbacks in costs on the part of
the designers.
The situation is made no easier by the fact that design standards
are not unified and are relatively undefined in Egypt. Since 1966 the
Ministry of Housing had set some 10 committees to issue standards or
specifications for the various stages and activities in building con-
struction; in 1978, however, only 4 codes were in existence. Six
others, which deal mostly with finishing items (paints, plaster, doors
and windows, etc.) which require large detailing efforts on the part
of the professional, had not yet been finished. This lack of unified,
Civil law in Egypt holds both professionals and contractors mutually
responsible for the execution of projects The law, however,
does not clearly define the exact extent of each party's responsi-
bility.
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enforced codes and standards, as well as the inadequacy* of ex-
isting ones, intensifies the problems faced by contractors in
project execution.
Clients and professionals also influence contracting firms
when projects are launched for award competition. They have
flexibility in packaging these contracts for tender to either
exclude or include whatever they wish. Presently, medium-size
contractors complain about the fact that the projects launched
are usually too large for them or smaller contractors to handle (51)
These firms are therefore discouraged from bidding on such
projects. Furthermore, these clients, by adopting methods of
project launching other than pure open competition, in fact only
aid certain contracting firms. The existing prequalification
requirements for projects have been established to protect clients
against bad workmanship on the part of the contractor. If these
requirements, however, were coupled with a formal classification
of contracting firms in Egypt, both clients and contractors would
benefit. Client rights would still remain un-jeopardized, and
at the same time contractors would have more chances to participate
since different projects might have different prequalification
requirements.
*In many instances contractors find that professionals specify
certain materials that are not available on the market, or they
receive notification not to adhere to previous standards for
some materials, thus increasing their uncertainty
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This lack of classification of firms in Egypt affects
contractors at the bidding stage. Since contractors do not have
any idea of the competition for projects, the extent of that
competition is known only through informal communications with the
client organization, especially since no information is published
concerning the types of projects awarded or their prices. Bidding
is made more difficult for the contractors by uncertainty with
respect to acquisition and prices of building materials and labor
on the Egyptian markets. Although contractors are usually
compensated for any increase in official prices of these materials
by the government client, there is no guarantee that materials
will be delivered on time (51). Labor cost increases, however,
are always absorbed by the contractor. Since these have
increased almost five-fold in the last five years, the un-
certainty in the labor situation has increased and adversely
affected the bidding policies of contractors. This does not
however mean that contractor problems with bidding are entirely
imposed by the environment; internal problems also exist in firms
and hamper their bidding activity.
These several issues that affect project inception and the
award process in Egypt are reflected in the hesitancy of the firms
to expand their contracting activity and diversification into other
activities which can be a reflection of external constraints such as
those imposed by the difficulties in securing financing for
contractors. Problems also exist within the firms, as with the
case of bidding, which leads to low priority attributed to project
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planning. Now that the Open-Door Policy in Egypt has somewhat
increased the number of suppliers of various materials, and
that government is aiming to decontrol many of the price fixing
policies to some extent, external constraints on project inputs
will ease; but internal ones still pose a serious challenge to the
development of the industry.
4.3 Project Planning and Mobilization
The planning at the early stages of the project involves the
executives of the firm. Decisions regarding resource committment
to the project as well as other decisions concerning amount of
work subcontracted are also generally set at that stage. Such
decisions concerning the techniques used in the execution have
definite impacts on the costs, time of execution and the required
cash for the project itself. For example, on non-building projects,
the required labor for the ear 1 imoving activity to execute work
valued at L.E. 1,000,000 in the case of manual construction is
3,500 workers per year. If equipment-is used to do the earthwork,
even at the Egyptian technological level, the labor requirement
is estimated to drop to 200 workers per year for the same value
of work (11).
Despite its importance to the firms, planning for the projects
seems to enjoy low priority from both public and private sector
firms in Egypt. This is partly due to the clients' practices in
discriminating against the private sector, and the lack of
competition between the public firms; actions that reduce
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incentives for efficiency improvements. However, the difficulties
associated with obtaining the various resources seem also to
contribute to this situation of uncertainty and hesitancy of the
contractors to commit resources to this function.
The study of the technology used depends to a great extent
on the relative prices of the various inputs, and this entails that
contractors keep records of the development of such prices, since
the savings realized by substituting one input for another may not
realize overall savings for the project. This is especially true
in the case of the building construction, where the materials costs
were relatively expensive relative to the labor. In such cases
the replacement of the labor by equipment, especially if it entails
changing or increasing the materials consumption, might not prove
cheaper at the end. This may be one of the major obstacles that
face the prefabricated houses factories that have been brought
for the public sector contractors.* Preliminary estimates for the
costs of the units erected from those factories seem to be somewhat
higher than those built in the traditional way in Cairo so far;
despite the savings in labor costs (53).
The construction technology in Egypt in general does not rely
heavily on equipment, in either the public or private sector. This
is indicated by the values in Table 4-4 which show the average
number of equipment by major types per project in the early seventies
See Section 2.3 above.
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TABLE 4-4
Average Number of Various Equipment Used by Contractors
in Egypt in 1970/71 and 1971/72
Per Project
(Source: Ref. 3,4)
Pub 1 ic Sector
General General General Total Total
Equip- Contractors Buildin Roads Non-Bldg. Specialty* Public Sector Private Sector
ment Type 70/71 71f72 70/71 71/72 70/71 71]/72 70/71 71/72 70/71 71/72 70/71 71/72
Building Equipment 3.6 4.0 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.1 1.9 3.4 3.5 0.02 0.03
Transport 5.0 5.5 19.9 22.8 5.8 5.3 4.8 2.1 6.6 6.4 0.08 0.10
Earthmoving 0.3 0.2 0.06 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.03 0.06
Road Equipment .24 0.3 7.3 8.7 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.8 0.8 0.03 0.03
Material Handling 0.10 0.07 0.70 0.90 0.13 0.15 = 0.03 0.14 0.14 NA NA
Small Tools 2.2 2.1 1.1 1.9 2.4 2.8 1.6 2.5 2.1 2.4 NA NA
Other Equipment 0.6 9.0 1.3 2.1 1.0 1.4 0.7 0.14 0.8 5.5 .0.04 0.02
Avg. No. of Projects
per firm 36 38 31 25 34 26 27 53 32 34 3 2
The average for specialty contractors in fiscal 71/72 is low because one specialty contractor was changed
to the category of general non-building contractor in that year by the Ministry of Housing.
TABLE 4- 5
Example of Equipment Operated By A
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for both public and registered private contractors. Although
the information on private contractors is not broken down by
type of contractor, it does, as expected, show that on the overall
public contractors use equipment more than private sector firms.
This would lead us to expect that public firms would have more
incentive to plan their equipment use. However, it is expecsted
that difficulties in equipment acquisition and maintenance may
have limited such efforts.
Contractors in developed countries usually would have the
options to buy or lease equipment to satisfy their needs (54). In
Egypt, however, the leasing option is almost non-existent. Only
in 1979 one privately owned firm started an equipment leasing
business (33); until then, the only way to get equipment was through
purchase. Because of the limited funds available, contractors were
forced to use down payments from clients to finance such purchases,
especially on government and large projects (14). Furthermore,
such practice hampers the planning for the execution of the project.
The final detailed planning is contingent on the negotiations with
the client to be able to .secure the financing for the purchase.
Private contractors were in a worse situation, due to the
difficulties they faced with regard to the accessibility to
financial sources. However, their equipment planning was even
further complicated when they worked as subcontractors to the
public firms. In some cases they would be able to rent equipment
from the main contractor on the project. Although this facilitates
their operation on the project, the fact that such practice is not
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governed by any rule, and is left entirely to the discretion of the
main contractor complicates their planning problem; they simply
do not necessarily know in advance if such procedures will be
possible or not (33).
Such constraints on equipment acquisition had also
indirect effects. They have affected the contractor's stock of
equipment and complicated maintenance. The largest contractor in
Egypt owns 400 types of equipment from some 250 different
manufacturers which complicates the spare parts problems (34)
a situation that is not made better by relying on the official
exchange market to find the foreign exchange needed to buy them. (34)
Recently many suppliers of equipment started to operate in Egypt
and established agencies which might affect the availability of
spare parts. Such action has not however overcome the problems
of maintenance associated with this excessive variation in
types and manufacturers.
The maintenance situation is further complicated since most
of the equipment owned by the contractors, especially the private
sector, is very old. Table 4-5 shows an example of a public
sector firm. The accumulated depreciation figures show that the
equipment is about 75 percent used; that is, about 3 to 4 years
old on the average. This is exemplified by the fact that even
in that particular year, 1975, the company under consideration
in the table received some L.E. 600,000 worth of new equipment
from the Ministry of Housing, which represents some 40 percent
of its paid-in capital (17). This shows that most of the
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equipment in operation is expected to require frequent maintenance.
Also, not all contractors have maintenance facilities. Only
the very large public sector firms have yards facilities that
enable them to perform major repairs in-house. This affects
the planning of the contractors adversely since their control
over repair time is limited because they have to rely on outside
facilities to do the work. Even those firms that have facilities
for repair are hampered by the shortage in required skills to
perform the work.
Training mechanics is particularly expensive due to the
excessive variety of equipment. The largest.contractor needed
almost one year to train mechanics and about 6 months for engineers
to perform repair activities (34). Due to the labor shortage in
Egypt caused mainly by the migration of skilled laborers, even
those laborers trained by the firms usually seek work elsewhere.
One firm estimated the loss rate in trained mechanics to be as
high as 20 percent of those workers trained (34). Such issues
are largely responsible for the reduction in the productivity of the
equipment in Egyptian projects that is sometimes as low as 50
percent. Other factors, however, such as work stoppage and cash
flow problems, add to these planning problems.
Construction labor is another important resource that has
to be committed to the various projects by the contractors. Many
firms because of the instability of the demand facing them, rely
on temporary workers. These are hired either for the duration
of the project or for six months at a time. Most of the firms
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hire only some skilled laborers required for their type of work,
and rely on labor subcontractors to supply them with the rest
of the requirements of the labor force. This temporary nature
of employment plus the fact that the available statistics on the
workers employed by the firms on the various projects are old,
restrict the indications we can get from such figures. Nevertheless,
Table .t-6 shows the average number of workers employed by
contractors in both sectors.
The information is not available by type of project but
rather by type of contractor, still some indication can be gained
on the number of workers assigned to the various projects in
both sEctors. As expected, public sector firms who have by far
larger projects than private ones, assign 2 to 3 times more
employees to their general contracting projects. On specialty
work, -n the other hand, private firms assign more employees than
public sector ones, because as we discussed earlier, private
firms do concentrate their work in that area, which is labor
intensive and uses less tools.
Furthermore, the table shows that generally public sector
contractors employ more supervisory staff than private sector
contractors. On general non-building work public sector firms
have the largest percentage of staff employees, which is expected,
since these projects are generally larger and more spread out
than the building ones. Also, the quality of the staff employees
of the private and public firms is also different. Public sector
firms have higher qualified personnel working on their projects
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TABLE 4-6
Average Number of Workers Per Project Employed by
Public & Private Sector Contractors













































(1)Supervision personnel, in the case of public sector firms include the following categories:
Engineers & TEchnicians, Administration & clerks, and supervisors as well as service workers.
The sudden change between 71/72 and 70/71 in the general non-building and specialty category
is caused by the reduction in the number of firms in the specialty category by one firm changed




than private firms. Engineers and technicians on public sector
projects averaged some 30 per project, while from the interviews
private sector projects averaged only 2 at the most (51).
Planning for workers on the projects of the firms will depend
mostly on the availability and production of the labor employed
by the firms. Such information however is difficult to find in
Egypt, especially separated between public and private contractors.
The available figures on the production of workers involved in
some activities of the construction process are shown in Table 4-7.
These figures are mostly compiled for building projects, and it is
expected that they would differ somewhat on non-building projects.
For instance, while a team of masons composed of 8 people is here
expected to produce 7 cubic meters of one inch thick wall per day,
on non-building projects that would not involve large quantitites
of brick work; this figure might be lower due to the lack of
repetition that exists on such projects. Unfortunately, such
difference cannot be quantified. On the other hand, the difference
between the projects affects the planning for the labor require-
ments of the firm, because of the importance of one type of
labor on one project relative to other projects. On building
projects, for example, reinforced concrete in Egypt is ov over-
riding importance, while on non-building the earth work takes up
priority and so on. This is further complicated by the fact that
e'?n on similar projects the requirements will differ according to
the design, because labor productivity on different components of
the projects differ with the complexity of the work involved.
174
TABLE 4-7







































































































7 cu.m. of wall brick
(25 cm.) thick or 40-45
sq.m. of wall 1/2 brick
(12 cm.) thick.
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For example, the carpenter expected production is larger on slabs
and walls than beams and columns. A crude measure of the
productivity of the workers is considering the share of output
of every L.E. paid in wages. Private firms' wages are usually
higher than public sector firms, because of the temporary nature
of that employment and the extra output required for them. Table
4-8 shows that share of each L.E. paid in wages in both public
and private sector contractor output for 1970/71 and 1971/72.
Productivity of wages in private firms was much higher than in the
public sector firms especially in building construction. On non-
building construction, the productivity ofwages is much lower
for both contractor types than in building; however, public
sector wages had lower productivity than private sector ones.
The important qualification here is that the public sector
wages in the table include the administrative and supervisory
wage while the output figures only include the work executed
internally by the firm, which tends to understate the productivity.
Despite such descrepancies and the fact that supervisory wages in
the public sector is larger than the private sector, the producti-
vity of the wages in the public sector is still comparatively lower
than the private sector which would lead us to conclude that the
productivity of tye laborers in the private sector is somewhat
higher than that of the public sector larger firms.
Such findings seem to support the fact that the large number
of staff in the public sector is due to government efforts to
provide for employment in the economy, rather than a reflection
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TABLE 4- 8 .
Share of Each L.E. Paid in Wages in Both Public and Private Sector Contractor Output
(Source: Ref. 3,4)
General Building General Non-Building
Contractor's Sector Contractor Contractor
Private Public Private Public
Fiscal Year 1970/71 1971/72 1970/71 1971/72 1970/71 1971/72 1970/71 1971/72
Value of work executed 19,497 19,061 40,525 65,841 9,634 10,667 14,81 13,130
Wages Paid 4,190 4,049 15,557 17,398 3,513 4,220 3,630 5,739
Productivity of L.E.
of Wages 4.65 4.71 2.61 3.78 2.74 2.53 4.08 2.29
of larger needs of these firms. The lower productivity might
indicate the existence of masked unemployment. On the other
hand, the availability of such qualified staff in the firms
increases the opportunity to use formal planning and control
techniques.
Traditionally in the late sixties and early seventies, public
sector contractors did subcontract some 20 to 30 percent of their
total work to other public and private contractors, and private
sector general contractors also did subcontract some 30 percent
of their work to other private firms (3). The majority of sub-
contracts are performed by the private sector firms, which as
discussed in Chapter 3, do between 35 to 50 percent of their w1 rk
as subcontracts. Public sector firms do perform some subcontracting,
but only account for some 5 to 10 percent of their output.
As in most other countries, building construction in Egypt
involves somewhat more subcontracting than non-building. Alh=ough
the available information on subcontracted work by type of
project is only for the public sector contractors' projects, it is
expecsted that the larger private sector contractors would have
a somewhat similar distribution. Residential buildings usually have
between 25 and 30 percent of their value subcontracted as in the case
with general building, other non-building construction projects
on the other hand, only have some 20 percent of their value produced
as subcontracts; while road construction has some 25 percent(3,4).
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TABLE 4-9
Subcontracted Work From Public Contractors
Values in L.E. 1000
(Source: Ref. 4)

































































Taking into consideration the fact that most of the
main contractors in Egypt perform the main activities of their
various projects; i.e., the structural parts, internally, and
usual-ly subcontract the secondary finishing works, we can see
why in Table 4-9 the general building contractors subcontract
some 35 percent of their work, while general road contractors
subcontract only some 16 percent. The fact that genral non-
building contractors in the table also subcontract some 35 percent
of their work does not contradict with what we have discussed with
regard to type of project, considering that the public non-
building general contractors do some 25 percent of their work
on building contracts as demonstrated in Section 3.2.
Most of the work subcontracted from public general
contractors is in piece work form as opposed to whole buildings
or projects which explains why speciality public contractors
subcontract more than 60 percent of their work.when compared to
general contractors. While this fact might seem reasonable,
as most subcontracts are relatively small in size and special
in character, the low figure for total subcontracting of large
portions of projects may be also partly attributed to the ceiling
set on government and public sector contracts carried out by
private contractors.
Subcontracts are small in volume as indicated by the fact
that they are performed by small firms. Their value is also
small compared to the total value of the project. This, however,
should not minimize the importance or the effect of that activity
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on the performance of the contractor, first because of the type
of work being subcontracted and secondly because subcontracting
can either be based on the provision of labor only or may include
also the provision of materials, i.e. comprehensive.
Table 4-10 shows that 20 percent of the subcontracted work
is in foundation work; 10 percent in concrete work, including
carpentry, steel fixing,- and paving; while plastering, joinery,
masonry, electrical and sanitary works, represent each about 7
percent of the works subcontracted. Furthermore, it shows that
about 50 percent of the work subcontracted was on a comprehensive
basis. Such facts show the role that this activity plays in
determining the overall performance of the firm on its projects..
While various factors related to the firm's experience with
the type of work might affect the decision on what type of
subcontracting is let out for tyh various activities, tradition
seems to play a certain role in that matter. In Egypt, some
activities traditionally are subcontracted comprehensively more than
others. Painting, glazing, electrical works, tile fixing, and
wooden flooring are some examples where, as shown in Table 4-10,
mroe than 65 percent of the work subcontracted was on a compre-
hensive basis, while with concrete works and masonry the amount
subcontracsted on labor only basis was about 75 to 80 percent.
The decision is also influenced by the kind of building materials
involved. For example, the reason that concrete work is largely
subcontracted out on a labor only basis, is a reaction to the
government distribution policy of cement and steel, making it more
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TABLE 4-10
Subcontracted Work From Public Contractors in 1970/71 and 1971/72
Value in L.E.1000
(Source: Ref. 4)
Comprehensive Labor Only TOTAL
Type of Work 1970/71 1971/72 1970/71 1971/72 1970/71 1971/72
Paving & Road fixing 649 785 869 1,039 1,518 1,824
Foundation works 1,743 2,106 2,725 3;255 4,468 5,361
Concrete works 645 780 1,972 2,355 2,617 3,135
Massonary 241 292 1,044 1,246 1,285 1,538
Tile fixing 354 428 197 237 551 665
Marble fixing 158 190 212 253 370 443
Plastering 988 1,194 383 457 1,371 1,651
co
NCarpentry (Joinary) 595 718 972 1,159 1,567 1,871
Wooden floors 184 222 72 86 256 308
Sanitary 800 967 868 1,036 1,668 2,003
Electrical 900 1,088 534 637 1,434 1,725
Air conditioning 54 65 3 4 57 69
Painting *396 478 98 116 494 594
Glazing 122 148 33 39 155 187
Metal ceilings 628 758 261 311 889 1,069
Supports/Demolish/Clearance 149 207 172 178 321 385
Elevator erection - - 3 6 3 6
Scaffolding works 157 189 144 171 301 360
Other 652 788 1,614 1,927 2,226 2,715
TOTAL 9,438 11,403 12,153 14,512 21,591 25,915
difficult for subcontractors to obtain such materials.
Building materials in Egypt can be grouped under two major
groups: main building materials that include cement, reinforcing
bars, bricks, and sand and gravel; and secondary building materials
that include lumber, tiles, .sanitary fixtures, electrical fixtures,
metallic fixtures among others. The government took control
over the procuction facilities as well as the distribution of two
of the main building materials, namely cement and steel, as well
as glass and import of lumber in the secondary building material
category.
Table 4-11 shows the average use of the various main building
materials - cement, steel, bricks, sand and gravel - by the various
project types. As expected, in the public sector projects that
average consumption are about 50 times that of the private sector
ones. The highest consumption of building materials for public
sector projects is in industrial buildings, where there seems
to be a large quantity of reinforced concerete work per project
compared to other non-building projects where the consumption of
reinforcing bars and cement is less than half. Road construction
projects consume more sand and gravel than any other type of
construction. Private sector construction projects consume less
building materials than the public sector ones partly because
theyare smaller and partly because they include labor subcontracts.
The highest consumption of cement, sand and gravel in the private
sector projects is on road construction, where these firms are
heavily involved in tile paving of the sidwalks in the urban areas.
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TABLE 4-11
Average Main Building Materials Requirement by










































































































































On non-building private projects, however, materials consumption
is lower than on the building projects which indicates more labor
contracts in the non-building category.
Material requirement, however, changes from year to year, and
from project to project. The main factor that influences the
consumption is the design -and specifications of the projects
prepared by the professionals. Residential projects differ from
industrial projects as far as total requirements of building
materials is concerned, but each also differs based on the type of
building being built. Large mutli-story general buildings require
different quantitites per unit of area than smaller storage
buildings. The lack of historical data with regard to the various
types of projects limits our ability to establish or use the figures
in Table 4-11 as industry-wide average, but these figures do give
an indication of the practices in Egypt when we take the previous
qualification in mind.
If we consider cement as an example of the regulated building
materials, we can further get a feeling of the problems faced by
the contractors in planniong for their projects. Local production of
cement was between 3.2 to 3.5 million tons, the consumption of
cement in 1977, however, was on the order of 4.5 million tons (17).
The difference between the local consumption and the produduction
has been supplemented by imports which amount to about 1 million
tons per year. These figures indicate the expected problems in
securing cement for all the projects of the various contractors in
time. Up until the early 1970's the government controlled the
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distribution as well as the importation of cement in Egypt, where
every project was allocated quantities to be delivered to the
main contractor.
As a result of both the shortages and the government control,
contractors and clients in the private sector had to wait for about
6 months before they could get their allocated amounts (17).
Public sector contractors did not have to wait that long to
receive the allocations, probably due to the backing from the
various ministries (34). This indicates the advantages that
private contractors had in working as subcontractors to public
firms since it did help them avoid such bottlenecks. The government-
allocations of cement further complicates the private sector's
acquisition. The rule of thumb for the allocation to private
sector projects is to allocate 10 tons of cement for every L.E.
1,000 of construction value while public sector gets allocations
based on their actual requirements (56).
The delivery of cement to the various project sites is effected
by the Egyptian Cement Office (ECO), which is the office responsible
for distributing the local as well as imported cement in Egypt.
Ninety percent of the deliveries are made by truck while about ten
percent is made using waterways, and about one percent is through
rail transportation (17,56). The trucks are largely owned and
operated by the ECO. Road transportation, although costly, is
very convenient for the contracting industry that does operate a
large amount of geographically dispersed projects.
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With road transportation costs of L.E. 1,080 per ton for
a 20 km haul, to a L.E. 8,250 for a 900 km haul, transportation'
of the materials becomes an obvious factor that affects the.
planning of the project. In the case of cement, transport
costs represented some 15 percent of the official prices of the
material in 1975*(17). This is why the various contracting
firms have a large investment in transportation equipment, especially
the road contractors. Based oh the importance and urgency of the
project, they have to decide whether to rely on the suppliers
to deliver the materials to the site, or to take delivery at the
depot and transport the materials themselves.
The allocation of the various regulated resouces helped
the flourishment of the black market where prices are set well
above those officially set by the government, partly because the
allocations are based on some ill-defined technical consumption
co-efficients and partly because of the delays in the delivery
associated with the regulation mechanisms. These delays force
clients and contractors who cannot wait for 6 months to use the
black market to get their requirements, and then resell their
allocations when they receive them on the same market. The problems
associated with the quantities allocated are very well represented
in the case of residential buildings. A recent study .on the
building materials in the construction industry in Egypt suggests
that "... housing has been allocated more cement than it has been
*Price with transport was in the range of L.E. 15,000 per metric
ton, and without transport it was some L.E. 13,500. Figure II-8a,
Ref. 16.
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supposed to be, and second, that this also appears to be more
than it actually has been using, leading to the conclusion that
housing has been serving as a mechanism for obtaining cement
for other types of construction, be it'a direct transfer from
one project to another of a single contractor or a transfer
via the black market " (17).
The building materials problems go beyond the mere allocation
problems. Consumption of these materials in the various
construction projects seem to be relatively high compared to other
countries which is a reflection of different specifications and
design norms. Studying the various mixes of cdncrete, mortar
and plaster in the U.S. and in Egypt, it can be concluded that the
various mixes in Egypt are much richer, using much more cement
than in other countries (17). Considerable savings could be realized
in cement consumption by the introduction of new building materials
such as lightweight aggregates in concrete, or surface bonding in
mortar, and other additives to the plaster.. Such changes, however,
may require also changes in the use of labor and equipment, as
well as changes in the specifications and design norms.
Planning for the cash flow of the project is another important
factor in the process of planning for the execution of the projects
of a contractor. As discussed earlier, contractors in Egypt face
serious problems in financing their activities.* This is partly due
* See Chapter 3 above.
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to lack of available financing from banks, and partly due to the
difficulties in getting suppliers credits, as well as delays
in clients payments.
It is not clear at this point whether most of the public
and private contractors prepare a project by project budget, and
whether such budget is detailed enough to allow it to be used as a
tool in the cost control during execution. But since the planning
for other-resources is somewhat informal, it is expected that the
budgets being currently prepared might not reflect realistically
the actual situation. It is also expected that the delays in
delivery of building materials that are in many cases prepaid
as well as the delays in client payments which might extend to a
year or two adversely affects such plans.
If the firm is able to secure bank financing, either by
overdrafting its accounts as in the -se of public firms, or by
selling the project to a bank as in the case of many private
firms, it reduces the risk of losing on the.projects, only if it
had adequately estimated the cash flow. It is expected that the
requirements of the banks.would represent a clear incentive
for the contractors private as well as public sectors to improve
their planning efforts and techniques.
4.4 Project Execution and Control
The site preparation activity which would include among
others proper storage of mateials, receives usually small attention
from the contractors in Egypt, being clouded by other issues such
as the uncertainties in the delivery of building materials.
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Inadequate preparation however causes delays, extra costs and
even sometimes damage to the projects. An example was the
Mattaua pump station built in the mid-60's where foundation
costs were increased due to failure in the sheet policy due to
storage of fill (14).
While on larger projects such activities are given some
attention, on medium and small projects they are somewhat
neglected. This neglect increases waste in materials, as shown
in Table 4-12 where few extra warehouses in the case of Company B
almost doubled the value of the spoiled building materials. The
neglect also increases the costs of hauling the material which in
some instances may represent up to 30 percent of the costs of
materials The bottlenecks in the supply of materials
aggravates the situation by forcing the contractors to store extra
material to face probable shortages in the future and thus increase
the waste.
The bottlenecks are expected to diminish as the government
continues to reduce its intervention in the economy; however,
as far as execution is concerned, inventory control is the main
issue to controlling the material cost component of the projects.
Firms in the public sector face problems imposed by the government
regulations which require them to record all inventory items at
their actual costs'as opposed to a fixed cost to be adjusted
periodically. Regardless of that problem which increases the
cost of the inventory control for these contractors, it is
customary for contractors to have inventory release documents
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that are kept to record the use of the materials, and inventory
acquisition documents that are required by clients to pay for the
materials in stock at the site.
Equipment use on the site is another major cost item that
affects the project execution, not only because of operating
expenses which contribute to the total cost of the project, but
also because of maintenance and repair activities that cause
delays. Only a few of the very-large firms charge equipment
on a time basis to the projects, based on the historic data of the
equipment running and maintenance history (34)._ Table 4-13 shows
an example of a typical truck operating cost on construction projects
in Cairo. Such a practice would constitute an incentive for the
project personnel to reduce equipment idle time.
In the table the major item in direct costs is the maintenance
costs. This cost item is, however, in many cases beyond the
control of the project team. In cases where maintenance is per-
formed in the contractor's own workshop, the uncertainties and diffi-
culties in obtaining spare parts, and trained labor makes it
difficult to control the time and cost of such activity. When
maintenance is carried on outside the firm's workshops, public
contractors may be somewhat more adversely affected by the
regulations concerning the arrangements of such maintenance.
rivate firms have the flexibility to maintain constant relations
with outside shops, while public sector contractors who are
governed by regulations forcing them to adjudicate such activities
and look for lower prices might sometimes trade off gains in time
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TABLE 4-13
Example of Truck Operating Cost Breakdown
(Source: Ref. 14)
Direct Costs:
(i) Drivers'wages = varies about 10% of the depreciation costs
(ii) Fuel = one liter gas per 2.5 km. (yearly average 45,000 km.)
(iii) Maintenance costs = 30% of capital cost per year
(iv) Depreciation = varies about 30% of cost per year
(v) Licenses/Insurance = .5% of capital cost
(vi) Interest on capital = 20% of capital
Indirect Costs: = 10% of total direct costs
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for cheaper costs. The fact that operating the equipment is
not done properly is another possibility which when added to the
maintenance issue would explain the 50 percent figure of equipment
utilization often quoted in Egypt (34). This situation will.
hopefully improve with the emergence of equipment agencies,
joint ventures with multi-nationals, as well as the increased
use of tools due to labor shortages.
The control of labor depends on whether the labor is
directly working for the contractor or for a subcontractor since
in the second case the general contractor only has indirect
control through the subcontract. Also the control might differ
depending on whether the labor is a permanent or temporary
one since most permanent workers are generally controlled through
a time card. The actual control of the output of the workers
on Egyptian projects, however, is measured against a production
norm for each activity. The set norm is called "Tariha" and
is a prescribed daily output per activity for each worker or
team of workers. These are usually set by tradition and usually
represent a range of production.
Table 4-14 shows an example of these norms for certain
main activities on building construction. They reflect some
of the differences in the type of work. For example, the
norm for the glazed tile worker is set lower than the floor tile
worker because of the more precise work involved in glazed tile
fixing. The units of measurement also reflect the tradition;
for instance, carpenters and reinforced steel fixers output is
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cu. meters of earth
cu. meters of R.C.
cu. meters of R.C.
cu. meters of R.C.
sq. meters of wall
sq. meters of wall
bathroom unit
sq. meters of wall
sq. meters of floor
sq. meters of wall
195
also measured in cubic meters of concrete like the reinforced
concrete workers who pour the concrete. This is due to the
fact that for practical reasons supervisors consider concrete
work as work performed by a gang of these different skills.
This piecework approach to control of labor while
minimizing the required supervision during working hours,
requires that the production norm be calculated accurately.
In Egypt, however, the norms are not particularly set very
accurately, since during one observation on many building sites
it was customary for gangs to finish their daily "Tariha" before
the eight hour work day was over. The adjustment of that norm
to the case by case situation is left entirely to the experience
of the supervisor. Information on cost reporting, the main
tool that management has to control project costs, is not available
for public use. Public sector contractors do keep cost records
to be presented to the Central Agency for Auditing. The cost
system required by the Unified Accounting System is based on the
definition of 4 categories of cost centers in each firm: production,
production services, marketing services, and marketing and
financial services. The end of year financial statements are an
aggregation of these records under different classification.
Some insight can be gained from considering some companies'
financial statements. Public sector firms do not differentiate
between the administrative and services centers, but only between
production (i.e., project) and other centers. Costs are grouped
as wages, production requirements, services requirements, and direct
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costs (i.e. rents, interest costs). The main difference between
the various contractors is their treatment of the other costs,
namely depreciation and indirect expenses (sales, administration,
etc.). As shown in Table 4-15, some do break down these costs
per project thus considering those production centers as profit
centers, while others keep them aggregate at the firm level.
Such practice of not distributing fixed costs to projects
may reduce the incentive of the project team to increase its
control over the indirect cost items. Regardless of such differences,
firms do distribute these semi-fixed and fixed costs either by
allocation to projects or by calculation of actual expenditure.
Firms record actual direct costs and compare them with the contract
value and calculate the percent complete for each project.
Such practice can be enhanced to enable management to
establish norms and standards for project performance based on the
comparison of actual expenses to the planned costs. This can be
done with the existing cost system by considering the reservations
and qualifications made earlier about the reserves and the
limitations of the financial reports. However, partly due to the
complication of such a cost system, and partly due to the low
priority given to planning, such analysis of cost variance is
seldom if ever performed.
Time control on the projects in both public and private
sectors does not receive high priority. The lack of information
on average project duration of the various contractors gives an
indication as to the importance attached to schedule on the various
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Contractors (A) and (B) had an approximate turnover in 1975 of some
L.E. 7,700,000 and 7,800,000 respectively.
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projects. On large projects, time schedules are usually set
with the use of Bar(GANT) charts. On smaller projects, time
is only monitored informally by the contractor, where sporadic
control is implemented on certain activities. Although
selective informal control is effective, it may not be very
efficient, especially since there is no guarantee that it will
be genrated in time for the remedy action to be successfully imple-
mented.
Contracts with clients, especially those with the government,
have penalty clauses for delays within the control of the
contractor. Most of the time, however, the government is
reluctant to use this right on public sector contractors, especially
when back payments from the client are involved. Further-
more, even on large projects, the public contractor can obtain
extensions from the client on the due date (for example, Arab
contractors extended delivery date of the second part of the 6 of
October bridge three times for 18 months. The importance of time
control on projects is reduced.
The situation is complicated by the frequent delays in
delivery of building materials, which increases the difficulties
associated with the estimating of the activity durations. It could
be that such issues might stand in the way of implementing more
close control tools such as networks and Critical Path Method (CPM)
on Egyptian projects.
Despite the lack of readily available information on
average project duration, some indications can still be gained
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TABLE 4-16
Value of Work Executed During the
By The 29 Contractors of the Ministry





























































































by considering the average value executed by the 29-companies
affiliated with the Ministry of Housing with respect to the value
of work forwarded to the following year, and of that being continued
from previous years. Table 4-16 shows that between 1974 and 1975,
for all of the companies, the total work on hand tended to be
equally divided between contracts carried over from previous years
and new contracts. The value of work executed was almost equal
to 30 percent of that on hand. This might suggest that the
average duration of the projects is a little over three years.
This long duration, however, is not a reflection of the
size of the projects, but rather a reflection of the direct order
system in contract award. The actual execution of many of the
projects does not start directly after award. This might explain
the relatively low share of work executed by the largest three
contracting firms with respect to their total contracts on hand.
This is substantiated by the fact that, in 1978, after the return
to, competitive bidding, the value of work forwarded decreased
considerably for all the firms (38).
The table also shows that in non-building works the project
duration tends to be somewhat longer than in building construction,
since share of the work executed to that on hand for both was 30
percent and 50 percent respectively. Such a finding is concurrent
with the fact that non-building contracts are usually a little
larger than building ones.
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These differences are shown further when considering
the duration of the various activities in the project execution.
Table 4-17 shows the average duration in months of the various
activities for a L.E. 1,000,000 project with a total duration
of 30 months. These durations are based on the labor productivity
discussed earlier, and on the average unit costs of these
activities in the early 1970's. Despite the changes that have
occurred on both these parameters as discussed earlier, the
table does give some inedication on the contribution of the various
activities to the project duration.
On the average, the finishing work* lasts between 40 and
80 percent of project duration, while ordinary works only last
between 20 and 60 percent of the total duration*. The duration
of the ordinary works in industrial buildings is longer than in
residential or general buildings, probably due to the lower
quantities in finishings required by this type of building. For
example, sanitary works only require 50 percent of total duration
in industrial buildings, while the other two types require 60
percent. The fact that in the painting activity general
buildings require a somewhat shorter time than in industrial
does not contradict the previous statement; it only reflects the
fact that painting in industrial construction is more major than
in the general building, which includes a wide range of structures
*Ordinary works are the excavation, structure and masonary works.
All other activities are finishing works.
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TABLE 4-17
Typical Duration of Project Activities
in L.E. 1,000,000 Projects That Last for 30 Months
(Source: Ref. 11)
MEDIUM CLASS GENERAL BUILDING INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AVERAGE
HOUSING
Activity Relative Activity Relative Activity Relative
Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration
Months % Months % Months % Months %
Excavation Works 5 17 3 10 10 33 - 6 20
Reinforced Concrete 22 73 15 50 19 63 18.7 62.2
Masonry Works 22 73 15 50 19 63 18.7 62.2
Insulation Works 21 70 15 50 12 40 16 53.3
Floors & tile Works 20 67 16 53 15 50 17 56.7
Plastering Works 21 70 19 63 20 67 20 66.7
Painting Works 19 63 9 30 10 33 12.2 42.2
Joinary & Iron Works 19 63 16 53 20 67 18.3 61.1
Sanitary Works 19 63 17 57 15 50 17 56.7
Electrical Works 25 83 23 77 23 77 23.7 78.8
that may not even require painting, such as warehouses. The
fact that the duration of the joinary and ironworks in industrial
buildings is longer than in other buildings may reflect the fact
that unit costs of such activities in the former type is lower
than in the latter.
This table, however, does not indicate the interdependence
that exists between the various activities. Such interdependencies
are the major factor governing the total duration of the project,
since, for instance, plastering cannot start before masonry work,
joinery, and flooring. Nevertheless, the table shows the
typical overlap that exists on the projects, since the durations
of the individual activities add up to more than three times the
total project duration. In the absence of studies concerning
the actual productivity of the labor on the various activities
and the delays and problems with materials and equipment use,
one cannot assess whether such activity duration represents normal
or crushed durations.* This affects cost overruns, since
crushed activities have a higher probability of overrunning than
those with normal duration (60).
Other factors, aside from the delays in materials supply
and the lack of formal controls on project cost and duration, such
as quality control on the projects, change orders, and the
financial arrangements between the various participants cause
*Crushed duration is the time required to perform the activity by
committing more resources than normally required.
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delays and increased costs of the projects in Egypt. Change orders
on contracts for the 29 contracting firms in 1974 and 1975 are shown
in Table 4-16. The largest change orders relative to the value
of work on hand for all contractors seem to be relatively small,
representing some 0.5 percent in value. Such a figure on the
aggregate is deceiving; first, since these figures show only
the officially documented change orders, which are associated
with maybe major changes in the contracts.
It is expected that smaller changes do occur on the various
projects and are not necessarily recorded. This is substantiated
by the fact that the government as a client reserves the right
to altE* contracts by 25 percent of their original value, without
having tj change unit prives for the contractor(48). Also, the
largest ;ontractors' records show almost no change orders, which
could b( attributed to the fact that, due to their size, they
usual"y settle their charges with the clients directly. Secondly,
the amount of these changes is usually concentrated in a small
number of projects, for example, the L.E. 169,000 change in the
value of the contracts for the largest three contractors was on
projects Leing executed by one of these firms.
The table shows that on the average, non-building construction
and specialty work showed a larger share of change orders relative
to building construction. This is expected since these types
of construction are of a less repetitive nature than building
construction, and are more susceptible to problems in designs and
detailing. The fact that no information is available on the
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originators of the change orders does not allow us to trace the
source of the problem either to bad design, or to improvements
on the execution techniques. But the fact that design specifi-
cations are largely loose, and in many cases incomplete, might
indicate that these changes are usually a reflection of the
inadequacy of the designs (59).
The problems with the standards and specifications compli-
cate the process of quality control on site for the contractors,
since the enforcement of these controls is usually left to the
discretion of the client's representative and the contractor.
The poor quality of the materials delivered to the site
further complicates this issue since they increase the already
long delays contractors have to absorb due to inadequate supply of
these materials. On most of the ordinary projects, however,
sampling of the materials and testing of products is not wide-
spread; it is only on special large projects that such practices
are required. Such tests usually have to be carried out at
universities and central research centers; for projects far
from the urban areas the.process becomes expensive.
Client inspection does exist on the projects, and is
either carried out by the client's representative, the
professional, or by the client personnel themselves, especially
in the case of government projects. This procedure allows
for some minimal level of quality control, but as seen on most
of the completed projects, this inspection seems to concentrate
on the structural safety of the buildings, and does not attach
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importance to much of the finish works. For example, it is
customary to find in most completed new buildings wastewater
leaks due to faulty drainage, bad materials and bad insulation.
Part of the problem stems also from the lack of incentives
for the contractor to trade-off higher costs for better quality.
It is not clear whether the contracts between clients and the
firms allow contractors to defray the costs of the increased
quality, or that the process of negotiating unit prices, especially
with the steeply rising costs of labor and materials, inhibit the
contractors' concentration on quality control.
This lack of incentive may even complicate the relationship
between the various participants - lead to delays in final delivery
and even to litigation. These relationships are rendered even
more complex by the delays in the payments and the financial
responsibilities between these participants. With increased
delays in clients' payments, the client representative may be
forced to make certain tradeoffs when enforcing the contract
between the literate interpretation and the extent of existing
pressure on the contractor executing the job. Contractors, being
aware of such facts, may be tempted to take advantage of the
situation by reducing the amount of their commitment to the control
of the various elements of the projects.
The performance of the contractors on the site is highly
correlated to the quality of supervision they allocate to the
projects. While this varies considerably with the size, type
of projects and the contractors, it seems that the private firms
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on the average rely on less qualified people to perform this
activity than do the public firms. Private firms usually
rely on one or two experienced foremen to act as project managers,
while public sector firms have usually a more elaborate-project
organization headed by an engineer or architect with five to ten
years experience (34). Such practices are partly due to the
differences in the projects executed by the type of contractors,
but is also a result of the regulations of the public sector.
Studying a model project organization of a public sector contractor
can serve as a good example to highlight some further issues that
face the development of the project's execution. Figure 4-1
shows such an example of a typical project organization of a
medium size building project carried out by a medium size public
sector contractor.
Two sets of issues appear from investigating such an
organization. The first relates to the relationship between
this project organization and the contracting firm itself. The
other relates to the activities of the team itself. The first
set of problems arises due to a conflict between project related
and firm related issues that affect the project team. For example,
centralizing the building materials purchase, which is a critical
issue in the Egyptian construction might cause delays in the
execution. Equipment assignment is another issue that is assigned
centrally, which minimizes the teams control over the functioning
of equipment. Such issues became problematic when delays interfere
with the compensation of the project's team, and might reduce the
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FIGURE 4-1













Project Value Around L.E. 5,000,000
incentives for the project team to improve its efficiency.
The second set is manifested in two areas; one is
related to the type of work assigned to the various positions
and the other has to do with the relationship between the team
members. The fact that project engineers' duties which include
measurement of quantities and approval of time sheets seem
to underutilize the qualifications of these engineers is an
example of the first. The latter is detected by the relationship
that the mechanical engineer for example has in the project
since he is technically subordinate to another department all
together. Also, the fact that cost data is collected by two
different groups, technical and financial, would cause some friction
between the team. These problems are not unique to Egypt and similar
ones can be see, for example, in U.S. construction practices. Address-
ing these issues is of vital importance however, for contrator efficiency.
4.5 Constraints on Project Development
Generally in Egypt today two major sets of constraints tend
to inhibit project inception - planning and execution. From the
standpoint of the contractors these can be defined as constraints
external to and/or constraints internal to the firms. The external
ones, aside from physical constraints such as the lack of develop-
able lands and the scarcity of some resources, can be traced to
government action as well as to actions taken by other participants
in the industry.
Government regulations that stem from the centrally planned
economy constitute a major obstacle to project development. These
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regulations are intended chiefly to control distribution of the
resources that are mostly government-owner; they do not concern
themselves very much with the implementation of continuing and stable
strategy. Their effect is reflected in the lack of land development
policy, which contributes to the problem of land availability and
complicates the process of obtaining building permits. This is also
reflected in the inadequacy and sometimes absence of specifications
that deal with the setting of standards, as in the case of residential
buildings, where the specifications concentrate more on tangible
properties of certain parts of the physical structure than on the
more important issue of fitting user needs with the provision of
affordable housing.
Concentration on details and on measures to control market
forces, especially on the supply side, increases the effort required
for project initiation and does not solve the problems associated
with any real shortage of resources. For example, the difficulty
in financing projects in Egypt is increased by the government's
efforts to reconcile needs and resources. Such efforts subject
clients and thus their projects to the changes in government priorities
that come about as a result either of changes in goals or of inadequate
forecasting by planning authorities. Regulations such as subsidies
and price control of materials and rents increase the effort required
to initiate projects, even if financing is more or less available,
especially for the private sector. Like in other countries, clients
have to secure government blessings for the project idea, banks
have to agree to finance it, and permits have to be secured. In
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Egypt, however, even after all these obstacles are surmounted,
delays in the delivery of government-controlled materials
may threaten timely project completion. Clients thus have to
face uncertain availabilioty of funding in the following fiscal
period, which might force them to the black market, further
complicating the situation.
Construction projects in Egypt, like in the United States,
are inhibited by the separation of design and construction. This
separation delays entry of the contractor into the project process
and deprives projects of contractor input that can sometimes defray
both the projected cost and completion time of projects. It also
increases the possibility of delay and claims due to subsequent
change orders and reduces the possibility of realizing possible
savings in project costs. Finally, it further complicates the
process of making changes during execution of the project, as all
the participants have to agree on them. This may increase friction
between the two teams, especially when the professionals are also
responsible for the supervision of construction.
The increased difficulty in changing inhibits innovation.
The contractor may be reluctant either to initiate changes or even
to accept new ideas, since this would involve the relatively
complicated process of convincing the client as well as his represen-
tatives, the professionals. Innovation may be further barred by the
lack of incentives to contractors provided in client contracts; the
contractor may not be allowed a share of the benefits of savings
on project costs initiated by him.
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The standards and specifications in use in Egypt do not promote
the adoption of new ideas or techniques either, as they do not
allow room for these ideas to be tested or implemented but rather
treat each case individually. Specifications can further be a
source of delay or increased costs, for example, by specifying
materials that may not be readily available in the market, or by
requiring the rigid adoption of certain architectural particular
details that might complicate execution of the project. Also,
in Egypt, specifications exist for only a small number of con-
struction activities, which complicates the issue of controlling
the quality of the other activities. This process can facilitate
cheating and may even present safety problems.
Quality is further hampered by the low standards for building
materials used in the construction process, due to inadequacy of
inspection and problems in the production of those materials; but
what complicates the quality control inspection process on site,
is the lack of specifications of allowable tolerances in the
dimensions, stresses, and other specifications for the various
activities, leaving the decision to accept or refuse particular
work somewhat to the discretion of the parties involved. This
lack of specifications may complicate and delay the delivery process
on projects. These delays usually tie the contractor to the site
physically as well as financially. Such delays complicate the already
difficult cash flow situation of the contractors on their various
projects. This situation arises mainly from the difficulties
associated with securing short-term financing, especially for private
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sector contractors as well as public sector ones due to competition
for bank credits from the various sectors of the economy. It is
further complicated, however, by the problems in securing advance
credit from suppliers of building materials and main contractors,
thus increasing the financial burden on contractors.
These external constraints are emphasized by internal ones
which are partly in response to the environment, but which are
also a reflection of the way contractors carry out their work in
Egypt. An example of the latter is in the area of technology
selection. In facing the changing situation of resource markets
in Egypt, the need to modernize project execution is confronted
by lack of trained personnel and lack of expertise in using and
maintaining unfamiliar equipment. The lack of such expertise in
contracting firms, especially in smaller ones, may constitute a
major bottleneck to firms' efforts to enlarge their activities
and may even result in inadequate preparation for projects.
Such difficulties are further demonstrated by the fact that
small modern tools are not used on project sites. It is common
for contractors to centralize their modernization efforts in
separate stages of project activities, such as in the lifting
and puring of concrete, while it is seldom the case to spread
the use of mechanical hammers or cement guns for plastering, a
fact which re-emphasizes the problems these contractors have in
using technology on a widespread level.
The reliance on informal, personal, and individual control
methods does not clarify the guidelines being used nor the norms
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that the system requires to evaluate the performance of the
project team as individuals. This lack of clarity-makes it
difficult to tie the incentives and motivations directly into
the control system used by the firm. For instance, the small
private sector contractors who happen to keep personal control over
their projects by physically visiting the sites and who do not
keep any formal records, make for control based on physical,
individual communication by words, relying on an individual's
ability and experience, which varies from case to case. On larger
and more complex projects the need for formalizing such control
techniques becomes more evident, highlighting the need for better
information flow and communication.
The control systems presently used by the contracting firms are
deterministic in nature, which complicate the process of adapting
to changes in the environment. This also makes the incorporation
of predictable changes in the plans for the firms virtually impossible.
This may be a result of inadequate assessment or consideration to
the interdependencies which exist between the needs of the performed
activities and between the use of the various resources. For
example, the low priority attached to maintenance of equipment, as
well as to project time control in general, may be a reflection of
the difference of perception of the time variable. Future benefits
are usually traded for present, short-term results.
Not formally establishing the accepted production norms for
labor is another example of such problems leading either to
inefficient use of the available workers or to delays due to the
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lack of them, depending on how accurate the informal productivity was
set. Such issues are also reflected in the handling of building
materials on site. The understatement of the amount wasted, and/or
the failure to recognize all the variables affecting the performance
on the projects, leads to cost increases due to bad handling or
storage of the materials. Such issues among others, further limit
the ability of the contractor to plan or even adjust reasonably
to changes in the -resource market.
Aside from quality problems due to specifications, the con-
tractors do not seem to be requiring quality of their project
teams. No internal quality control standards exist, and testing
when practiced is very limited. This lack of enforcement and low
priority attributed to quality leads to potential delays, complicates
the relation between contractors and other parties involved in the
project, and even leads to the necessity for larger factors of
safety (i.e., increased project costs) in the design and execution
of the work.
The project team set-up, being temporary in nature, adds
another dimension to the -above problems - that of human relations.
The project-oriented organization of the smaller firms may inhibit
the foundation of a continuity and a feeling of belonging among
the project personnel, espeically on projects of short duration.
This issue is of importance since project personnel express multiple
loyalties: to various firms, departments, and even participants.
Coordination among all these parties might require the consideration
of new forms of organization for contracting firms, such as matrix
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organizations, whereby project managers play a major coordinating
role between the various interests in the firm.
A major problem however still stands in the way of successful
project management in Egypt, that is, the integration of control
into a continum cycle of planning, control, and feedback. This
at present is made impossible by the record-keeping and the data-
handling in the firms. Improvements in the record-keeping of firms
is essential for.communicating information among firm levels- and
also for establishing plans and measuring variations, leading
finally to definite areas which require action. The lack of such
records and the inadequacy of detail collected limits the effectiv-
eness of the actions taken by project teams on site. For instance,
the lack of use of equipment operating cards complicates exact cost
calculation for projects, further inhibiting equipment policy in
the firms and even affecting the ability of a firm to obtain new
work successfully.
The above constraints all interact in the Egyptian project cycle
from inception to completion and lead to cost increases as well as
delays. They foster dishonest practices and low quality of work,
inhibit innovation, and nurture black markets and informal building
practices.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
The preceding analysis of the contracting firms in Egypt was
carried out on three different levels: the economy-wide level, the
firm level, and the project level. At the economy-wide level we
determined the forces that interacted in the economy and their influ-
ence on the construction industry. At the firm level, we determined
the characteristics of the firms and the environment in which they
operate; and at the project level we analyzed the operation of the
contractors and their interaction with the other participants in the
industry. The analysis has led to the definition of various issues
that. face the development of the contractors in Egypt.
5.1.1 Firms and the Economy
The economy and the firm's interaction has been mainly dominated
by the control of the government over the production units as
well as the investment in the economy. Despite such control, the
government's planning for the construction industry is limited in
scope. The five year (1978-1982 ) plan consider the sector as being com-
posed of large public sector contractors who suffer mainly from certain
shortages in the various inputs to the industry. While this is true,
failing to recognize the construction process as an interaction
between clients; i.e., owners and financiers, professionals, suppliers,
contractors, users, and the government limits the effectiveness of such
planning efforts. For example, the building materials problem cannot
be solved by ignoring the suppliers or the effect of the government
regulations on the availability of the materials, as well as the
influence of the professionals on specifying and improving their use.
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This limitation in the definition of the industry is only
one of the drawbacks of government control over planning in Egypt.
Another problem stems from changes in the government priorities
in directing fixed capital investment to the various sectors of the
economy, leading to fluctuations in the demand for constructed
facilities. These fluctuations increase the uncertainty facing the
contractors in the industry, and might even inhibit their growth. This
situation is worsened by the lack of adequate studies on demand for
construction in Egypt, its size, elasticity, etc. Such lack makes
the planning for work on the part of the contractors only based on
individual perception, and complicates the efforts of the government
in planning for the industry's needs in response to this demand.
The lack of detailed information on the industry and the
firms might represent an important constraint facing the development
of the firms. Not only is some of the information not available,
but even what is available may not be in a form usable by the firms.
For example, no information is available on the number and prices
of contracts awarded to the contractors in Egypt, which affects the
ability of the various contractors to predict the extent of competition
in the market. Firms are thus unable to accuratly plan for the
demand of the different construction types, since the available
information by economic sector might not exactly parallel that of the
types of facilities. On an industry wide level, planning cannot
quite trace construction price increases to all their sources since
no adequate price indices exist for the various construction
types based on actual, up-to-date information.
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The regulations governing the construction and the contractors
in Egypt have in many instances stood in.the way of the development
of the firms. Rules that regulate the relationships of the firms
with the government in such areas as registration and taxation have
always been discriminating against the private sector contractors
while simplifying the duties of the public sector ones. This has
been intensified by the fact that contracting activity is not re-
cognized or organized in anyway, unlike many other trade or industry
activities.
The regulations that govern the relation between the parti-
cipants were conceived to protect clients and professionals from the
contractors' actions. The discriminatory effects of such rules
has been increased in Egypt because the largest client of industry
is the government itself. Such rules increase the risks of the small
private sector contractors, and complicate their competition aga.1st
the large public sector firms.
Government actions have been responsible for such discrimination,
first by the creation of the public sector firm through nationalization
of private firms, and then by its intervention in the market of the
various resources used by the contractors. The creation of the
public sector has led to a general reduction of the private sector's
role in the economy and consequently in construction, as the govern:
ment enacted ceilings on those private firms and gave contracts by
direct order to public sector firms. The government control over
the supply and prices of the resources has increased the effects
of their shortage, and made prices not directly tied to their relative
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scarcity. The allocation of materials helped the flourishing
of the "black market" dealings in the controlled materials, and has
also'created distributional problems, increasing the probabilty of
sudden shortages and delivery delays. Such actions also affect
the availability and accessibility of financing for the contractors.
Government control over credit and banks in Egypt has not helped the
small private firms to receive long-term loans since the public
sector firms had access priority to the limited credits available
for the industry.
Faced with such an environment, the private sector firms
remained small and specialized, with only a few growing over the
past two decades. On the other hand, public sector firms increased
in size, although only a few did attempt to develop their construction
techniques.
The limited competition led the firms in both sectors to limit
their cooperation with other firms. Public firms felt no need for
such joint venturing and limited their cooperation to subcontracting
parts of their work to private contractors. Private firms did not
feel safe enough to enlarge their contracting activities, especially
since no organization exists to represent their interests.
Now that the government is trying to revitalize the private
sector through implementation of the open door policy and the en-
couragement of joint ventures, it is faced with the difficulty of
overcoming the lack of confidence the private sector has developed
in its actions. Such lack of confidence had been reinforced over the
years by the policies and decisions implemented since 1961. This
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is why it is not suprising to find many of the larger private
sector firms enlarging their activities in other fields besides
construction in real estate or import of materials and equipment.
Nor is it suprising to find local contractors involved in joint
venture with multi-nationals, acting more as agents to these foreign
firms rather than actually participating in execution of the work.
5.1.2. Projects and the Economy
The second set of issues mainly affect the project
inception and design phases. The problems in financing projects
is the first obstacle facing project development in Egypt. The tight
control exercised by the government complicates the financing pro-
cedure for both private as well as public clients. Before
being financed, projects of both sectors must be approved by various
government agencies to ensure its consistency with government priorities;
however, after such approval, and as government priorities change,
financing might be interrupted, causing delay in project execution.
Private projects are further inhibited, first by the smallness
of the investments allocated for the private sector, and secondly
by some of the regulations enacted by the government. For example,
rent control in housing makes investment by individuals in that
area unprofitable and inhibits the development of new projects.
Separation between the design and the construction on almost
all the projects of the industry, although not solely existing in
Egypt, constitute a constraint on the project development process.
It delays the contractor's entry to the process, thus foregoing possible
benefits arising from time and cost saving ideas he might have to offer.
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It further complicates the relationship of the professionals and
contractors, as each tends to blame the other for delay and cost
increases during project execution. The lack of clarity in the
law with regard to the responsibilities of the two parties might
increase the delays arising from such a relationship.
Rules and regulations inthe economy also cause delays and
cost increases on the various projects. The lack of clarity and
inadequacy of the design standards and norms, at least delays the
delivery of the completed detailed designs to the contractor, causing
delays in construction. Also, such issues give rise to later changes
due to practicalities. Such changes even if they do not cause
price increases usually cause delays in the project execution.
The lack of planning regulations in Egypt also complicates
project starts, since building permits for the various projects have
to be considered on a project-by-project basis at the local level of
government. This might delay the start of the project, and even lead
to changes in design, leading to time and cost increases. The inter-
ference of government in the supply of the various resources is
another source of delay in project execution, and might inhibit the
efforts of formalized planning for project execution.
5.1.3. Firms and Projects
In response to the uncertainties imposed by the environment,
contractors seek to maintain centralization of decisions at the
firm level. This centralization, however, imposes some
constraints on the project performance, as it requires
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the measurement of their cost is not accurate.
These practices, coupled with the external constraints on both
projects and resources have reduced the importance of the other than
erection activities carried out by contracting firms in both sectors.
Planning for the construction work achieved a secondary role in the
fitms, complicating the financial problems of the contractors in
meeting their working capital requirements. Also, bidding became
a problem for firms. On the one hand, private firms suffer from
the lack of qualified personnel to prepare bids; while on the other
hand, public sector firms lack the experience in bidding due to their
lack of exposure to' bidding in the past.
These issues can all stand in the way of the development of the
contractors in Egypt, especially those in the private sector. Now
that the government is moving towards reducing its intervention in
the market and encouraging the private sector participation, these
issues acquire paramount importance, if the construction industry is
to effectively meet the increasing demand in the future without
excessive price increases and waste of resources.
5.2 Recommendations
Both the government and the contractors in Egypt have a role
to play in the development of the construction industry, first as
separate entities and then by interacting together to achieve such
development.
5.2.1. Government's Role
The government as a regulator has to improve planning
for the construction sector, first by recognizing the interaction
of the different participants in the construction process, and second
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by undertaking the necessary studies to determine the existing
capacity and efficiency of the industry. This requires that the
government planning effort extend beyond the allocation of building
materials and capital to the sector.
The government has to determine the constraints that inhibit
the clients, the professionals, the suppliers as well as those
that inhibit the contractors. This will lead to a better under-
standing of the financial and regulatory needs of the industry in
Egypt, and will provide more stability to the implementation of those
plans. It will allow the government to channel the required fixed
capital investment to the various sectors including construction more
realistically, thus reducing the fluctuation caused by the changes in
the priorities.
This requires that government reconsider and review the present
regulations that govern both the industry and the participants. This
will entail the abolishment of certain laws and the enactment of some
others. For instance, existing physical planning regulations that
govern and may even delay projects in Egypt need improvement. While
review of the subsidy and price control regulations will improve this
availability, the review of taxation and registration laws will
remove the existing distortions that have led to discrimination
against private sector firms. If this is coupled with the removal
of the present regulations obstructing banking and the availability
of credit, it will give more security to the private sector and show
the government's commitment to encourage the private sector's active
participation in the development of Egypt.
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communication between the project level staff and the firm
executives. Private firms maintain such communications by the direct
involvement of the executives on project activities, which imposes
a direct limitation of the number and size of these firms. Public
sector firms, by centralizing certain decisions as purchase and
equipment, ensure such centralization. The centralization actions
carried out by the firms neverte!ess do not seem to be coupled with
a system of dividing the resporsibilities between the project and firm
level. For example, transfer prices are not used on equipment assign-
ment to projects. This leads to a lack of clarity between the
responsibilities of the project team and those of the firm executives.
In performing their activities, the firms in both sectors seem
to rely highly on informal communication. While such practice may
be effective in the case of the private firms on small projects, it
poses problems for the larger firms, and even constitutes a constraint
on developing planning and control activities for the firms in the
future.
Control is performed somewhat informally in both sectors. Although
some records are kept for the control of the direct inputs, most
of the indirect costs are not controlled effectively. Furthermore,
quality is almost not controlled as it seems that firms have no
incentive to incur extra costs for quality control to save time and
money on projects. Such is also the case with the various inputs.
Since labor control is only based on arbitrary norms their productivity
cannot be accurately measured, and effective control cannot be introduced.
Wasteful use of materials and labor becomes difficult to change because
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Abolishing distributional regulations will also enable the
government to concentrate its efforts on improving those regulations
actually governing the industry in order to enhance its enforcement
ability, as well as to enable it to resume its more important roles
in diffusing technology and disseminating information. Improved
data collection and handling is an area where the government has
to reinforce its activities by compiling and classifying the now
scattered data on firms and contractors in the various government
agencies. It has to improve its ability to produce such information,
update it in time, and make it available to the public from various
outlets. It also has to produce such information that would make
it possible for the firms to plan their activities and work on the
basis of the existing and past conditions of the economy, such as
information on the number and values of contracts let per year, etc.
Such action besides improving the abilit, of the firms to plan their
work, will allow the firms to improve their performance as it will
give them an indication of the extent and nature of the competition in
the market.
In diffusing technology the government has to improve its
present research and development facilities, extend their activities
and make them available and affordable by the various contractors. It
also has to develop and implement standards for the construction
of the facilities being built in Egypt, as well as to disseminate the
knowledge of new practices and techniques by sponsoring seminars, and
holding training programs directed towards the management of firms
not only for public firms but especially for private sector contractors.
227
It is also important that the government uses other indirect
measures to ensure this diffusion of technology, such as tax in-
centives for innovation. The encouragement of joint ventures with
multi-nationals is an important way to ensure the diffusion of new
technologies, but has to be carried out together with other actions
to encourage the active participation of the local contractors
in these ventures.
In carrying out these actions the government may begin with the
other role it plays in the industry; namely, its role as a client,
simply because it is the largest client in the Egyptian economy.
It has to improve the planning of its own projects by emphasizing
the importance of feasibility studies, and decisions on the project's
financing, size and timing. When it ensures the permanency of the
financing of its projects, the government as a client addresses
directly the issue of alleviating working capital problems of the
contractors. Indirectly, it increases the stability of the demand
since this reduces fluctuations due to work stoppage.
Better definitions of contract letting with regard to timing
and size of these contracts-directly influences the ability of the
contractors to respond to the government demand and can thus allow
government to help small and medium contractors. Furthermore,
the government by improving its contract letting techniques can
promote cooperation between the participants. By allowing for design
construction packages to be launched, which aside from realizing
savings on its projects will also improve the relations between the
professionals and the contractors in general.
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This requires the government to review the traditional contract
forms it holds with both professionals and contractors, and
allows for new contract forms. Such new contracts can promote the
team approach to project implementation, and encourage cost-saving
techniques and improvement by providing for sharing between the
participants in the benefits realized from such savings.
The encouragement of small and medium contractors can also be
achieved by improving the registration and prequalification pro-
cedures required by the government projects. Allowing small or new
firms to register even for certain projects would increase the
accessibility of the contractors to the market. Also, the encourage-
ment of local joint ventures between small firms to work on larger
government projects can promote the cooperation between the firms
and allows for risk sharing between them. While such action as the
setting of yearly quotas for small contractors can provide some risk
shelter for such firms and allows them to grow.
No action, however, taken by the government, whether as a client
or as a regulator, can alone alleviate the industry constraints and
achieve the required development.
5.2.2. Contractors' Role
Contractors in both sectors have to improve their internal
performance to be able to enlarge their activities. Their bidding,
planning, and control activities have to be improved if any change
in the industry's technology or performance is to be realized.
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Firms have to improve their ability to secure work through
bidding. This requires improved recording techniques and filing
of historic cost data and information on the firms' past performance
as well as the performance of competitive firms. It also requires
the training of appropriate personnel to prepare such bids for the
firms. Such actions will allow firms to improve their project planning
activity. Since they would be able to consider alternative approaches
to the execution of their projects with regard to different tech-
nologies as well as different alternatives to the use of their
resources by deciding on work to be carried out by firms and that to
be carried out by others. This enables firms to set formal policies
for the use of their resources. Such policies should cover the use
of the firms' equipment, labor, inventory as well as finances. The
formalization of decision-making concerning these resources allows
firms to set formal plans for the execution of their work.
The planning process cannot, however, be complete without the
use of formal control techniques on project execution. The use of
such formal control requires that firms clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of their project teams versus those of the central
firm's employees. This definition of roles helps firms to establish
formal control and incentives for the execution of the projects,
where project teams' actions can be monitored and feedback instituted
to allow for plan adjustments. Such formal controls will help improve
the efficiency of the firm's project personnel as well as the produ-
ctivity of its equipment and labor.
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This will not be entirely possible, however, without raising
'the level of quality control exercised by the firms on the execution,
an action that can be incorporated clearly in the control system,
may be through incentives or through quality control teams run by the
firms. At any rate, the implementation of formal recording and control
requires that the quality of the work that firms' project personnel
are performing be changed. This entails improving the use of the
qualified personnel in the case of public contractors and raising
the quality of such personnel in the case of private contractors.
5.2.3. Joint Government and Contractors' Actions
For these changes and improvements to take place in the
Egyptian construction industry, it is important that both government
and contractors join in creating the means by which these efforts can
be channelled to the benefit of the projects. The recognition and
organization of the contracting activity, not only through laws and
regulations, but by allowing contractors, especially in the private
sector, to form associations might help-achieve these goals.
Such associations or organizations would represent the contractors
interests in their dealings with other participants and also adopt
and foster their requirements. They can help in the formulation and
the implementation of the laws required to organize contracting and can
help in creating a contractors' classification based on the firms'
financial, technical and managerial abilities. They can also help
in the dissemination of information among contractors, and even
sponsor research in the areas constraining contractors.
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Without these actions stemming from the separate but comple-
mentary roles of the government and the contractors, it may not
be possible for the private sector firms to increase their involve-
ment in the industry. This in the face of growing demand for con-
struction might lead to the persistence of cost increases and delays
in the execution of projects and certainly negatively affedt the
development of Egypt.
5.3 Further Research
Research should continue to investigate the contractor's
performance in the industry, especially to analyze the impact of alter-
native mechanisms open to the government on the firms. This is proposed
at a time when realistic limits will be put on government control in
Egypt because without understanding the various effects of the
regulations on the firms, deregulation alone cannot bring about
the required changes. Without determining the critical factors that
limit the growth of existing firms, prevent the entry to contracting
or encourage the exist of existing firms, the government cannot be
effective in alleviating such constraints.
The study can start by identifying the various factors affecting
the efficiency of existing, as well as prospective contractors, through
interviews and questionnaires. At the same time, the study will
determine the set of potential mechanisms and policy tools available
to the government to influence the contractors in the industry. It
will further determine a measure of effectiveness against which it
will rank the various policy alternatives and recommend the most
suitable set necessary to alleviate the constraints on the contractor's
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performance.
All along the demand facing the contractors was assumed to
be known with certainty. However, since information on demand
for the various types of construction does not seem to exist
in Egypt, the study can use available data to estimate various likely
demand alternatives and analyze the effects of the various policy
tools in the context of such alternatives and a set of preferable
policies selected for these demands.
Such a study would allow the government authorities to test
and measure the impacts of such policies as alternative tax con-
siderations or production subsidies on the factors motivating the
contractors before taking the risks of full-scale implementation
without being able a priori to consider the full effects of such
actions. This effort might require the use of decision analysis
techniques and utility assessment of the various participants and
can also be viewed as a step towards being able to model the
construction industry in Egypt more formally.
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APPENDIX I
The Unified Accounting System*
The Unified Accounting System has set the forms as well as the
rules to be used in preparing company statements. Figure A-1 shows
typical accounts shown in the balance sheet of a public sector
contractor. The assets side shows the normal accounts such as fixed
assets (#11), inventory (#13), financial investments (#15), accounts
receivable (#16), and cash (#18). Special accounts are also included
to help in clarifying the activities of the firm. Investments in
fixed assets ar. shown separately in account #12, while the debit
side of the various payables (#26 and #27) is added also to the assets
side and the co t of work being forwarded to the next fiscal year is
shown in account #132 under "unfinished products and work underway at
cost." The fi:m's activities, however, cannot be fully detected from
the balance sheet. For instance, the value of the work at sale price
is not shown independently but is lumped into account #273, "other
accounts receivable," making it impossible to calculate the value of
work executed from the balance sheet.
The income statement for these companies is presented in three
different accounts. The main one, shown in Figure A-2 is the
Current Activities Account, which is divided into two parts. The
* This appendix is largely based on information from References 42 and 43
except where otherwise noted.
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first part includes current income (#41) and current expenses during
the period (#31, #32, #33, and #35), leading to calculation of the
gross margin from projects. -The second part includes other incomes
(#44) and other indirect expenses (#36),.leading to calculation of
the net profits for distribution. The other two accounts, the
Production and Trade Statement (Figure 3-8c), and the Profit and Loss
Statement (Figure 3-8d), include basically the same information as
the Current Activities Account. The Production and Trade Statement
calculates the gross margin from the project by deducting the costs
of production (#53) and the production services costs (#63) from the
income of current activities (#41). The Profit and Loss Account
calculates the net profit for distribution by subtracting from
the gross margin the costs- of management and financing services (#83).
Net profits of public sector firms are distributed according to
government-set rules, while those of the private sector are, of course,
not. Three percent of these are used to finance the Nassar Social
Bank, a government-specialized bank charging no interest on its loans,
while 15 percent are retained as reserves. The remaining 83 percent
of profits are used to pay employees' end-of-year bonuses (25 percent)
and to be added to the paid-in capital of the firms (75 percent).
In the case of private corporations, the only requirement that has to
be met with regard to profit is the setting aside of a 5 percent legal
reserve. These reserves, however, are tax deductible for both private
and public corporations.
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Contracting differs from other businesses in that most of the
projects of public contractors extend over a period of several fiscal
years; also, the financial status of each project may not be evident
until it approaches completion, as early profits may be offset by
later losses and vice-versa. To cope with such peculiarities in
contracting, the system has allowed contractors to calculate profits
only on work that has exceeded the 50 percent complete stage and to
create temporary reserves to cope with future costs incurred in
finishing up these projects. Two types of such reserves are
encountered. One is for completed projects, where 5 percent of the
profits gained from a project are retained to cope with claims that
may arise during the guarantee period. First, these are deducted
from the second half of the Current Activities Statement, usually
under account #367, and any costs incurred on these projects form a
part of account #365, "previous year expense"; ultimately, when the
guarantee period ends, the 5 percent is added to the Current Activity
Statement under account $444, "income from previous years." The
second reserve, created for projects more than 50 percent complete,
retains a part of the profit realised on the project, equivalent to
the remaining percentage to be completed. However, the Unified
Accounting System does not have a special account for such allocation,
and so it is also lumped into account #367 of the Current Activities
Statement.
This treatment of projects is further complicated by the way the
system treated the costs and values of work performed during the year.
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In order to link the incurred costs of the Current Activities
Statement with those of the national economy, the system requires
that all costs figure in the statement. But in order to calculate
margins, only those costs relevant to work on which profits have
been calculated should be counted. The system has created for this
reason account $414, "changes in unfinished goods inventory." This
account is debited at the beginning of the period with the value of
work carried over, then credited at the end of the period with total
costs of work forwarded; the balance which is shown in the final
statement is either added to or subtracted from the current activity
income (#411). This procedure does not show the differences between
the cost of work carried over from the previous year and that
forwarded to the following year in relation to the total cost of work
being carried out during the year. Finally, account #411 should show
the value of work on which profits are calculated, but the system
reserved that account for the income from activities. In order to
arrive at the value of the former, the system has created an
intermediate account called "change in finished product inventory at
cost," which is treated similarly to account #414. Since most final
accounts do not show that intermediate account, the result is that
the Current Activities Statement does not reflect the value of work
executed during the current year as opposed to that carried over from
previous years and that forwarded to the following one.
These complications have made the task of evaluation of a firm's
performance somewhat difficult, as they do not afford direct compari-
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sons between the cost and value of work executed and that carried
over versus that forwarded in a certain fiscal year. Such comparisons
were more easily made under the old accounting customs in contracting,
which relied on a balance sheet to present such information and
where current assets included the costs of a piece of work and
current liabilities included the value of the same work, as well as
detailing the portion carried over from previous years, that executed
during the current year, generating profit, and that forwarded to the
following year.
These issues are even further complicated by requirements of the
system such a- inventory valuation and the depreciation of fixed
assets. The s stem requires that goods inventories be valued on the
basis of a floiting price calculated as follows:
item co-. = value of previous stock + added value of goodsquantity of balance + added quantity
Such a system, especially in contracting, where the quantities and
types of goods in inventory are very large and the warehouses
numerous and widely distribu ted, requires a rather large amount of
clerical work. The depreciation rules set by the system require that
all assets be depreciated on the basis of a constant balance depreci-
ation method. These should be calculated quarterly and each quarter's
share allocated depending on the use of the asset. The system also
indicated the economic life of the components comprising the assets,
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depending on the use of the asset itself. However, up to 1977 no
special depreciation ratio was set for every contracting activity,
since the uses of equipment are expected to differ from one type of
construction to the other. Also quarterly allocation of the depreci-
ation of fixed assets requires, besides keeping track of the hourly
use of each asset individually, vastly increased bookkeeping effort,
which may not sometimes be justifiable. The system, in trying to
take into consideration price inflation of fixed assets, has required
that firms set up allocations to offset these price increases; such
allocations are usually financed from the net profits of the firm
(see-Fiqure A-2) -and from the capital gains realized on sales of
fixed assets that are added to the reserves. Capital losses, on the
other hand, are deducted from net profits in account #364 in the
Current Activities Statement.
Such requirements are mandated on public sector firms when tax
regulations even allow private firms to use a simpler and sometimes
more advantageous system in reporting and recording their financial
position. As far as inventory valuation is concerned, the tax
office accepts inventory valuations based on fixed prive valuation
either on a first-in-first-out or last-in-first-out method. Such
methods, which require only that inventory be valued at the fixed
prive of either the first or last item stocked made the recording
less cumbersome. For depreciation the tax-office does allow firms to
use declining balance depreciation methods. Such methods tend to
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lower the reported income of firms in the early years of the assets'
economic life, thus reducing taxes during that period. The fact that
the Unified Accounting System does not allow such a possibility
imposes an extra burden on public firms and may even contribute to
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* Gross Margin Account: Value =
Account #44 - (Accounts 31 +
32 + 33 + 35)
__
Figure A-3







Current & Special transfers













Production at selling price
Work executed in sites
Production of workshops
Changes in unfinished goods inventory
Internally finished products
Scrap & Debris
Total Margin [Value = Account #41
- #53 - #63]














Profit and Loss Account
(Source: Ref. 42)




835 Current transfer expenses'









Price differential on spare parts
Price differential on inventories
Taxes
Delay fines
**** Net profit distribution
3% Nasser Social bank's share
5% Legal reserve
5% Reserve for government bonds















Net profit to be distri-
buted.
[Value = Account *** +
Acct. #44 - Acct. #33]
245
APPENDIX II -' Table II-1
Consolidated Balance Sheets of the 29 Companies Supervised
(Value in L.E. Millions)
(Source: Ref. 39)
29 Companies 3 Biggest 3 Speciality
1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975Name
by MOH from 1974 and 1975
8 Non-Building 15 Building
1974 1975 1974 1975
Total Fixed Assets 77.7
Depreciation (50.8)



























































































19.5 24.6 30.0 42.7
6.3 7.0 5.8 5.0
2.4 2.3 4.0 3.8
5.2 7.7 5.3 14.8
4.8 13.4 11.2 4.4
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5
5.4 3.6 6.2 5.0















28.2 37.1 13.4 17.6 0.9 1.0 5.6 7.3 8.3 11.2
23.8 29.4 11.9 16.0 0.6 0.8 6.1 13.3 5.2 (0.6)
40.6 50.0 14.8 19.3 1.1
1.3 1.9 0.6 0.5 0.1

















- - 0.6 1.2
0.2 0.2 6.7 4.2
10.4 14.3 15.3 19.6
10.0 11.8 8.8 9.9
17.7 25.6 31.3 47.1
2.0 3.4
5.8 8.1 61.4 86.0 91.3 111.8
NOTE: (1) Figures may not add up due to rounding.
(2) = negligible value
Account
Number
APPENDIX II - Table II-2
Consolidated Income Statements of 29 Companies Supervised by MOH for 1974 and 1975
Serial Account
Number Name
1 Value of Work Realizing Profit
2 Cost of Work
3 Margin from Operations )3-1-2)
4 Other Income
(including previous years income)
5 Total Gross Mart'" (5-3+4)
6 Administrative Costs
7 Income Before Taxes (7-5-6)
8 Taxes
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